1. 01 - Unveiling the Dynamics of Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare

COL Leon Holc, SVN (A); NATO MW COE Director

The recently concluded 5th NATO Mountain Warfare Congress touched on the critical aspects of mountain warfare, with a particular emphasis on the pivotal concept of vertical manoeuvre. The event brought together experienced lecturers and participants from various countries to delve deep into the dynamic field of mountain warfare, emphasizing the strategic importance of vertical manoeuvre in such challenging terrain.

Mountains have always posed unique challenges to military operations. The Congress aimed to shed light on the complexities and strategic significance of operating in rugged landscapes, highlighting the decisive role played by vertical manoeuvre. Lessons learned from mountain warfare underscore the need for specialized skills, adaptive strategies, and a profound understanding of the obstacles inherent in such environments.

At its core, the event aimed to underscore the complexity of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare, recognizing the advantages that high ground offers while acknowledging the formidable challenges it presents to military operations. Vertical manoeuvre embodies adaptability, resilience, and agility – attributes which are indispensable for success in such demanding landscapes.

Throughout the Congress, discussions revolved around the critical elements and integrated strategies required to effectively conduct vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare. The comprehensive dialogue covered the physical, logistical, strategic, and leadership dimensions, recognizing the dynamic nature of operations in mountainous terrain and the impact of vertical manoeuvre on mission success.

We delved into the principles of parachuting and paragliding in mountain environments, examined the force structures of mountain units, explored the significance of close air support based on experiences in Afghanistan, and analysed the strategic use of drones, especially in conflict scenarios such as the Russo‐Ukrainian war.

The scope of our discourse extended beyond tactical considerations to encompass critical aspects such as Combat Service Support (CSS) and Engineer (ENG) support, medical assistance, and the crucial roles played by helicopters and drones in supporting mountain warfare operations. The lessons learned provided us with invaluable insights, enhancing our collective understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented in mountain warfare.

The event provided a platform for diverse perspectives, expert insights, and collaborative discussions, fostering a deeper understanding of the complexities of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare. The participants engaged in robust dialogues, exchanged experiences, and shared expertise, collectively aiming to enhance their understanding of manoeuvring in challenging landscapes.

The four‐day Congress marked a significant milestone in the collective exploration of
mountain warfare and vertical manoeuvre. Lecturers from many different nations and organizations contributed their insights, expertise, and dedication to enriching the collective understanding of this specific land domain. The vibrant exchanges, diverse perspectives, and invaluable collaborations between mountain warfare experts, troop commanders, school leaders, academia and industry highlighted the depth of the discussions and the wealth of knowledge shared during the event.

The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

See the Power point Presentation of titled “support and cooperation with other COE in 2024”

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The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

2. 02 - Mastering the Art of Mountain Warfare: Navigating Challenges and Embracing Triumph

COL Italo Spini, ITA (A); NATO MW COE Deputy Director/COS

From a Mountain Warfare Chief of Staff Perspective, the Congress on vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare emerged as a pivotal and comprehensive gathering, bringing together a diverse array of experts and professionals. This assembly proved instrumental in delving into the unique challenges and potential opportunities that characterize military operations in mountainous terrain. Throughout the extensive presentations and nuanced discussions, a multitude of novel perspectives came to the fore, shedding light on the intricate nuances of tactics and strategies essential for achieving success in these complex environments.

At the heart of these deliberations was the pivotal role played by the Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MW COE). Acting as a nexus for endeavours aimed at standardizing procedures, the Centre is poised to address the prevailing diversity in approaches. It stands as a cornerstone for providing a unified and clear vision for the future of mountain warfare over the next two decades. By consolidating best practice and honing specialized training programmes, the Centre aims to foster a harmonized approach to mountain warfare, thereby enhancing interoperability among military forces engaged in such operations.

The Congress even served as a crucial forum for addressing not only the tactical and
strategic aspects, but also the intricate challenges posed by logistics in mountainous terrain. The discussions highlighted the unique logistical hurdles that military operations encounter in such environments, where rugged topography and extreme weather conditions add layers of complexity.


In this context, the MW COE emerges as an essential hub, not only for refining combat techniques but also for devising innovative logistical solutions. The need to standardize and optimize logistical procedures in mountain warfare was highlighted as a key priority. The MW COE, through collaborative efforts, seeks to develop streamlined logistical approaches that account for the demanding nature of mountainous terrain, ensuring the timely and efficient deployment of resources. These discussions, encompassing supply chain management, transportation, and resource allocation, contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted logistical demands associated with mountain warfare.

The Congress also presented a unique and invaluable opportunity to engage in high‐level discussions with commanders of NATO mountain units and leaders of military mountain schools. This collaborative dialogue not only facilitated the exchange of ideas but also played a pivotal role in fostering a comprehensive understanding of the diverse challenges faced by practitioners of mountain warfare.


In conclusion, the next Congress, entitled “Mountain Warfare in 2040”, represents an exciting challenge as we collectively chart a course towards the future, envisioning the landscape of mountain warfare two decades hence. The MW COE stands as a beacon, guiding the way towards standardized practices, collaborative knowledge exchange, and a unified vision that will undoubtedly shape the trajectory of mountain warfare for years to come.

3. 03 - Facts and Figures of the 5th NATO Mountain Warfare Congress

LTC Tomaž Pavlič SVN (A): MW COE

The NATO MW COE organized the 5th Mountain Warfare (MW) Congress, dedicated to Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare, from 2-6 October 2023, in Brdo, Slovenia.

The 5th MW Congress was part of a series of annual events organized under the auspices of the MW COE on topics related to mountain warfare. Encouraged by the success of the previous MW Congresses and positive feedback from the Community of Interest, the MW COE continued with these activities in 2023.

At this MW Congress more than 130 participants heard an ensemble of speakers ranging from mountain unit experts in vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare to military and civilian scientists. Real life cases presented different nations’ experiences of their preparation processes for mountain warfare. To open the Congress, COL Leon Holc, the Director of the MW COE, and LT GEN Ignazio Gamba, the Commander of the Alpine Troops Command, set its general frame and context; then speakers and experts from different nations and specified domains demonstrated both the military and civilian points of view, thus enabling the participants to reach their own conclusions on their responsibility in real military work as decision-makers.

The basic ambition of the Congress was to provide the Community of Interest with recognized deeper knowledge and real-life expertise in vertical manoeuvre. In addition, a short field exercise demonstrated the specific requirements of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare, such as different movement techniques in mountainous terrain and logistical support in such environment.

Participants

A total of 133 representatives from 2 non-NATO (Austria, Georgia) and 19 NATO countries (Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) participated in the Congress, representing different commands and units, MW training and civilian educational institutions, Centres of Excellence and mountaineering organizations. During the Congress the activities were conducted by 22 speakers, a moderator and more than 60 representatives from 28 companies as part of the Industry Day.

5th MW Congress speakers and presenters

Once again we had the excellent opportunity to listen to speakers who are top experts in their fields of work. We would like to express our great gratitude for their response and participation in the Congress. The knowledge and experience the speakers shared with the participants was of great value.

We introduce the speakers with great enthusiasm:

  1. LTC Dennis Jahn, DEU (A)
  2. LTC Miha Kuhar, SVN (A)
  3. Stefan Kurz, AUT
  4. COL Riccardo Peretto, ITA (A)
  5. 1st SGT Markus Geist, DEU (A)
  6. LTC Loic Desilles, FRA (A)
  7. LTC Davide Pascoli, ITA (A)
  8. MSG Tim Roggatz, DEU (A)
  9. MAJ David Würtz (DEU (A)
  10. Viktor Bikovs
  11. LTC Alessio Alfonso Iozzino, ITA (A)
  12. LTC Bernhard Adden, DEU (A)

 

13. LTC Klaus Rosenkranz, AUT (A)          14. LTC Holger POEPPE, DEU (A)                15. MAJ Ágnes Györfy, PhD, HUN             16. LTC Josef Hager, AUT (A)                     17. MAJ Mathias Sporer, AUT (A)             18. COL Tomislav Pušnik, HRV (Air)         19. Sebastian Maygruendter, ITA            20. Mario Schuler, AUT                                  21. LTC Igor BRINAR – SVN (A)                    22. LTC Petr Križ – CZE (A)

The participants came from 21 different countries: 19 NATO + 2 non-NATO

4. 04 - Vertical Manoeuvre link with ATP 3.2.1.3 Definition

 

 

 

LTC Dennis Jahn, DEU (A)

NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence

Head of the Doctrine and Standardization Branch

Military Mountain Guide

Email: dennis.jahn@mwcoe.org

Summary

The Doctrine and Standardization Branch (DSB) of the MW COE is responsible for creating NATO regulations in order to establish common knowledge about tactics, techniques and general procedures in Mountain Warfare (MW). At the MW Congress 2023 the DSB was responsible for organizing and conducting the theoretical (presentation) part. The participants were offered a very diverse programme on the topic of vertical manoeuvre; 22 speakers from 10 countries and 4 COEs contributed to the topic, divided into joint functions: manoeuvre, fire, and sustainment. This gave the participants a comprehensive overview of various different approaches to the topic of the Congress: “Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare”.

Background

As there is currently no official definition of vertical manoeuvre, it was the responsibility of the DSB to establish one, based on the available knowledge and experience.

The process of standardization is divided into three dimensions: Operational, Materiel and Administrative. One sub-topic within the administrative dimension is terminology. As we began to plan the Congress, our first question was: What does vertical manoeuvre mean? With this question the work for the DSB began.

We decided to divide the approach into three phases in order to find a definition for the term ‘vertical manoeuvre’.

First phase: Research: Maybe a definition already existed.

Second Phase: Brainstorming: If there was no definition, we had to create one.

Third Phase: Conclusion/Proposal

First, we checked the Official NATO Terminology Database on the NSO webpage for the term ‘vertical manoeuvre’. We are not giving away a secret when we say an official definition does not exist.

Next step: we only used the word vertical. There are many entries related to ‘vertical’, but none in connection with ‘manoeuvre’ or the mountainous environment. We began the next attempt with the word manoeuvre. First success: a definition exists which fits our topic. Manoeuvre: “Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”

Then we checked the topic-related Doctrines/STANAGS, e.g. AJP-3.2 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations” or ATP-3.2.1 “Conduct of Land Tactical Activities” for the term vertical manoeuvre. We also checked our mountain-related documents, the ATrainP-6 “Mountain Training and Education” and ATP-3.2.1.3 “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in the Mountainous Environment (Final Draft)”.

Result = no definition exists for the term vertical manoeuvre.

Next, we applied the same approach as to the NATO Terminology Database. First we checked the term vertical; there were some entries with the term vertical, but in the end they were not very helpful.

Then we scanned the doctrines for the term manoeuvre and came to the same result as before. Manoeuvre: “Employment of forces on the battlefield […]”. So we decided to retain the already existing definition for manoeuvre.

In the final step of the research phase we checked open sources for the term vertical manoeuvre. For the word manoeuvre the first challenge was the spelling: manoeuvre vs. maneuver; we checked both, but the result was the same. Most of the definitions are related to flight manoeuvre, aircraft performance or manoeuvre in general. For the term ‘vertical’, open sources provided the following definition: “vertical describes something that rises straight up from a horizontal line or plane”. However, the term ‘vertical’ is not necessarily limited to mountain terrain. The term is generally understood in relation to up and down movement in reference to a horizontal line.

With the definition of manoeuvre ‘in the backpack’, we moved on to Phase 2: Brainstorming. First, we wrote down all the terms related to the term ‘vertical’, with a focus on mountains, that came to mind. Then we did the same again for the terms ‘mountain’ and ‘mountainous environment’. The idea was to check whether the term ‘vertical’ is only related to mountains. Finally, we convinced ourselves that the term ‘vertical’ can be applied to various other environments, such as air, water, the urban environment, coastlines, and many more.

The term ‘vertical’ generally refers to deviations from a horizontal line upwards and downwards, regardless of the environment being considered. In the context of three-dimensional space, vertical refers to the up-and-down direction.

It does not matter at all whether it is mountainous terrain, a coastal region, a canyon or a city (urban environment); for movements up and down in these areas we face the same challenges: we must operate in difficult/extreme terrain. This means that specially trained forces with appropriate equipment are required. This does not only matter to land forces, it relates to all forces and services, for example air (helicopters), maritime (marines), logistics and so on.

If we now combine the definitions of ‘vertical’ and ‘manoeuvre’, this should result in a definition of ‘vertical manoeuvre’. We developed two options; the basis for both possibilities was the already exciting definition of “Manoeuvre”.

Taking into account all the other aspects mentioned earlier, we favoured the second option:

“Employment of forces in a mountainous environment or areas with significant changes in altitude through vertical movement (air, ground or even water) in combination with fire to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Vertical Manoeuvre requires specially trained forces with appropriate equipment.”

This or alternative proposals needed to be discussed further. To achieve this, we distributed a sheet with our proposals and ran a survey, meaning that we asked the participants to work on it.

Twenty-one Congress participants agreed with the proposed definition; five did not agree and submitted the following remarks:

  • Implement the difficult and extreme terrain according to ATrainP-6
  • Air, ground or even water = all domains
  • Difficult and extreme terrain (mountains, cliffs, urban…)
  • Is fire always necessary?
  • …or the potential of fire.

We subsequently analysed the results of the survey and used them as a basis for further discussion. Taking into account the insights from the research and brainstorming phases, as well as the survey, we decided on the following definition:

Definition of Vertical Manoeuvre

“Employment of forces in difficult and extreme terrain through vertical movement with a main focus on the domains Land, Air and Maritime in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Vertical Manoeuvre requires specially trained forces with adequate equipment.” 

How does it proceed?

The Doctrine and Standardization Branch of the NATO MWCOE continues to invest its efforts in the area of terminology development, in particular in the building of mountain warfare standards and doctrines, which are the basis of interoperability within mountain warfare capabilities.

Next year, we are planning to conduct a workshop on the topic of terminology, where the definition of ‘vertical manoeuvre’ will be a subject. Finally, we will submit a definition of ‘vertical manoeuvre’ to the Senior Land Terminology Panel in the hope that it will be confirmed and incorporated into the NATO Standardization Office database.

References:

  • Allied Joint Publication (AJP) – 3.2 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations”
  • Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) – 3.2.1 “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations”
  • ATP- 3.2.1.1 “Conduct of Land Tactical Activities”
  • ATP- 3.2.1.2 “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in an Urban Environment”
  • ATP- 3.2.1.3 “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in a Mountainous Environment”
  • Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-6 “Mountain Warfare – Training and Education”
  • Mountain Warfare Concept 0.9 (Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept)
  • NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence Publications: “Knowledge and Principles of Warfare in a Mountainous Environment”, “Physical and Psychological Performance of Mountain Warfare Soldiers”
  • NATO Terminology Database
  • Open sources: Oxford Reference, Wikipedia, Cambridge Dictionary, Vocabulary.com, Britannica.com, Dictionary.com

5. 05 - Vertical Manoeuvre link with MW Concept 0.9

LTC Miha
Kuhar, SVN (A)

NATO
Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence

Head of
the Concept Development and Experimentation Branch

LTC Miha Kuhar (Slovenian Armed Forces) is currently posted to the MW COE as Head of the Concept Development and Experimentation Branch. For more than 25 years he has carried out various tactical duties in mountain units and at the Mountain School of the Slovenian Armed Forces. He has spent a few years in peacekeeping operations and missions abroad. He disseminates his vast experience and knowledge as a lecturer, instructor, publicist and screenwriter of mountain education films.

Email: miha.kuhar@mwcoe.org

Summary

The aim of this article is to explain vertical manoeuvre in a mountainous environment from the perspective of the Mountain Warfare Concept. In November 2022, the MW COE completed the final draft of the NATO Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept (MWCC), and in February 2023 it was signed by COS SHAPE and COS HQ SACT. The aim of the MWCC is to unify the understanding of the importance of the mountain environment from a military point of view, and to set guidelines for how NATO land forces will function in the mountains under the combined arms approach and as part of joint forces. The purpose of the MWCC is to:

  1. Address the mountainous environment and its military implications;
  2. Describe the characteristics and abilities of MW;
  3. Formulate the capabilities and requirements of MW;
  4. Recommend actions to implement these capabilities;
  5. Develop a framework for future MW considerations.

Introduction

First, let us look at the definitions of three words related to the word vertical: mountainous terrain, cliff and gorge. According to the ATrainP-6 definition, the main characteristic of mountainous terrain is a slope inclination of more than 15 degrees.

In the Oxford Dictionary a cliff is defined as a high area of rock with very steep sides,  and a gorge is a deep, narrow valley with steep sides. In all three terms it is clear that we are talking about the third dimension, even if that vertical dimension is not explicitly mentioned.

In connection to the vertical dimension, the MWCC distinguishes between the air-ground and ground dimensions. In a mountainous environment mobility is limited, and manoeuvrability, firepower and ground forces must be reinforced by air support, artillery, air defence, MILENG and extra logistical support. In this case vertical manoeuvre is an important support element to the ground forces. For land forces, mountains are basically a natural barrier with a vertical dimension, which require specially trained and equipped units. The air-ground dimension is the relation between the two services. We understand the vertical ground dimension more as a natural obstacle and barrier.

In the MWCC the vertical dimension is mentioned in Annex A – Mountain Warfare Capabilities and Requirements. There is a requirement that land forces in the mountainous environment are:

“Capable of movement and manoeuvre in mountainous and compartmentalized terrain in all weather conditions and snow-covered terrain including the provision of MILENG support to mobility, counter mobility and survivability. This capability requires all-terrain and all-weather mobility including the execution of vertical manoeuvre. The integration of the third dimension of vertical manoeuvre will be crucial to ensure mobility and manoeuvrability in the mountains. By using the vertical manoeuvre of ground forces, combat and logistic support provided through the vertical manoeuvre will increase the combat power of ground forces.”

Air/Land Domain Intersection

Establishing air superiority is the first and most important effect that airpower provides for the land domain and overall joint force. Air domain control is a prerequisite to enabling the ground scheme of manoeuvre. Once access to the land domain has been achieved, precision fires are an essential element for achieving a joint force commander’s manoeuvre objectives. Joint airpower assets have the capability of directly attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity. If the centre of gravity is an enemy land formation, air and land assets can work to destroy it. In addition, air power’s flexibility makes it easier to attack soft targets to achieve follow-on effects in other domains.

Multi-Domain Operation in the Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan from September to November 2020. Retired US Colonel John Antal wrote in his book, “7 Seconds to Die”, that the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was the first war decided by autonomous weapons, and was a multi-domain operation. In this war, Azerbaijan dominated land, air, cyber, and space. Armenia quickly lost air domain; they fought in the land and cyber domains, but never dominated a single domain. Azerbaijan commanded the land, air, space, and cyber domains for decisive moments during the first two weeks of the fighting to degrade Armenian air defences, and this gave Azerbaijan air superiority over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the first phase of the operation, Azerbaijan focused on the disintegration of key Armenian networks and systems, primarily by flying robotic combat systems – unmanned arial systems (UASs), loitering munitions (LMs), and ISR unmanned arial systems. On the morning of September 27, the Armenian side lost 50% of its anti-aircraft forces and 40% of its artillery in 15 minutes.

The 2nd phase in the Azerbaijani plan was to find, fix, track and destroy targets within the AOR. In this new war Azerbaijani executed a “deep battle” with a new concept –robotic systems to attack Armenian positions everywhere in the AOR. The first two phases established the decisive conditions for the final ground mountain operation, and top attack was the decisive method of engagement.

The MWCC pointed out that “the use of Unmanned Air/Ground Vehicles (UAV/UGV) will bring a new functional approach to operating in the mountains. In particular, their use allows access to unreachable areas, improves persistent surveillance, endurance communications coverage and the extent of a communication range, contributes to the coordination of fire support and ensures cheaper automated logistics deliveries”.

However, in the mountainous environment there is a significant weather and climate impact on military operations. The matrix below simulates how weather affects winter operations in mountains in a multi-domain environment. On the one hand, weather can be an obstacle to operations, but on the other it can be also an opportunity for camouflage and masking.

Conclusion

One of the options to ensure the ability to manoeuvre decisively against enemy multi-domain effects is to amass superior manoeuvre capabilities. In defence, air-mobile tactics can help commanders limit the tactical risk by enabling friendly force dispersion until offensive capability is required. When offensive capability is needed, air-mobile forces can mass rapidly and cross the harsh impassable mountainous terrain, to penetrate enemy lines in the third dimension with fewer natural obstacles than land forces on the ground. Dispersion, fast concentration, and rapid power projection across vast distances are the advantages that define air mobility and vertical manoeuvre.

The ability to see, decide, and engage in multiple domains, and dominate the ones that matter during decisive periods, is the essence of warfare in the 21st century. Operating in all domains does not guarantee success, but it provides significant advantages. Cross-domain manoeuvre along the five domains provides the concentration of power on the adversary’s centre of gravity.

Sources:

  • MW COE, Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept, NOV 2022
  • NATO, AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, FEB 2022
  • NATO, AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, FEB 2022
  • NATO, ATP-3.2.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Operations, FEB 2022
  • Antal J., 7 Seconds to Die, Casemate Publisher, 2022
  • NATO, AAP 06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2021
  • NATO, AtrainP-6 Mountain Warfare Education and Training, Edition A, Version 1, NOV 2020
  • Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2000

6. 06 - Vertical Manoeuvre from a historicalpoint of view

MMag. Stefan Kurz,

AUTResearch Assistant to the DirectorMuseum of Military History 

Military History Institute, ViennaEmail: s.kurz@hgm.at

Stefan Kurz studied history and political science at the University of Vienna. He was a reserve officer (air defence) in the Austrian Armed Forces; since 2015, research assistant at the Museum of Military History – Military History Institute, Vienna; since 2020, provenance researcher of the museum and member of the Austrian Commission of Provenance Research; co-curator of several exhibitions. His research focus is the Austro-Hungarian armed forces up to 1918 and the Austrian Armed Forces of the First Republic (1918-1938), military diplomacy, museum history and provenance research.

Summary

After a brief overview of warfare in the mountains, the author discussed the emergence of specialized mountain troops in the second half of the 19th century, and then gave an insight into the mountain warfare of the First World War on the Italian front. The fighting in the western section of the front in South Tyrol was examined in more detail using several case studies. Based on these combat examples, historical lessons were derived that to a certain degree can still be relevant to military operations in high mountain terrain today.

Historical Evolution of Vertical Manoeuvre Capabilities/Mountain Warfare Mountain Warfare in History

The late director of the Austro-Hungarian War Archives and military writer, Major General Emil Woinovich, stated, in a study guide for the Austro-Hungarian general staff training published in 1901, that “high mountain areas and heavily forested low mountain ranges are not suitable for major warfare“. This viewpoint had a long tradition and was still widespread in military circles up to the First World War. In fact, there were practically no extended military operations in high mountains until the First World War. Where special alpine achievements in the history of warfare were claimed, it was mainly mountain crossings that were meant. This is true for famous military operations in mountainous terrain such as the crossing of the Hindu Kush by Alexander the Great, the crossing of the Alps by Hannibal in 218 BC, the crossing of the Lessinian Alps by the Imperial Commander Prince Eugene in 1701, and the operations in Switzerland under the command of the Russian general Suvorov in 1799 or Napoleon in 1800. The movements were largely confined to existing roads and paths, and fighting took place primarily in the passes and valleys. Extensive fighting in the mountain terrain itself did not occur away from the roads and valleys.

However, the second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of permanent specialized mountain troops. This development originated in Italy. It was here that the Italian government first established mountain troops in 1872 – the famous Alpini. As the formations were recruited territorially in the mountain regions of northern Italy, they were originally supposed to protect the mountain passes. In the following years, however, they were greatly expanded. The number of companies grew to 78 before 1914. After mobilization, in May 1915, there were as many as 179 companies in 52 battalions. From 1874 onwards, this force had its own mountain artillery, and at the end of the 19th century, the first ski training began. The original focus of the Alpini was initially the border with France, and only later the passes to the Habsburg Monarchy. Accordingly, France followed suit with the formation of its own mountain troops, the “Chausseurs Alpins” in 1888, which had reached the size of 20 battalions by 1912. Italy and France thus clearly played a pioneering role in the creation of dedicated mountain troops.

Mountain Troops in the Habsburg Monarchy

In contrast, the development in the Habsburg Monarchy, which had undoubtedly the highest share of mountains of the European great powers, appears surprisingly delayed. There had been formations of the non-standing army recruited from mountain regions since the 16th century, whose members therefore had a familiarity with the mountains. But even the famous Tyrolean Kaiserjäger regiment, which was permanently established in 1813, were no mountain troops and had no in-depth mountain training or mountain equipment.

In 1863, a mountain artillery regiment was formed for the first time. The first steps towards forming infantry troops capable of mountain combat were taken in the 1870s in connection with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian troops were confronted with mountainous and impassable terrain. Based on the experience gained, so-called mountain brigades were created, which had some special features and were supposed to take into account the mountainous terrain in terms of equipment and organization.

The mountain brigades were large units that, similar to modern brigades, were capable of independent combat of combined arms, taking into account that in difficult terrain the connection with the higher command levels and other units could be impaired. Each of these brigades had only five battalions, unlike outside the usual regimental framework of the time. In addition, there were two mountain batteries each, which had special mountain artillery material that could be loaded on pack animals. Liaison elements were also particularly strong, with field telephones, telegraph, and optical signalling equipment available. Mountain radio stations were only being tested on the eve of the First World War. The mountain brigades also had their own engineer companies and more extensive medical equipment than was usual for infantry brigades. The equipment was also better at the supply level. For transport, the mountain brigades relied on pack animals instead of horses and carts.

However, these mountain brigades had no high-altitude training and no winter mountain training or equipment. The soldiers’ personal equipment did not differ from that of other soldiers. They were therefore not mountain combat brigades in the modern sense. Although skiing and winter mountaineering training was introduced informally into the Austro-Hungarian Army at the end of the 19th century, it was not until 1906 that it established real mountain troops, when three mountain regiments were initially formed within the framework of the Imperial-Royal Landwehr.

These were two Tyrolean “Landesschützenregimenter” (“Kaiserschützenregimenter” from 1917 onwards) and the Carinthian Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 4 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 1 from 1917 onwards). In 1909 a third “Landesschützenregiment” was added, and in 1911 in Ljubljana the Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 27 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 2 from 1917 onwards) was established, which was recruited mainly from Slovenes.

In the training of the new mountain troops, great importance was attached to the independence of the companies. In peacetime, the companies were garrisoned in their intended areas of operation and carried out intensive and realistic training. Specialized mountain training included climbing, ice and skiing courses. Civil high alpinists often acted as instructors, and only officers with a private passion for the mountains were assigned. Individual equipment met the most modern standards of the time. As with the mountain brigades, transport and supply were based on pack animals, and while the Landesschützenregimenter had no artillery at regimental level, the individual battalions were equipped with MGs from 1907. They were thus more powerful than entire infantry regiments of the regular troops. The total number of these genuine mountain troops, regardless of their quality, was 16 battalions in 1914, only about a third as large as that of Italy.

Mountain Warfare on the Italian Front in the First World War

The First World War was the first war in world history in which large-scale operations took place in mountain terrain, and in which real front lines in the high mountains were established and maintained permanently. All in all, the mountain warfare fronts reached a total length of 9,700 km; not only on the Italian front in Tyrol, Carinthia and the Karst region, but also in the Carpathians, in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Caucasus, Persia, Asia Minor and the Vosges. For the first time, fighting took place over longer periods of time in snow up to 10 m high, in cold temperatures ranging from -10 to -46 degrees, and at altitudes of up to 4,000 metres. This was most pronounced on the Austro-Hungarian South-Western front – the Italian front.

The Italian Front stretched over approximately 650 km and was characterized by particularly mountainous terrain. This ranged from 3,900 m high positions in the Ortler Group in the west of South Tyrol to the Kolovrat Ridge and Monte Sabotino on the edge of the Gorizia Basin. Although the Italian centre of attack was near Gorizia and in the Karst, the highest and most inhospitable mountain regions also quickly became a combat zone. Mountain warfare was especially extensive on the front in South Tyrol and Trentino. Here the Tyrolean Defence Command had to defend about 350 km of front line.

Only gradually did continuous positions emerge in the high mountains, even if in some places it continued to be the case that only individual peaks and positions were occupied. Often the forces of nature remained the greatest challenge and threat. Two-thirds of all casualties were caused by the environmental conditions. The soldiers not only had to contend with difficult terrain, but also with snow and extreme temperatures from October up to April or May. Sickness, frostbite, malnutrition, dysentery, falling rocks and falls from heights all caused casualties.

During the winter months, more soldiers were killed by avalanches than by enemy action. The number of avalanche deaths on both sides over the course of the war is still contested; the numbers given range from 10,000 to 80,000 killed. However, in the Austro-Hungarian army alone, more than 350 incidents with fatalities were registered, and in the first two of the three wartime winters the Austro-Hungarian army lost 4,529 soldiers due to avalanches on the Italian front. The “catastrophic winter” of 1916/17 was particularly hard. The number of Austro-Hungarian avalanche deaths was almost 3,300. In total 35,000 men are said to have been lost on the Austro-Hungarian side during the winter months due to weather and environmental influences such as avalanches, exhaustion and frostbite.

Caverns and tunnels were an important element of warfare in the high mountains, especially in those areas that were visible to the enemy. Tunnels were dug for different purposes – fighting tunnels, supply tunnels and accommodation tunnels. In the Adamello-Presanella group, for example, 24 km of underground tunnels were dug on the Austro-Hungarian side. On the Marmolata, based on an idea of Ingenieur Leo Heindl, the famous ‘ice city’ was built, a battalion camp of caverns and tunnels completely dug into the glacier with a total length of 10 km. It offered protection from shelling and the weather and ensured constant temperatures.

Despite great alpine achievements and successful attacks in detail, neither side was able to achieve operationally effective breakthroughs, as the terrain and fortifications made it possible to quickly reestablish an effective defence after abandoning a position. Both sides therefore attempted to collapse enemy positions by using mines. Thirty-three such actions are known; sometimes they buried hundreds of soldiers at once.

Because of these arduous conditions and the bitter winter, the time window for military operations of a larger extent was limited to a few months. However, real mass battles were fought in the high mountains as well, for example on Monte Ortigara where 22,000 Italians and 9,000 soldiers from Austria-Hungary were killed or wounded in June 1917. These battles were by no means only fought by proper mountain troops. Soldiers from all regions of the Habsburg Monarchy were deployed in the mountains.

A special challenge was the supply of the troops in the high mountains. This had to be carried out by pack animals and porters. On the Austro-Hungarian side, Russian or Serbian prisoners of war were often used as porters. Because of the lack of pack animals, the Austro-Hungarian forces also intensified the use of cable cars as a means of transport. By autumn 1918, 1,735km of cableways had been built by the Austro-Hungarian army.

For the soldiers, in any case, deployment in the high mountains often meant that they not only had to endure severe cold, but also that rations often failed to arrive or arrived only cold, and that amenities such as newspapers or field post only occasionally made it to the more remote positions. Despite the lower intensity of fighting than on the Isonzo, the battles in the mountains also cost the lives of about 150,000 to 180,000 Italian and Austro-Hungarian soldiers during the course of the war.

In general the theatre of operations of warfare in the high mountains was – according to the famous alpinist Herman Czant – characterized by four features: scarcity of resources, a small number of paths, difficulty of movement, and unexpected occurrence of severe natural events.

Warfare in the high mountains therefore exhibited the following features:

  1. Whoever took a summit position first could rarely be driven away from it.
  2. There was only a small period of time during which weather or snow conditions made it possible to carry out combat activities on a larger scale. From September onwards, the onset of winter was to be expected.
  3. Attacks were more effective in bad weather, so that the opponents could be approached as invisibly as possible.
  4. Attacks were often conducted through rock and ice walls, while enemy crews were held down by supporting fire. This was followed by hand-to-hand combat at close range and by all possible means.
  5. Repairs, and the construction and extension of positions and connections of all kinds – paths, cableways, and telephone lines – were mostly carried out during the summer.
  6. From September to May, the focus was on the struggle for survival, especially against masses of snow. Constant shovelling of the access routes was necessary to avoid burial. When the connection with cable cars and field telephones broke down, supply was particularly demanding.
  7. If a position was abandoned in winter, the enemy could occupy it as soon as the weather improved, because of the proximity of the enemy positions in the mountains.

The Symmetry of Mountain Warfare and the Difficulty of Operational Significance: Examples of Engagements and Combat in the Ortler Region

The western parts of the mountain fronts of Tyrol and Trentino, which were considered to be of secondary importance from a military point of view, were of particular significance from an alpinist perspective. Here were the highest combat fronts of mankind, with mountain ridges of 3,000-4,000 metres above sea level. Here was the longest ropeway of mountain warfare, with 20 kilometres as the crow flies between Carisolo and the Caré alto, and here were the highest altitude battles and the most extensive glacier battles in spatial and temporal terms. Even more than in other regions, a particular challenge was coping with the special environmental conditions. 

The use of troops trained and equipped for high mountain operations on both sides often meant that a tactical advantage gained through a single successful action was quickly offset by an equivalent reaction. The result was a constellation of symmetry which caused the fronts to stabilize and solidify, and which could only be overcome temporarily. This was evident, for example, around the Ortler. Its summit was occupied for the first time by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1916, namely by the High Mountain Company No. 30, which was mainly composed of Kaiserschützen.  From the summer of 1916, a permanent position existed on the summit of the Ortler, which also became the highest position of the World War and was equipped with field telephone lines and a three-week emergency supply. At the same time, the first two guns, two old mountain M.99 guns without recoil buffers, were brought up to an Ortler pre-summit at 3864 m, which thus became the highest artillery position of WWI. The Italians responded by occupying the Trafoier Eiswand (Cima di Trafoi), the Thurwieser and Ortler passes, and by extending the position on the Hochjochgrat. They also brought a machine gun into position on the Thurwieserspitze (Punta Thurwieser), which threatened the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Kleineiskogel (Cima della Vedretta Piccola). The Ortler guns then took up the fight against this MG and successfully knocked it out. The conquest of the Cima di Trafoi by the Italians was thus an outstanding military and alpine achievement, but operationally it could not be exploited to its full extent.

The events around the Königsspitze (Gran Zebru) were similarly dialectical and symmetrical. The Italian army prepared an attack on the 3851 m high peak, as it was in a strategically important position from which the supply routes of the Ortler front could be observed. The Austro-Hungarian troops therefore reinforced the garrison on the Königsspitze and extended the positions on the Königsjoch (Passo della Bottiglia) in front. The Italians worked their way up to these, with the two forces facing each other at 150 m and machine guns from both sides controlling the intermediate terrain between the positions. Despite constant fighting, neither side managed to gain sufficient superiority to turn the situation in its own favour until the end of the war.

Both armies therefore tried to introduce new combat methods to break the symmetry. While on other fronts in Tyrol tunnels were dug under enemy-occupied peaks and summits in order to bring them down with mines, on the Ortler front ‘attack’ tunnels were increasingly built. This was the case for the first time during the attack on the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo). The plan for this came from the creator of the ‘ice city’ under the Marmolata, Leo Handl. Construction began in October 1916. The crews each spent six days digging before they were relieved. They worked in extreme temperatures and poor air conditions and had hardly any natural light during the six-day period. The work continued until March 1917, when the construction of a second tunnel began. Before this was even finished, the Italians had become aware of the work and began to advance into the first tunnel. It was only by chance that this was recognized by the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, who reacted immediately and without hesitation attacked the Italian soldiers. Via a niche in the snow tunnel, the Tyroleans were able to dig a second tunnel exit with their bare hands and take the surprised Alpini in the back, thus capturing the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo).

When the three factors of weather, surprise and coordination of the attacking elements were fulfilled, both sides were repeatedly able to achieve limited success despite the symmetry. A good example of this is the conquest and recapture of Punta San Matteo. With simultaneous attacks in the Adamello group, at the Tonale Pass and in the Southern Ortles group against the Punta San Matteo, the Italian army tried to achieve the conditions for a breakthrough against the Val di Sole and Val di Non, and subsequently the Adige Valley, beginning on 12 August 1918. During the night of 13 August 1918, heavy snowstorms raged, and the Austro-Hungarian mountain troops and mountain guides felt that an enemy attack was impossible in these conditions. Nevertheless, around 100 Alpini, under Captain Aldo Berni, attacked the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Punta San Matteo from the Gaviapass and the Dosegú glacier between 1am and 2am, silently taking the field guards by surprise and holding down the entire garrison of High Mountain Company 21 with hand grenades in their caverns. Subsequently, the daring Alpini advanced along the ridge and also managed to capture Monte Mantello and Villacorno.

An immediate counterattack was not possible for the Austro-Hungarian troops, due to the weather conditions and lack of resources. The positions taken at Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello had an essential function in the Southern Ortles Group. If they were captured by Italian troops, they allowed sight into the Val Monte and thus also the shelling of the supply routes there. In addition, an attack on Monte Giumella, the last support of the Austro-Hungarian position in the Southern Ortles, was imminent. If this peak also fell, the position on the Tonale was under threat from the rear. There was thus an acute need for action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian army. For the recapture, the Imperial and Royal 22nd Rifle Division provided the 3rd Company, and the half MG Company of the Assault Battalion 22 came from the Imperial and Royal 44th Rifle Brigade. It took about 14 days to assemble the necessary forces. The commander of the High Mountain Company No. 30, Captain Luis Molterer, who had already been responsible for the occupation of the Ortler in 1916, was tasked with working out ‘Operation Chamois’.

The goal was the recapture of Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello. Captain Molterer had highly specialized and powerful troops at his disposal. The core was formed by the 3rd Company of Assault Battalion 22, composed of Kaiserschützen. These assault troops (Sturmtruppen) were excellently trained elite troops, specializing in close combat with hand grenades, highly motivated and exceptionally physically capable. Further elements came from the 21st and 30th High Mountain Companies and the Mountain Guide Company 2. A total of 150 men with ten machine guns were planned for the attack itself. In a second wave to secure the captured positions, Mountain Guide Company 11 and the remaining elements of Mountain Guide Company 2, High Mountain Company 21 and High Mountain Company 30, the Mountain Canon Battery on the Giumella and machine guns were provided. Plunging artillery fire was to provide the combat support element. For this purpose, a 30.5 cm M.16 mortar and 28 howitzers with 22,000 rounds were assembled. Communication was to be ensured by carrier pigeons, telephone, radio, light signals, flares and detectors. An ice cavern on the Giumella was set up as the attack start position, and all reinforcement and supply activities for the attack were carried out at night.

The attack formation was divided into two groups under the command of Kaiserjäger First Lieutenant Franz Tabarelli of Assault Battalion 22: one group was deployed under Tabarelli against Punta San Matteo, and the second under First Lieutenant Wilhelm Lička was to recapture Monte Mantello. Each of these groups had an assault platoon, a platoon of a high mountain company, and a heavy MG half platoon. The 1st Group also had a light MG half platoon, while the 2nd Group had a mountain guide patrol. Six heavy machine guns on the Corni Del Morto ridge were to support the attack. Meanwhile, on the Italian side, 57 guns were available in the area, which suggested an Italian intention to attack.

Bad weather and snowfall delayed the start of the attack for several days. After the weather had improved on 3 September 1918, the attack began in such a way that the infantry forces could advance at dusk and the defence in the newly won positions could take place at nightfall. A one-hour artillery preparation was to begin at 6 pm. The 30.5 cm mortar scored a direct hit on the enemy position. The intensity of the artillery fire is said to have lowered the summit of Punta San Matteo by 6 metres. The 1st Group evaded the Italian artillery barrage with shrapnel over the northern slope.  Fog favoured the approach. After about half an hour, Punta San Matteo was captured and 50 prisoners brought in. Only ten minutes later, massive Italian drumfire began on Punta San Matteo, but there was no counterattack.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Group, under First Lieutenant Lička, had to advance against Monte Mantello on the most difficult terrain. According to the order, this had to be done over the summit of Punta San Matteo and past the 1st Group.  Lička, however, when already on the way to the Punta San Matteo, ordered a swing away onto the ice wall of the Matteo south face, since enemy artillery fire was particularly heavy on the west ridge of Punta San Matteo. There it was difficult to find cover or avoid the fire. The ice wall had an inclination of 50 degrees over a width of 500-600 metres. The brigade’s official alpine advisor had stated that it was completely hopeless to proceed via this route; First Lieutenant Lička nonetheless took the decision on his own responsibility. The mountain guides of the group had to beat a total of 600 ice steps for the subsequent troops. This work took about 50 minutes, while forward movement stalled in the middle of the technically difficult ice wall.

In the meantime, the 1st Group had taken Punta San Matteo and counterfire began. The resulting rockfalls hit the 2nd Group, killing numerous soldiers, including the MG half platoon and the medical squad, and thus critical assets. The time schedule could no longer be kept, and the supporting artillery fire had to be extended by 30 minutes. The mountain guide squad penetrated the enemy position first and took an unoccupied MG. The support of two MGs from Punta San Matteo and the well-placed artillery fire finally enabled the assault soldiers and high-altitude soldiers to take the summit of Monte Mantello in close combat. By 20:30, Monte Mantello was taken.

Essential to the success of the attack was the obstruction of the Italian artillery observers’ vision by fog, and the surprise caused by the approach over the Matteo south face, which was considered impassable. The decisive factor was the coincidence that the Italian crew of the MG on the south slope had not manned their gun and did not recognize the approach. Otherwise, the entire 2nd Group could have been wiped out in the middle of the ice wall during their difficult advance. Another important factor was the support provided by the well-placed plunging fire. Advantageous weather conditions and the associated surprise effect, as well as good coordination with the artillery and between the attacking units, and great speed were thus decisive for the success of this and many other high-alpine attack actions.

The implication of this tactical success at the operational level lay in the prevention of far-reaching operational possibilities in the event of an Italian success. This again showed how difficult it was to exploit individual tactical successes at the operational level, and how much the defensive was favoured in the high mountains.

Conclusion Lessons from Mountain Warfare in the First World War

The necessarily sketchy discussion of mountain warfare in the First World War in general and on the Western Front of South-Tyrol and Trentino in particular in this article suggest some observations that could be considered as historical lessons that still hold some value for contemporary operations and manoeuvre in the mountains:

  • Implications of terrain and weather for the supply of troops: Harsh weather and adverse environmental conditions in the high mountains, difficult movement, and the early onset of winter made it necessary to exploit the short season of milder weather for the resupply of troops and the establishment of depots. Precautionary measures were necessary to enable the permanent occupation of positions even when supply lines were interrupted, which could not be avoided. All technical means available (such as special equipment for individual soldiers, cable cars, drilling machines etc.) had to be utilized and employed.
  • Effects of terrain on C3I: Difficult movement, the regular breakdown of communication, and impeded lines of sight due to the terrain meant that every dimension of C3I was more difficult to implement than in lower lying areas.
  • Increased responsibilities and capacities at lower levels of the hierarchy: The implications of terrain on C3I meant that lower levels of the military hierarchy – especially lieutenants and captains – had to assume more responsibility and self-reliance. It also meant that battalions, companies and improvised battle groups needed more means in terms of communication, fire support and supply than was otherwise customary at the time.
  • Significance of peaks in positional warfare: Once a peak was taken it was hard to drive the defenders from it. Peaks also often meant the control of valleys, since they allowed for sight and therefore the direction of artillery fire.
  • Advantages for the defenders (especially at the operational level): The difficulty of movement and C3I in mountainous terrain supported defence, and therefore it was easier to re-establish effective defensive positions once driven from another line of defence.
  • Prospects for the success of offensive action depended on surprise, speed and fire support: The strength of the defence in mountainous terrain and the advantages of positions on peaks made the skilful combinations of all three factors mandatory if an attack was to be successful.
  • Need for widespread dissemination of mountain warfare skills beyond specialized troops: Even in the high mountains, warfighting could not rely solely on specialized alpine troops. In order to achieve success not only at a narrow tactical level but at an operationally significant scale, forces had also to be involved which were not specialized mountain troops (such as in the Austro-Hungarian offensive ‘Avalanche’ in June 1918). Basic mountaineering skills had therefore to be disseminated beyond specialized troops.

7. 07 - Principles of parachuting in mountainous environments

1st SGT Markus Geist, DEU (A)

German Airborne School

Military Freefall Instructor

Alpine Army Specialist

Email: markus1geist@bundeswehr.org

Background

This presentation was designed to give a basic overview of airborne operations in a mountainous environment.

The presentation was intended to answer the following questions:

  • Which units are designated to paradrop in a mountainous environment? (Structure and particularities)
  • What are the challenges to paradrop in a mountainous environment? (weather, terrain, altitude)
  • What kind of training is required? (duration, structure)

If possible, I was asked to conclude the presentation with experiences (lessons learned) from exercises.

I therefore structured my presentation as follows:

  • Units designated for airborne operations in a mountainous environment;
  • Basics of airborne operations;
  • Challenges of airborne operations in a mountainous environment;
  • Training required;

Units designated for Airborne Operations in a mountainous environment

The units that can be designated for airborne operations in a mountainous environment must be defined by each nation. At present, in Germany, we have the following state of affairs:

  • Special Forces (Army / Navy / Airforce)
  • Long Range Reconnaissance
  • Airborne Troopers (Pathfinders / JTACs)
  • Mountain Troopers (Parts of: High Alpine (Reconnaissance) Platoon / Mountain Leader Teams / JTACs)

The requirement for units to be trained for airborne operations is constantly discussed and adjusted according to the current tactical and operational needs.

Basics of Airborne Operations

Airborne Operations can be divided into ‘static line’ and ‘freefall’ operations. Both can be conducted in daytime and at night.

In static line operations the parachutes are mostly round, not controllable, and are always released by a static line.

In freefall operations the canopies are rectangular, controllable, and are released by the jumper.

Freefall operations are again divided into Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) High Altitude High Opening (HAHO), High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) and Low Level (not included in the presentation, due to lack of time).

High altitude is defined as an altitude greater than flight level 120 (STANAG 7056), and it may be necessary for oxygen equipment to be used to prevent hypoxia and decompression sickness.

The main difference between the HAHO and HALO procedures is the duration of the freefall phase. In HAHO operations the parachute is opened shortly after exiting the aircraft, in contrast to a lower opening altitude in a HALO procedure.

Low level is a procedure where the aircraft approaches in proximity flight, pops up to exit altitude, drops the jumpers and dives off again.

Challenges of Airborne Operations in mountainous environment

For static line operations, the main challenge in mountainous terrain may be to find a suitable dropzone. In addition, the descent rate of the canopies increases with the elevation of the dropzone, and therefore the risk of jumpers getting hurt also increases.

Normally the mission planner is responsible for the calculation of the droppoint of the jumpers; the glide ratio, depending on wind data; the main heading; the setting of the automatic activation device (a device which releases the reserve canopy at a certain height above ground level, in case the jumper has passed out); and so on. A mountainous environment definitely makes these calculations a bigger challenge.

Since the jumpers must stabilize their freefall with all the equipment they have to bring to the ground, a high level of training in freefall is required, due to the bulky alpine equipment (especially skis).

The size of the Landing Zones can require single approaches by each jumper

In general, freefall jumpers can land in much smaller landing zones than static line jumpers, due to their controllable canopies. Normally freefall jumpers try to land in a team in close formation, following the team leader. In mountainous, and especially in high alpine terrain, the landing zones can be very small, and it may be safer if each jumper conducts a single approach, which requires a higher level of accuracy from the troopers.

Unpredictable wind conditions

In a mountainous environment, you may find cliffs, boulders and other obstacles in close proximity to the landing zone. These can cause local leeward, windward or thermal conditions that can change very rapidly and may make a quite easy landing zone a very difficult one for parachutists.

 

Training required

There are no rules as to what extent soldiers must be trained before jumping into a mountainous environment. However, it takes a larger training effort, and I would not recommend allowing inexperienced jumpers to jump into alpine terrain. The following is a rough recommendation:

  • Alpine skills, depending on terrain/task
  • Static line course
  • Level of freefall training: Team leader level (approximately 200 jumps / 50-100 jumps per year)
  • Special training for parachuting into a mountainous environment, provided by AUT / SUI / …?

 

Conclusion

Mountainous or higher alpine terrain makes an already risky and difficult means of insertion even more difficult.

  • It is a suitable option for bringing small to medium-sized units into mountainous terrain
  • Units should be ‘pre-selected’/specialized
  • High training effort

8. 08 - Joint Fire Support structure in mountain units

 

LTC Davide Pascoli, ITA (A)

Staff Officer MtnInfBn 232,

Military Mountain Leader – Tactics & Logistics Teacher

Italian Armed Forces

In mountain warfare operations, the mountain battery is the artillery organization most commonly used to provide FIRE SUPPORT to a Task Force or Battle Group (at the Battalion Level). A mountain battery operates independently and can provide a Fire Direction Centre (FDC) with the Firing Units (up to two artillery sections), the Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE), and up to three Joint Fire Support Teams (JFSTs). It is the organization that has the ability to deploy all the elements responsible for planning, coordinating and employing all the allocated assets for effective fire support. JFSTs serve as the SENSORS in manoeuvre, being the enablers of the FIND and FIX functions; the JFSE takes on the role of the C2 function, being the decision-maker of planning and coordinating the fire support; and the FDC implements the STRIKE function, responsible for calculating and delivering fire through the gun line.

 

In mountainous terrain, Indirect Fire Support requires multiple delivery platforms, such as artillery and mortars. Each of these platforms possesses varying firepower depending on the requirements of the battle and calibre specifications. For this reason, mountain artillery units have some features that differ from normal field artillery units: they embrace the MULTICALIBRE APPROACH, being trained to employ varied calibres and guns. This flexibility extends their effective firing range to 24 kilometres.

As an example, Italian Mountain Artillery is equipped with 3 different platforms:

  • 105/14 mm light howitzers, with a maximum range of 10 kilometres;
  • 120 mm Thompson mortars, with a maximum range of 13 kilometres;
  • FH 70 155/39 mm medium howitzers, with a maximum range of 24 kilometres.

Light howitzers, 105mm and 120mm mortars are essentials in mountain operations, thanks to their ability to employ a 1st and 2nd firing arc (low and high angle of fire). They are very effective because their trajectory enables them to engage targets on reverse slopes, to take over high mountains and to deliver fire into dead spaces and over intermediate crests. Their ability to use a high angle and rate of fire is suited to the support of dispersed forces. In addition, light artillery can be used as a source of direct fire for creating rock fragments or triggering avalanches for tactical purposes (i.e. counter-mobility) to block enemy approach or escape routes. Both of these assets can be easily towed or transported by air, enhancing unit mobility. They can be moved to their fire positions via air or ground, and by different means of transport such as helicopters, pack animals, cable cars or even by carriage. Medium artillery plays a strategic role, either guarding valley entrances or delivering DEEP fire to support deep manoeuvre tactics.

Mountain artillery units also employ ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES (such as the BV206 used by Italy) to maximize mobility in challenging terrain where conventional vehicles struggle. These vehicles can tow guns or howitzers with appropriate sleds, and establish Tactical Command Posts that align with manoeuvre requirements.

 

The challenges of reduced mobility and limited positioning areas in mountainous terrain can impact the availability of artillery fire support. The terrain promotes isolated battles which make the C2 function difficult, so small units often face ‘tactical independence’. To mitigate some of the limitations deriving from mountain terrain, and to better support isolated manoeuvre units, the artillery battery can be broken down into smaller platoons and directly embedded into manoeuvre units. This aligns with the MISSION COMMAND principle, crucial in mountain warfare operations, reflecting upon FS in terms of employment, operational autonomy and combined arms formations.

 

JFSTs, acting as forward observers of the firing battery (surveillance target acquisition crew), are embedded within manoeuvre units, often positioned near the enemy or within the forward edge battle area. Their primary task is to manage call for fires (both planned and unplanned), requesting, adjusting and controlling the fire delivered by the battery.

 

Joint capabilities are essential in mountain warfare, because CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK and AIR SUPPORT, in general, can be highly effective as terrain constraints also limit the enemy’s mobility. Furthermore, due to the particular nature of the terrain, Firing Units could face “NO FIRE AREAS” where ground fire support becomes ineffective. 

 

Qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) play a pivotal role in ensuring joint capabilities for JFSTs, working alongside laser operators, drivers/radio operators, and forward observers, as part of the same team. Their mobility and survivability in mountainous terrain are of paramount importance, often requiring the highest levels of advanced training in various specialized skills (combat-assault skills as well as mountaineering).

 

In addition to their core artillery competencies (as gunners, FDC, calculators, observers, and in mastering procedures), personnel in mountain artillery units must possess solid basic skills in mountain survival, combat, and mobility across icy, snowy, and rocky terrain. Specific branches or branch elements, like FST and FSE, may require individuals with advanced and expert-level knowledge and skills. Furthermore, JFST, given their frontline positions and exposure to combat, are strongly encouraged to undertake training in advanced special skills such as assault tactics, mountaineering, and assault-climbing. Collective training for mountain artillery units includes joint exercises and combined arms training events. Emphasis is placed on training in fire and displacement techniques to mitigate enemy counter-battery fires. Crew drills, including gun and mortar crews, are conducted in restrictive terrain conditions and adverse weather scenarios, including cold environments.

 

In conclusion, the combination of high mobility-multicalibre delivery platforms and well trained JFST allow Joint Fire Support in mountain units to be vital for achieving success in MWO. Through their adaptability, flexibility, and specialized training, mountain artillery units and their associated personnel play an indispensable role in providing the fire support necessary to overcome the challenges of mountainous terrain and ensure mission success in demanding environments.

9. 09 - Preparing for the fight

 

MSG Tim Roggatz, DEU (A)

2006-2017 Mountain Infantry Battalion 231 Bad Reichenhall (JTAC )

2017-2021 Air Ground Operations School Nancy-Ochey, France (JTAC-Instructor/Evaluator)

2021-2023 German Army SOF KSK Air Land Integration Cell (SOALI Planner/JTAC Instructor)

Email: ksktr009pn@bundeswehr.org

Summary

When we talk about Close Air Support (CAS) in Mountain Warfare, and especially about the specific challenges for a JTAC or any fire support element during the conflict in Afghanistan, we must first take a closer look at the fundamentals and definitions of CAS/JTAC, and carry out a basic terrain analysis of the Area of Operations (AOO).

1. Generalities

This will already give us the answer to many questions concerning the employment, integration, and general challenges for fire support, whether it is ground-based or air to surface fires.

CAS, by definition according to the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3321D, is an event which requires ‘detailed integration’, ‘hostile targets’ and ‘close proximity’ to friendly forces. Additionally, as is also defined by the ATP 3321, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is ‘qualified and certified’ according to ATP 3322 B, and is required to ‘direct the Air action’ against these ‘targets’.

This sounds generally logical and straightforward, but considering the environmental conditions, the frictions of war and other influences in the rough terrain of Afghanistan, it is everything but – not logical, and indeed not straightforward.

First of all, THE Afghan terrain and THE Afghan conflict do not exist. But most importantly, nor does THE solution for any problems for fire support that occurred during the period of more than 20 years when coalition forces served and fought in Afghanistan.

However, we should limit the experience we, and particularly I, had in that country to a specific time and region. Just to clarify that my experiences may or may not be completely different to what others might have experienced. The time and region I’m referring to are the ‘ISAF years’, especially the period between 2009 and 2014 – one of the deadliest periods of the whole conflict. The regions I’m referring to are the northern provinces of Afghanistan – Baghlan Province. Maybe not THE hotspot, compared to many other provinces. Maybe not the region with the highest peaks, the deepest valleys or the roughest environmental conditions, but, and this is in my opinion the most important thing, good enough to display and highlight all the important aspects and lessons learned for fire support in Afghanistan.

When talking about providing fire support, conducting CAS or simply analysing the challenges of these topics, what we should keep in mind at all times is the common guidelines, the tactical directives which applied at that specific period of the conflict. General Petraeus, COM ISAF, in his Tactical Directive from 2010, made a strong statement concerning COIN (counterinsurgency) operations: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the centre of gravity. Only by providing them with security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and lSAF prevail.” General Allen, COM ISAF, in 2011, in his Tactical Directive, even went a step further: “My intent is to eliminate ISAF-caused civilian casualties across Afghanistan, and minimize civilian casualties throughout the area of operations by reducing their exposure to insurgent operations.”

These two statements are a perfect example for guideline today. Winning hearts and minds and producing zero civilian casualties while conducting Close Air Support.
Once we begin to analyse the challenges and identify potential issues, we must always remember these two Directives.

2. General environmental challenges

So, what are the general challenges for fire support in Afghanistan? What first comes to my mind is the terrain and the weather. In my eyes these, beside all the other aspects which we will consider in this essay, are among the biggest troublemakers when implementing fire support, especially in close proximity to friendly forces. As mentioned above, the Baghlan Province is not the region with the highest peaks in Afghanistan, but with an average altitude of 600m above sea level and mountains up to 3000m, we already have the first indicator of what could possibly happen. This combination of low valleys, high ground, desert-like plateaus, and jungle-like ‘green zones’ around the main river lines crossing the province, provides perfect conditions for enemy forces, especially when dressed as common civilians, and for hideouts or ambush sites. To locate these hideouts and tunnel in the mountainous/desert terrain at a distance of up to several kilometres, or to locate enemy ambush sites during close combat situations in the ‘green zone’, where civilian infrastructure, trenches or any kind of revetments are used, are among the biggest challenges for fire support. It does not matter whether we are talking about CAS or any other indirect or direct fire from various ground-based fire systems.

The primary task of any JTAC and of any Forward Observer (FO), or whoever is in charge of directing the fire, is to identify the enemy’s location and to provide the accurate location to the appropriate supporting asset, of course always considering the movement and location of any coalition forces, and keeping in mind the guidelines, rules of engagement (ROE’s) and so on. According to ATP 3321D, target acquisition in mountainous terrain is one of the greatest challenges JTACs have to face. Poor maps, often old Russian maps from the past, and heavy target location equipment such as Laser Range finders were more or less useless due to the massive use of jamming systems, especially man-portable jamming systems, which were, compared to those used nowadays, not even close to modern man and convoy protection systems. Remember all this took place more than ten years ago.

That being said, the weather conditions were also not comparable to Central European standard weather. For sure infantrymen, and especially those who fight in the mountains, should be used to those weather conditions, but temperatures close to 50° Celsius in summer and minus 30° Celsius in winter are not the ideal conditions to fight against an enemy which is used to that climate. Nevertheless, operating during early mornings or at night was the weapon of choice, particularly for dismounted patrols during summertime. Poor Night Vision Devices did not make target acquisition easier for any fire support personnel.

As we can see, there were many different influences and general challenges for fire support personnel in those environmental conditions; the list goes on.
But let’s focus a little bit more on the challenges for JTACs.

3. Unique JTAC challenges in Mountain Warfare

Before we come up with further challenges, we should take a quick look at the main tasks of a JTAC during these years. Within the COIN scenario the core tasks of a JTAC could vary a great deal: from providing armed overwatch during mounted or dismounted patrols for friendly forces, to Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NTISR), to providing CAS for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The spectrum was as wide as the COIN mission itself.

One of the biggest challenges JTACs had to face during that period was the support to the ANSF. Often only connected via an interpreter on the phone, we tried to provide them with air power. Not having any situational awareness (SA) and not being in ‘close proximity’ to these forces made it very difficult to support them in an appropriate way. Most of the time, a picture from the targeting pod of the supporting aircraft was all we got, and even then, it was nearly impossible to define who was operating where on the battlefield.

The key phrase is ‘battle tracking’. It was not only with the ANSF that this caused several problems. Even with friendly or coalition forces, the use of marking devices was challenging. Combined patrols with other notions and different TTPs within the platoons and squads, and the variation in the length of convoys, sometimes up to kilometres, with different kinds of vehicle, number of soldiers and so on, clearly made it difficult to keep the overall SA at a high level. Especially in Troops in Contact (TIC) situations, the use of marking devices was essential to provide proper ‘target talk on’ for the aircrew and to enhance the SA for all the involved players. The use of coloured smoke during the day and infrared marking at night had a huge impact on the situation, significantly simplifying JTACs’ work.

Airborne-used markings, such as white phosphorus rockets, are also an appropriate tool, especially when aircrew has an increased SA compared to the JTAC on the ground. Aircrew can ‘mark’ enemy positions using these rockets, and the smoke will help friendly forces to identify the often well-covered enemy hideouts.

Proper ‘target talk on’, meaning to bring the eyes of the aircrew onto the correct spot, is also one of the challenges. We have already spoken about the environment. Traditionally the target talk on begins at a given ‘reference point’ (RP), which might be a prominent building, a significant road intersection, or just a single large tree standing in the middle of nowhere. But to find that ‘unique’ object in the middle of the desert or the jungle-like conditions of the green zone was not that easy. We may think of just providing proper coordinates, passing them to the aircraft, opening the targeting pod and away we go, but in an environment where friendly and coalition forces were using jamming systems, which had, by the way, a huge impact on the communication and video downlink (VDL), the use of optical devices to provide these coordinates was useless. Providing maps, in addition, were also no big help, because everything looked exactly the same: brown, green or grey with Cyrillic letters on it. So, whenever we stopped we took the time to switch off jamming systems and tried to ‘label’ the current area, in order to ease further target talk on between us and the aircraft, and also for upcoming events to already have something in hand, in case.

Back to our Afghan partners. The will to support them was one aspect; another aspect was the legal side of it. Different Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for the employment of CAS in support of the ANSF made it nearly impossible for us to support them in the way we were intended to. But not only that kind of support; the legal framework for the employment of CAS was also quite challenging. A variety of different ROEs, the necessity of providing positive identification (PID), a proper pattern of life (POL), taking in account the collateral and cultural concerns, and then requesting permission for the engagement at the right time to the correct agency made it nearly impossible to support the troops in an appropriate way, other than being under fire in a self-defence (SD) situation.

4. CAS in a multinational environment

National caveats were, in addition to the aforementioned challenges, also a big factor.
Dutch F-16s, for example, were only allowed to employ air to surface ammunition while in self-defence; JTACs were operating under the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom mandate; the list goes on.

In addition to the ‘official’ problems, we had to face a more unique challenge which popped up during the employments: the mindset and culture differences between the nations. Just imagine working closely together with a variety of partners from different nations, who all have their own interpretation of the term ‘self-defence’. It sounds funny, but it can lead to misunderstanding and complications. For example, a man with a rifle dressed in civilian clothes, walking on a path through the mountains, is not, in our German common way of understanding, a classic self-defence situation, but for other nations it may be. These situations appeared regularly, and showed just how difficult it can be to work in that kind of environment, with different nations and different ways of approach.

Last but not least, we must focus on one of the biggest challenges for any kind of fire support, especially in the mountainous environment, but actually in any environment: communication. Communication is the key to airpower. Without a solid communication plan there will be no Close Air Support, no fire support at all. To keep that communication up at a high level requires detailed integration of the JTAC into the support ground forces. An understanding, at all tactical levels, of the need of a solid communication plan and the needs of a JTAC is essential for mission success.

5. Lessons Learned

What are the Lessons Identified and the Lessons Learned from the ‘ISAF years’?
First of all, as previously mentioned: Communication.

‘No Comms – No CAS’.

This means that a proper PACE Plan for each and every mission is essential. Furthermore, a useful integration of jamming tools will ease the process of having stable comms between air and ground forces.

Using a massive number of jammers may provide the maximum amount of security, but may also lead to poor communication.

Integration is key. The use of liaison officers at all command levels is essential for the integration of air to surface assets.

Additionally, a command standard needs to be made. TTPs must be identical within coalition forces. Mass briefings, training and Rehearsal of Concept drills (ROC) can help to enhance the mission planning.

Back to the basics.

This is the major outcome and the key takeaway for me as a JTAC being deployed in a mountainous environment. The basics are essential. In an environment with rapidly changing weather conditions, with high peaks and deep valleys and an enemy and other coalition forces barely visible, we must go back to the basics. Use what you have – do not focus too much on ‘modern’ stuff. Train yourself in using map, compass and binoculars. Make yourself as familiar with the area as possible. Be in a physically good condition, and most of all prepare for every mission with 120%.

Always remember the five P’s: Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance.

10. 10 - Experience of JFS in exercises (‘Heimdall’, ‘Mountain Hornet’)

Maj. David Würtz                                                                                                        2019-             present Air Liasion Officer & JTAC-I/E MtInfBrig 23                              2021               JSOTF GAZELLE NIGER                                                                 2018               Transfer to Air Force                                                                       2014-2018     JTAC & Bn Fire Support Coordination Officer MtInfBn 232      2016               Staff Officer Course Army                                                    2005-2014     Officer Candidate and MtInf Officer                                2005               KFOR Prizren                                                                           2001-2005     Mountain Infantry (OR-1 to OR-6) and Pack Horse Company

Email: davidwuertz@bundeswehr.org

BACKGROUND

Introduction

The war in Ukraine shows once more that modern warfare relies on effective and readily available Fire Support. Not only the shelling of troops in fortified positions by the field artillery of the two opponents, but also, in particular, the target acquisition and guidance of precision strikes of rocket artillery and cruise missiles against high value targets such as supply trains and convoys, air defense and EW systems, and eventually command posts, characterize the war we are witnessing.

The extensive action of raid units in close cooperation with UAVs is also seen in the same conflict. Both the Russian Army and the Ukrainian forces inflict and suffer heavy losses with these tactics.

Most of the fire support is achieved by a mobile phone app and the support of Starlink satellites.

On the other hand, with the (most likely Russian-backed) Serbian escalation on the border with Kosovo, mountain warfare is once again to be considered.

If put together, the aforementioned high value targets (EW, SAM) will be found in proximity to the frontline, due to the nature of the mountainous terrain reducing the reach of line-of-sight systems. These targets will therefore be within reach of regular forces, such as mountain infantry with its reconnaissance teams, UAVs, snipers and JFSTs.

An effective network of sensors and effectors is therefore key to fast, precise and effective fire support.

Small units could be tasked with observing areas and supported by designated effectors in order to find and neutralize specific targets with minimum coordination efforts. Long range reconnaissance patrols, raid units, sniper teams and UAVs with the ability to call in precision strikes could also be sent into target areas of interest to achieve the same goal.

The digitalization of the battlefield is not only short of a big next step implicating digital systems for communication in order to direct fires, such as, for example, digital aided close air support. We are at the brink of a major revolution as the fifth generation fighter aircraft push forward the idea of a combat cloud and AI-enhanced automated fire support.

This is all to be considered when reading the following Lessons Learned from the exercises, with regard to joint fire support in mountain warfare.

The ‘HEIMDALL’ and ‘MOUNTAIN HORNET’ exercises

MOUNTAIN HORNET

As there are no exercises in mountain warfare with enablers like Joint Fire Support and reconnaissance elements as the main training audience, the air force liaison element of Mountain Infantry Brigade 23 (ALE X23) first created and conducted the MOUNTAIN HORNET exercise back in 2019. Since then, the exercise has taken place four times (2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023) in the Bavarian Alps, close to Salzburg. Each year has had a different focus, but fire support in mountain warfare has always been a central feature.

The participants comprise mountain infantry units, reconnaissance platoons, joint fire support teams, UAV squads, EW elements, pack horses, helicopters, military jets and contract air assets, as well as special forces.

As the exercise built up an international reputation, partnering nations like the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy have already sent forces to participate.

The exercise is divided into a training phase, a planning phase, and a 72-hour ongoing operation with opposing forces.

All the stated tactics and manoeuvres providing the following Lessons Learned have been tested and evaluated.

HEIMDALL

The German Navy pushed forward in the matter of Joint Fire Support exercises, creating HEIMDALL as a LIVEX including naval gunfire support, close air support and ground-based fire support in northern Norway.

HEIMDALL 2022 brought three German frigates, one Norwegian corvette, Alpha Jets and one tube 120mm mortars into action. Controlled by a Joint Fire Support Group (JFSCG), a Joint Fire Support Coordination Team (JFSCT), and three Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) consisting of mountain infantry and special operation forces.

The effort required to bring these three branches together in one live fire exercise in northern Norway in winter showed what potential, logistical and organizational challenges and training needs this cooperation implies.

Joint Fire Support in Mountain Warfare – Experiences from the MOUNTAIN HORNET and HEIMDALL exercises

Effects

Mountain terrain is characterized by steep slopes and large changes in elevation, and a mix of very short and far distant views. The weather changes quickly, sometimes within minutes, and so does the visibility if fog or clouds stream through the area.

This effects not only target acquisition and observation, but also devices using laser beams such as Laser Range Finders. Additionally, pilots inside a cockpit or aircraft sensors will regularly have trouble gaining ground visibility. If the surface can be observed by air platforms, mountainous areas mostly have a lack of distinctive terrain features, and peaks and summits often mask targets for manoeuvring aircraft, making visual targeting acquisition difficult and time-consuming.

In addition effects in mountainous terrain may often result in secondary weapon effects such as landslides or avalanches. These secondary effects are mostly difficult to predict and can affect both own troops and the enemy, and must be carefully considered.

Rocky terrain, as well as deep snow, can leave munitions useless, as cases and fuzes may break or the munitions may be absorbed before detonation, mitigating fragmentation and blast or even remaining unexploded.

Alpine terrain, with large rock formations, steep valleys, trenches and holes, shields the fragmentation and blast of ordnance. This results in the possibility of bringing own troops within dangerous close range without them being affected, but also the risk that the engaged targets maybe unaffected even with impacts in direct proximity.

The amount of employed ordnance will be significantly higher in mountain warfare to achieve the comparable effects in flat terrain. Fuse setting is a major consideration in fire support missions in alpine terrain.

Movement

Movement of troops, equipment and supply is a major challenge in mountain warfare. Rough terrain with large differences in elevation and steep cliffs, as well as extreme and swiftly changing weather conditions, influences movement and therefore complicates the planning and execution of operations.

In order to bring small teams, e.g. JFST, into impassable terrain to fulfil a specific task, insertion with freefall parachutes is a viable option. Due to unreliable weather conditions, contingency insertion is paramount. This affects the equipment of these forces, since exfiltration on foot must always be considered. Since jumping into unknown alpine terrain brings a marked risk of injury, the idea of inserting specialists via a tandem parachute jump is not to be recommended. This is especially the case where teams using parachute tactics would tactically jump in full gear, such as by night into the mountains. Perhaps ‘high exit high opening’ tactics with a long glide phase and a drop zone in a grassy valley or a large elevated pasture may work.

Modern warfare is most likely linked to extensive helicopter operations. Whenever the situation and weather allows, helicopters should be used to ensure rapid movement of troops and supply. Nevertheless, due to the impact of weather on helicopter operations, contingency planning is inevitable, and operations should be planned to be timely and flexible whenever possible in order to use time windows with favourable weather conditions.

As a consequence, JFSTs in mountain warfare must be physically robust and also require suitable equipment in order to survive alpine conditions. Furthermore, they need to be trained to move dismounted in challenging terrain, as helicopters may always be cancelled due to the weather. Deriving from this statement, equipment must be light and minimalistic.

Movement also includes the movement of ‘air-players’ like UAVs, helicopters and fighter jets. These players must share their airspace not only with each other, but also with mortar shells and missiles like Javelin or MELLS. As the terrain in the mountains naturally has a higher elevation above mean sea level (MSL), airspace with a top level given in MSL is smaller than in flat terrain. This sounds logical but is often overlooked in the planning phase. Higher airspace must be requested, since approving entities generally do not think of specialties in mountain warfare.

Communication

Communications with line-of-sight (LOS) radios are generally degraded and carry big challenges in mountain warfare. This is not the exemption but the norm in these operations. With weather and space weather influencing frequencies, and terrain naturally blocking the line of sight in the mountains, a detailed terrain and weather assessment in the planning phase must take place. This is a crucial point for a successful joint fire mission in mountain warfare.

To mitigate the disadvantageous factors, all available means of communication must be considered. Wherever possible, beyond line-of-sight radios, such SATCOM and HF Radios, should be implemented. For SATCOM, thorough planning, preparation and training of the operators is required. HF radios can help in bridging long distances. They should be operated to transmit data; transmission windows and an execution checklist help to minimize traffic.

Since JFSTs, snipers and reconnaissance squads regularly man elevated positions, equipping these forces with relay stations and allowing them to operate these should be considered. Mountain forces also should acquire UAVs, which can be operated as relays in order to optimize communication.

To counter all the aforementioned issues, and to minimize comms, a detailed fire support matrix should be created in order to ensure the concept of fires even with low comms by assigning effectors to sensors by task, phase or timing.

Sustainment

As mentioned in the Movement section, supply in mountain warfare requires a tremendous effort.

Resupply can be achieved by aerial resupply drops or helicopter supply lifts. These are again dictated by weather conditions.

For this reason, small teams serving as sensors for fire support in mountain warfare should carry 42 hours supply as standard to be self-sustaining and survive supply gaps due to unfavourable weather windows.

Helicopters or aerial resupply will not always be able to deliver directly to the troops in overwatch positions. Supply caches must be established by the supported forces, and goods carried at night and when the situation permits. This must balanced by the principle of minimum movement.

Pack horses can be a precious asset to fulfil this task. Being all-weather capable and self-sustaining, they are also able to compensate for helicopters, for example in longer periods of poor weather or if the situation does not permit helicopter operations. They should be considered additionally to other means to resupply elevated offroad mortar positions with ammunition, especially with tactics running single tube positions, in order to guarantee permanent supply even when helicopters are cancelled.

This short paper is to be understood as an index. The topics are only discussed at the surface level. The detailed elaboration of considerations and Lessons Learned would fill a handbook.

To conclude the article I offer this statement:

Mountain warfare without effective fire support will not be successful; to achieve effective support, detailed planning, proper equipment and well-trained soldiers are mandatory.

11. 11 -Drones – Lessons Learned in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Viktors Bikovs

  • Master’s Degree in Electronics and Geodesy at Riga Technical University
  • Entrepreneur with 10 years’ experience in cutting-edge drone technology: drone automation software development for enterprise and security area. Promoting and delivering cutting-edge UAS to the Baltic states.
  • Member of the Atlas Aerospace Business Development and Sales Team: Atlas Dynamics is a pioneering leader in fully autonomous drone solutions, catering to both professional and military users. Atlas cutting-edge technology enables us to swiftly and securely deliver valuable data, even in challenging situations.

Email: viktors.bikovs@atlasaero.space

ATLAS Enhances Military Operations

The integration of cutting-edge technology into military operations is a defining feature of the modern era.

In the last few years, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the world and developers have seen how small systems work. Bulky equipment is gradually being relegated to the background. Various drones, ground-based UAVs, homemade trench electronic warfare, and other solutions are in demand. They are more affordable and easy to use in a crisis. ATLAS engineers had to solve many technological challenges in the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and as a result, the ATLAS team improved the products according to military needs.

In this article we explore how ATLAS, a leading innovator in the field of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), is changing the game with its state-of-the-art Atlas TETHER and AtlasPRO systems. These advanced tools are helping military and intelligence personnel achieve their objectives even in the face of intense electronic warfare and jamming, reshaping the landscape of security and defence in the process.

 

Expanding ATLAS's Footprint

ATLAS has been working closely with Ukraine since 2019, providing high-performance dual-use UAVs, including the AtlasPRO.

AtlasTETHER – Securing Strategic Facilities

AtlasTETHER, a tethered drone that forms part of the ATLAS ECOSYSTEM, recently underwent successful testing in Ukraine. The primary objective was to demonstrate its ability to provide continuous monitoring of a strategic facility even in the presence of electronic warfare. This achievement represents a significant advance in military surveillance and intelligence gathering.

AtlasTETHER has proved itself indispensable in safeguarding strategic military sites, critical infrastructure, and crowded areas, thanks to its real-time video streaming capabilities. These capabilities ensure the immediate transmission of live images to command centres, enhancing acute situational awareness.

Ivan Tolchinsky, ATLAS CEO, said:

“Testing devices in real conditions is much tougher than any simulated ones, pushing our devices to the limit and providing invaluable insights. Through these tests in Ukraine, we’ve confirmed that AtlasTETHER operates independently of GPS.

“Our system performs flawlessly, maintaining consistency even when signal strength wanes, all thanks to the revolutionary optical flow technology that sets us apart.”

During the tests, AtlasTETHER was put into many different situations, yet the system remained stable due to its optical flow technology. This device delivers exceptional performance when you need it most, making us the foremost choice for unrivalled reliability in any mission.

The 20x hybrid zoom and the 10x digital zoom allow the user to see a detailed picture and to display a visual grid to define the target. In addition, the use of a thermal camera allows for observation at night.

AtlasPRO – Defying Electronic Warfare

The AtlasPRO drone, known for its robust design and innovative software-defined radio (SDR) module, has been effectively resisting electronic warfare during tests. Equipped with frequency hopping technology, the AtlasPRO can adapt to different radio frequencies, even in the presence of jamming systems, and maintain stable connections.

The frequency hopping feature in AtlasPRO demonstrates its resilience against jamming systems, making it a valuable asset for military personnel. The drone’s adaptability ensures successful mission completion under challenging conditions, a crucial selling point for defence agencies.

 

AtlasPRO – Defying Electronic Warfare

The AtlasPRO drone, known for its robust design and innovative software-defined radio (SDR) module, has been effectively resisting electronic warfare during tests. Equipped with frequency hopping technology, the AtlasPRO can adapt to different radio frequencies, even in the presence of jamming systems, and maintain stable connections.

The frequency hopping feature in AtlasPRO demonstrates its resilience against jamming systems, making it a valuable asset for military personnel. The drone’s adaptability ensures successful mission completion under challenging conditions, a crucial selling point for defence agencies.

AtlasPRO EW countermeasures

The Military’s Response to Electronic Warfare

Ukrainian military experts and soldiers have been exploring the capabilities of the AtlasPRO in a real-world electronic warfare scenario. The drone’s ability to maintain control even in the presence of electronic warfare systems is a game-changer for military operations.

The successful testing of the AtlasPRO highlights its combat-readiness and its potential to significantly reduce the loss of drones in hostile environments. This crucial selling point positions AtlasPRO as a reliable choice for defence forces in need of resilient UAS.

Smart Hopping

The pilot Artem D. (call sign “Scope”) said about smart hopping:

“Jamming was happening, we felt it – it was really close, but it didn’t jam on all GPS channels. This EW (electronic warfare system) isn’t an ordinary complex; it is an assembled EW called ‘Trenches’. Russians usually use such complexes. This is all they can buy in China. All the modules are Chinese, and the hardware is Chinese but simply assembled and very, very powerful.”

The smart SDR module of AtlasPRO independently determines where the enemy’s warfare complex is located, scans frequencies to detect the jamming range, and jumps to free frequencies automatically.‍

An Ecosystem of Excellence‍

ATLAS is marked by an ecosystem of devices designed to enhance the capabilities of units and empower defence forces to secure their homelands. The ATLAS devices seamlessly integrate into the command centre and can operate remotely, offering commanders and troops innovative solutions for heightened situational awareness, as well as communication between command centres.

The ATLAS Ecosystem includes the AtlasSTATION PRO, AtlasNEST, AtlasTETHER, AtlasPRO, AtlasROVER, AtlasPERKONS, and AtlasAVALANCHE PRO systems. These systems operate seamlessly in MESH, ensuring that you have the ultimate command and connectivity at your fingertips at all times. It’s a revolution, setting new standards in versatility, reliability, and control for your missions. When excellence is non-negotiable, trust the ATLAS ECOSYSTEM to deliver.

ATLAS’s AtlasTETHER and AtlasPRO are ushering in a new era of military and intelligence operations, where electronic warfare and jamming systems no longer hold the upper hand.

As ATLAS continues to improve its technology, military and intelligence agencies can expect increasingly advanced tools to support their missions, ultimately strengthening security and defence strategies.

ATLAS’s dedication to developing cutting-edge UAS technology showcases its commitment to enhancing military and intelligence operations.

 

12. 12 - Introduction to CSS in mountain units

LTC Adden

2005-2006 Conscript armoured artillery 215 bn, Augustdorf                                           2006-2012 Officer training, Master’s degree educational science, MW training             2012-2016 Platoon leader, executive officer (XO) 4th Mountain Infantry Coy 231th Mountain Infantry Btn.,                                                                                                                                           2016 CIMIC Officer 23rd Mountain Infantry Brig., Bad Reichenhall                                    2017-2018 Logistics officer training | Staff officer training, Garlstedt | Hamburg          2018-2019 Joint Logistic support group officer 472th CSS Btn, Kümmersbruck               2019-2022 Company commander 3rd Mountain CSS Coy 8th mountain CSS Bn, Füssen    Deployments: 2020-2021 MINUSMA, MALI Commander CSS Coy

Email: BernhardAdden@bundeswehr.org

 

LTC Rosenkranz10/1996 Military Service

1997-2001 Military Academy

Duties 2001-2002 ENGR PLT CDR, 2002-2003 Deputy Company CDR, 2003-2010 Company CDR, 2010-2013 S2 &DepS3 & CBRN, 2013-2017 S3, 2017-2018 Deputy Battalion CDR, 07/2018-10/2023 Battalion CDR

LTC Adden: CSS in mountain units in the German Army

Mountain warfare always entails the battle of the high ground – the decisive terrain. Consequently, the logistical support of combat forces must also occur there.

Combat operations in mountainous terrain can only yield success when the deployed forces are adequately supplied with essential ammunition, fuel, water and combat rations. Damaged equipment, vehicles and weapons should be removed, and repairs should be carried out.

In the absence of resupply, combat units deployed in the mountains have an estimated operational endurance of approximately five days, during which they must rely on the supplies carried in their backpacks (self-sustainment). Within this five-day window, it is imperative to establish a resilient supply chain which delivers the critical supplies required by the engaged forces.

In mountain warfare, the primary supplies are ammunition, water (especially during the summer), combat rations, and fuel for stoves, heaters, and generators. Secondary priorities include materials and tools for entrenching and building field fortifications, as well as replacement clothing and equipment. The evacuation and exchange of damaged equipment are of tertiary importance. The supplies must reach the positions of the engaged troops; it is crucial that the supply chain does not stop at the base of the mountain.

This supply chain in mountainous terrain is primarily contingent on three principal factors:

  • Topography
  • The prevailing meteorological conditions
  • The volume and weight of the supplies

Factor I: Topography

Topography stands out as the paramount factor. Beyond the incline that must be conquered, the condition of roads and pathways serves as the chief limiting factor, impacting the extent of logistical routes and the duration of logistical operations.

In mountainous regions, often only a limited number of ‘main’ supply routes and lines of communication are serviceable. In the valleys, asphalted, ‘high-capacity’ roads are available. As altitude increases, gravel roads, paths, and trails become the norm. The combat actions of mountain troops are likely to take place in areas with no established paths.

In the event that one of these routes becomes obstructed due to environmental factors (such as avalanches, etc.) or enemy activities, extensive detours must be undertaken to reach the engaged units. Where supply routes are rare and/or bypass options are limited, it is advisable to maintain transportation capabilities on both sides of the primary supply route. In the event of an obstacle/barrier, this approach mitigates the necessity of carrying supplies beyond the obstacle/barrier. Consequently, only the obstruction needs to be surmounted, and supplies must be transhipped.

The battle for control of the high ground/decisive terrain also implies the imperative to maintain thorough surveillance of supply routes, typically from these high grounds. However, the high ground also provides the adversary with favourable positions for utilizing artillery fire, close air support (CAS), and drones against logistical convoys. Given the challenging terrain, all convoys must hold 360° self-security on the move.

As the altitude rises, the availability of infrastructure diminishes. Wherever possible, existing huts, cowsheds, and bivouac accommodation should be employed for the establishment of depots or concealed supply caches. These depots and caches serve to shorten the supply chain and enhance the sustainability of the deployed forces. Frequently, makeshift infrastructure may need to be constructed.

Altitude not only affects the physical capabilities of the troops but also those of helicopters. These aerial assets can only be effectively employed up to a specific altitude.

The maintenance and repair of vehicles, weapons, communication equipment, generators, and other essential gear usually necessitates the utilization of heavy tools and machinery. Mobile workshop facilities integrated into vehicles can only be deployed in areas accessible by these vehicles. Maintenance and repair of vehicles ceases when the paved roads end.

In mountainous terrain and remote areas, repairs are typically limited to small arms, communication equipment, and generators. For optimal operational efficiency, it is recommended to establish appropriate facilities within the limited available infrastructure. In general, it is more prudent to maintain an ample supply of replacement weapons, equipment, and materials to transport  damaged equipment to the repair facilities located in the valley.

Factor II: Prevailing meteorological conditions

The second factor to consider is the climatic conditions in mountainous terrain. In exposed areas, soldiers’ fluid requirements significantly increase, especially during the heat of summer. This increased demand is further exacerbated by the heightened physical exertion required when ascending. It is to be expected that the estimated minimum requirement of 10 litres per soldier will be significantly exceeded. Complicating matters, there is progressively less water available at higher altitudes during the summer. Consequently, an elevated supply of water is necessary.

Heavy rainfall is not uncommon, especially in mountainous regions. This not only hinders movements in the mountains but can also damage or destroy improperly stored supplies. The only solution in such cases is once again the utilization of the limited available infrastructure.

The use of helicopters is, in addition to the altitude, also subject to weather conditions. In unfavourable weather, alternative methods of transport must be planned and prepared.

In high-altitude and winter conditions, temperatures can drop significantly. Snow and avalanches can render areas inaccessible, cutting off the fighting force from resupply. Under these conditions, it is essential to store temperature-sensitive supplies in a warm environment to prevent freezing. Repair work, especially delicate tasks with insulated gloves outside heated facilities, becomes challenging. In general, personnel must wear tough gloves at a minimum to prevent freezing of the skin to metal surfaces.

In remote areas, a minimum of 7 days of supplies (DoS) in summer and 14 DoS in winter should be stockpiled. This is necessary to ensure that the mountain fighting force is not cut off by adverse weather conditions.

Factor III: The volume and weight of the supplies

Figure 1: Methods of Transportation

The third factor is the dimensions and weight of the supplies. On an average day of combat, a mountain infantry company alone requires 1.5 tons of ammunition for their small arms, anti-tank weapons, and hand grenades

The diagram illustrates the number and types of transport needed to transport this quantity alone. The 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade has a total average daily requirement of 1344 tons of various types of supplies, and in addition, 180 cubic metres of water and 54 cubic metres of diesel (F-54). Loaded onto the German Army’s palletized load systems, capable of carrying 14 tons each, the daily requirements of
the entire 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade would necessitate the space of a football field.

Where only paths and trails are available, or in trackless terrain, transport goods must inevitably be flown in by helicopter. The use of helicopters is to be preferred wherever possible. To facilitate this, appropriate landing zones need to be scouted and set up. Simultaneously, supplies must be prepared for aerial transport. Wherever possible, efforts should be made to reduce weight. Unnecessary packaging and transport containers should be left behind. This is especially true for air transport or when employing pack animals and porter teams.

Given the examples of the quantities and weights of supply items mentioned, it quickly becomes apparent that for three combat units, regardless of their size, at least one unit must be designated to carry the supplies. If the terrain is challenging and no paths exist, or if they are snow-covered, this ratio is reversed; for one combat unit, three units are required to carry the supplies.

In the light of these considerations, it is evident why every march and flight must simultaneously be utilized for the transportation of supplies. In general, there should always be an alternative to the use of helicopters.

The Mountain Supply Chain

From these three factors, it becomes clear that robust planning of the supply chain, and especially the transport chain, is crucial in order to sustainably support the fighting mountain troops. The illustration shows an example of what this supply chain could look like in a fictional mountainous region.

Various means of transport are used, according to the terrain and the available roads and paths. In the German Army, this is only possible through the collaboration of the specialized capabilities of different branches and units. Alongside the trucks, snow vehicles from the 8th Mountain Supply Battalion, Army Aviation helicopters, Combat mountain engineers’ makeshift cable cars, pack animals, and, not least, the soldiers of the Mountain Infantry Battalions as carriers are utilized.

Normally, in the valleys, the 8th Mountain CSS Battalion establishes a supply point for each Mountain Infantry Battalion within three hours, designed to support them for a minimum of 48 hours, depending on operational requirements. Here, supplies are kept mobile, prepared for air transport, and placed on the palletized load systems for several days. At this supply point, the vehicles, weapons, equipment, and materials of the Mountain Infantry Battalions can be fully repaired.

Starting from the supply point, supplies are primarily transported into the mountains by air. At least one alternative transport route is planned and established. Along this route, supplies are transported from transfer point to transfer point. Efforts are made to use the most powerful means of transport to move supplies as far ‘up the mountain’ as possible. German logistics doctrine dictates that supplies should be delivered to the Headquarters and Support Companies (push supply). The fighting units and sub-units retrieve supplies from the supply points set up by the Headquarters and Support Companies (pull supply).

As mentioned earlier, it is recommended that, along mountain roads, capable transport means are available at every transfer point. In the event of roads being blocked by weather conditions or enemy activity, this helps to prevent supplies from being carried by carriers for the entire remaining distance beyond the roadblock. The same applies to the use of recovery vehicles. They should also be on standby at each transfer point for rapid deployment.

From the point where the paved roads and pathways end, or when thick snow cover blankets the area in winter, alternative means of transportation must be employed. These alternatives can include snowmobiles, skidoos, all-terrain vehicles, pack animals, or soldiers as carriers. The choice of transportation depends on the terrain. Transfers between different means of transportation occur at transfer points. At these points, handling equipment (such as forklifts, etc.) or soldiers should be available to facilitate efficient transfers. Effort should always be made to minimize the number of transfers, as each transfer consumes time.

On steep, narrow paths where vehicles or pack animals cannot be used, transportation must ultimately be carried out by soldiers serving as carriers. Depending on an individual soldier’s fitness, they cannot carry more than 20-30 kg of supplies in addition to their personal gear and weapons. Their range is also limited, and they will require recovery time. It should be noted that in planning, both the outbound route with the supplies and the return to the transfer points must be considered. This is referred to as a circuit. For this reason it is also practical to create weather-protected rest areas for the carriers at the transfer points. Additionally, in trackless terrain, measures must be taken to prevent the carriers from falling. In the 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade, the installation of ‘rope rails’ is the responsibility of the High Mountain Infantry Platoons.

In trackless terrain, an improvised cable car, similar to those used by German Mountain Engineers, can be deployed. It allows the rapid transportation of large quantities of supplies. However, several days to weeks are required for its preparation, setup, and dismantling. Therefore, this method can only be used in defence or delay operations. If civilian ski lift facilities are available in the operational area, they should be integrated into the supply chain. Following the model of ski lift stations, advanced depots and supply caches, as mentioned earlier, should be established. Generally, this process is time-consuming and should be carried out before the commencement of the operation. However, during the operation it saves a significant amount of time, as the supplies are already in the vicinity.

Conclusions

It can be observed that a sustainable supply in mountainous terrain consistently demands an above-average deployment of personnel and material. When a sufficient number of helicopters are available and enemy and weather conditions permit, this is the preferred method for rapidly delivering supplies to the end-users and collecting small equipment and weapons that have been damaged.

In general, mountain logistics require specialized equipment and vehicles in order to be executed successfully. The industry offers various solutions, which are often not yet adopted by mountain troops. The use of drones, which are not fielded in the Mountain Combat Service Support, will also significantly reshape the field of mountain logistics in the near future. Despite all the innovations and developments, mountain logistics will ultimately hinge on the fact that heavy loads must be manually transported uphill.

In summary, the following eight principles can be derived to ensure successful Mountain Combat Service Support:

LTC Rosenkranz: The Ropeway Platoon of the Salzburg Engineers

General

Military operations in middle and high mountain ranges are affected by special environmental conditions. The 2 Engineer Battalion provides engineer support up to high mountain ranges, so the Battalion can rely on specially trained personnel and ‘mountain shaped’ equipment and machinery. Its Ropeway Platoon is unique in the Austrian Armed Forces, disposing two rope crane systems, which are presented below.

The Austrian Armed Forces’ military ropeways are generally used for material transport including supplies, equipment and construction materials. They are used in situations where significant terrain obstacles and narrow passages inhibit or completely prevent the construction of other transportation routes.

The military ropeway (cable crane system) serves the supply of troops, as well as assistance during natural disasters and support for military and civilian parties.

The ropeway is not used for the transport of personnel. The only exception is in the emergency rescue of individuals (rescue operation in emergency situations), where an injured person must be rapidly and safely transported to prevent a threat to life and limb.

Technical data of the ropeway:

  • Maximum length of complete system up to 1000 m
  • Ropeway up to 2000 m
    • 24 mm hauling rope, breaking load 60 t -> max. operating stress 20 t
  • Ropeway up to 1200 m
    • 22 mm hauling rope, breaking load 45 t -> max. operating stress 15 t
    • Hauling rope 11 mm, breaking load 7t

The Ropeway Platoon, as per the Table of Organization and Equipment, consists of 8 NCOs and 28 corporals/recruits (in total: 36 personnel).          

Special training courses are required for the professional soldiers of the Ropeway Platoon, in addition to their basic engineer training. These are both civil training courses at the Forest Training Centre OSSIACH, a department of the Austrian Research Centre for Forests, and military courses.

The Engineer Company has its own ropeway training area at its disposal for basic construction and operation training with the ropeway equipment, built by the Company itself with regard to all training needs. It has been proven that constructing ropeways for basic training in mountain terrain is not expedient due to the enormous logistic effort, the environmental conditions and the physical exposure.

Theoretical principles of ropeway construction

Military material cableways are classified as cable crane systems, cableways with self-propelled carriers or continuously running ropeways. Their usage depends on the specific purpose. Cable crane systems can lower and pick up at any obstacle-free point below the hauling rope. This requires a trained operating team.

Ropeways offer the following advantages:

  • Faster construction compared to roads, permanent bridges, and railways;
  • High mobility, allowing disassembly after task accomplishment and reassembly elsewhere;
  • Lower construction effort compared to road and path construction;
  • Insensitivity to weather conditions, making them operational regardless of the season (except for high wind speeds and lightning hazards);
  • Low susceptibility to damage from weapons;
  • Constant readiness for transportation;
  • High transportation capacity;
  • Low maintenance requirements;
  • Few personnel required for operation;
  • Unrestricted nighttime operation during missions.

Military ropeways consist of the following components:

  • Uphill and downhill anchors for the hauling rope (natural or artificial);
  • Intermediate supports (natural or artificial);
  • A hauling rope with tensioner;
  • A Crab (self-propelled or towed);
  • In the case of cable crane systems, a winch with a pull rope and a cable crane.

Times and transport capacities

Construction times under winter conditions depend on snow depth, visibility, temperature, and the prevailing wind conditions, so it is not possible to determine an exact additional time requirement. In general, the transport weight of a light transport helicopter (AB 212) can be transported in one round. The speed of the ropeway uphill and downhill is between 3 to 4 m/s. This means that for a ropeway with a length of 1,000 metres, a round trip, excluding loading and unloading, takes about 10 minutes. With experienced crews, you can expect to transport approximately 1.5 tons of goods per hour.

Construction Process

The construction process follows seven phases of construction.

The phases of construction are:

  • Phase 1: Initial reconnaissance
  • Phase 2: Detailed reconnaissance
  • Phase 3: Survey
  • Phase 4: Calculation
  • Phase 5: Construction
  • Phase 6: Operation
  • Phase 7: Dismantling and post-processing

The main goal of Phases 1, 2 and 3 is to determine all the aspects of the terrain the ropeway should be built in. A further goal is the arrangements with the troop to be supplied. In Phase 4, all the technical issues of the ropeway are calculated. After a thorough inspection and survey of the route, the Ropeway Platoon commander creates his plan for Phase 5, the construction. In Phase 6, the operation of the ropeway, a major task is not only transport, but also a daily technical inspection. Phase 7 is dismantling and post-processing.

The minimum staff of the operating team are:

  • 1 winch operator
  • 2 loading crew
  • 2 unloading crew
  • 1 per each intermediate support
  • 1 only in areas with poor visibility

Equipment

The main parts of the equipment are:

  • Artificial Ropeway supports
  • Cable reel winder (HAWA-S)
  • Cable reel winder (HSW50)
  • Cable reel winder (HSW80)
  • Cable crane machine (SKA1.5)
  • Cable crane machine (SKA2.5)
  • Means of transport, for example a work basket, wood-transport with choker, transport bucket, big bag, transport net
  • Drill Station Lumesa UBH90
  • Injection Station IS400

References

  • Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Dienstvorschrift für das Bundesheer (zur Erprobung); Pionierunterstützung im Gebirge. Wien, Oktober 2017.
  • Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Merkblatt für das Bundesheer; Seilbahnbau; Grundlagen, Leistungsparameter und Gerätekunde. Wien, 2018.

Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Merkblatt für das Bundesheer; Seilbahnbau; Bauausführung, Betrieb und Sicherheitsbestimmungen. Wien, 2016.

13. 13 - MILENG support in VM in MW

LTC Holger POEPPE, DEU (A)

2011 – 2015 Dep Bn COM MnEngrBn 8

2016 – 2018 EXO Director of Management

2018 – 2020 MILENG Chief Ops

Since 2020 Senior Officer Concept & Doctrine, Custodian AJP-3.12

Email: holgerpoeppe@bundeswehr.org

Military Engineering (MILENG) is described as an inherent aspect of every joint function, at all levels of command, in any mission, campaign or operation, and in all phases. It achieves the desired objectives by enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility, and developing, maintaining, and improving infrastructure. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as engineering, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, Environmental Protection (EP), military search, and management of infrastructure, including contracted civil engineering. MILENG also makes a significant contribution to Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), protecting the force; and providing life support.

This short article will focus on ‘Vertical Manoeuvre’ within Mountain Warfare, thus focusing on MILENG support at a very tactical level. Although MILENG provides a significant contribution at all levels, in any mission or operation the core areas of MILENG support vary with regard to the land tactical operation in the specific environment. This article will provide the reader with information related to MILENG ‘as function’, its planning, execution and capabilities in support of ‘Vertical Manoeuvre’ in Mountain Warfare.

This figure draws the three MILENG pillars: enable/prevent manoeuvre, support to survivability, and develop/ maintain Infra.

The basic principles of mountain warfare are subject to the mountainous conditions, such as limited manoeuvre, canalized movements, the advantage of altitude domain points, or high demands on logistics. These basic principles are applicable to all services, and also to the adversary.

As MILENG is an enabler for mobility and provides a significant portion of survivability, MILENG support to vertical manoeuvre is imperative. To achieve the best effects on MILENG support within the areas of expertise, early involvement in the planning of land tactical operations in a mountainous environment is crucial. The Chief MILENG (CMILENG) provides advice to the commander during all the phases of an operation. With his MILENG staff already integrated at the planning process of an operation, various COAs can be supported by the appropriate MILENG activities to achieve the anticipated effects. As stated, early engagement in the planning phase is vital due to time intensive engineering support such as pathways improvement, gap crossing (mainly dry gaps such as gorges), mitigating natural hazards, or conducting breaching activities to support the mobility of own troops. This also applies to activities facilitating logistic support to improve sustainment and survivability.

Mobile cable cars or ropeways require decent planning and construction of them is time-intensive, but these assets can be a beneficial part of the logistics chain in close cooperation with pack animals and supply by helicopter. Up to 400 kg of food, water, ammunition, or other required equipment can be moved by these cable cars. Once established, cable cars are capable of connecting supply points to ensure constant and adequate supply. It is obvious that the reconnaissance, building and installation of a cable car postulates adequate planning and timing. The installation and operation of such assets also needs (mountain) engineers to execute and maintain them.

This article describes briefly how MILENG support to vertical manoeuvre in mountainous environment should be planned, operated, and executed. The key factors are the early engagement of MILENG advice, already in the planning cycle of an operation. MILENG staff should be established at all levels of command from the operational to the tactical level. MILENG support also requires consideration of sufficient time to prepare and to execute MILENG activities to achieve the desired objectives.

14. 14 - Medical support in Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare

 

Maj Ágnes Györfy, PhD, NATO MILMED COE

Member of the Military Mental Health Panel

Member of NATO STO HFM RTG – 277

Areas of Work: Personnel selection, mental health screening, psychological counselling, teamwork in the integrated treatment of psychosomatic disorders, psychological preparation for riot control, SWAT activities and other special police operations, hostage negotiation, forensic psychology

Email: interop.conex@coemed.org

Introduction

In Mountain Warfare medical support could be essential for increasing the chances of survival, which is important in the case of a well-trained soldier who is capable of Mountain Warfare operation. From this aspect, the human factor, personnel are the hardest to substitute or replace, so it is a key factor to preserve their deployability for as long as possible.

Medical support in these circumstances and at this height also has its specialties, where from every aspect we could point out the crucial points that need support and solutions from the technical side. If we go through the well-known METHANE report which we use in military medical scenarios in order to gain exact information – which is crucial for treatment and timely reaction – as quickly as possible, we could see the following:

Type of incident/injury

From this aspect the usually cold weather, the particular terrain and, from a certain height above sea level, the potentially presented hypoxia could determine what injuries to expect and how differently the individual could react in those circumstances at the physiological level. In some major incidents, mass casualties could not be handled in time because of the terrain and the access to the patients. Time is crucial from a medical point of view: who wins time wins life. Therefore, there should be more emphasis on the CLS (combat lifesaver) medics’ tasks, who are part of the team, trained and prepared to handle the situation and carry out primary care and communicate the medical evacuation.

Exact location

In these scenarios, sometimes finding the exact location of the injured person(s) is the hardest task, even with activated signals and other special devices. Mountain Warfare professionals know well how to determine it exactly, but communicating it to the medical units, especially during civil-military cooperation, is a really difficult task. Sometimes the language and the concept are different between the services, and if we take the stress factor also into consideration, we can see that there could be a lot of distortion in the process. Based on practical experience in mass casualties, in civilian cases approximately the 15-18th call could give the right information, but in a well-trained military team it could be the 4-6th.

Hazards, danger

The concept of hazards and danger can be also different in these circumstances. The ice, snow, and the rapidly changing conditions of weather at altitude are enough to provide dangerous situations besides the relevant military danger.

A barely accessible terrain means that a specialist can hardly get there, and decontamination, which in some cases should be carried out before the medical evaluation and treatment to prevent the medical specialist’s possible contamination, can only be done with great difficulty or not at all. Besides this, special medical equipment may not be able to be carried on this terrain by the already fully equipped soldiers.

Accessibility

Accessibility is the key component in this process, because in this terrain the injured person(s) are usually hard to access, and special equipment and a lot of extra time is required for finding and getting close enough to them to give the right treatment and to prepare them for delivery to get more specific treatment. The specialized terrain makes it harder even when we know the exact location. Questions can be merged, such as: Where to put down the medevac, and where are the other points for delivery of the patients? Because of the protective uniforms, even the injury may hardly be accessible in most cases.

Number of casualties

The number of casualties is usually lower than on flatter land, because of the nature of the operation and the smaller groups that can move together effectively in this terrain. Sometimes just one casualty takes long hours to find and access for a whole group of medical staff. Triage is extremely difficult when there are multiple injured in barely accessible, diverse places. Their handling could be delayed for a long time, decreasing their chances of survival. Both the patients and the medical staff should be prepared for a delay in accessibility and potentially prolonged care at the scene.

Emergency

This can also – like the aforementioned points – be a critical aspect. Do we have enough time to get close and get access to the patient to save them in the event of life-threatening injuries? In these cases the normally expected ‘golden hour’ (giving treatment within one hour provides the highest chances of survival) of medical care cannot be expected because of the usually inaccessible terrain. Besides this, we must be prepared for casualty movement and prolonged field care. According to previous experience, in civilian special medical teams the average time to access and treat a patient in mountain terrain is usually 16-18 hours.

Conclusion

We can conclude that in these circumstances the training and preparation process of mountain warfare teams from the medical aspect is also essential. It would be best if every team member had CLS training (Combat Life Saver), and there should be a medic in the team with a good connection to a specialized military and/or civilian medical rescue team. They should be able to treat at least emergency cases at the scene in order to save each other’s lives. They should have basic knowledge about handling:

  • Serious, life-threatening wounds
  • ABC (airway, breathing, circulation)
  • Haemorrhage / Control of bleeding
  • Triage
  • Hypothermia
  • Liquid, blood sugar control
  • Well-known medications

Having basic knowledge of emergency care even in this extreme terrain and circumstances, the chances of survival and preserving deployability become higher, along with the success of the operation.

References

  • Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support AJP 4.10
  • Mountain Warfare Fundamentals

15. 15 - CSS by pack animals

LTC Josef Hager, AUT (A)

2007 – to date: Commander of the Pack Animal Centre/Austrian Armed Forces Nov 2018 – Dec 2020: Assistant Defence Attache to Ghana and Nigeria Federal Ministry of Defence; Course Director Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Training Centre  Jul 2018 – Nov 2018: seconded Officer to the Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence                                                                                                 2001-2007:    Commander of the Supply Service Unit of the Provincial Military Command Vorarlberg                                                                                          1999-2001:    Quartermaster Officer Infantry Battalion 23                              1997-1999:    Company Commander Infantry Regiment 9

Email: josef.hager.6@bmlv.gv.at

Full commitment on four hooves

At the Pack Animal Centre, located at the military training area ‘HOCHFILZEN’, almost 60 Haflingers and donkeys serve in the Austrian Armed Forces.

The Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) have accommodated some very special ‘employees’ at HOCHFILZEN. They do not have ranks, but they still have demanding tasks. Eight donkeys and approximately 50 Haflingers currently live and work at the Pack Animal Centre (PAC). After a structural reform of the AAF in 2007, all existing pack animal units were relocated to HOCHFILZEN. Situated on the site of a modern military training area at an altitude between 1,000 and 2,400 metres, they are organizationally assigned to Combat Service Support Battalion 6 of the 6th Mountain Brigade. Particularly in mountainous terrain, the military still relies on four-legged support.

An indispensable operational element in mountain combat

The days when horses played a central role on the battlefield are long gone. As in many other areas of life and business, modern technology has long since replaced them in the Army. Nevertheless, the remaining pack animals in the AAF are much more than nostalgia; in mountainous operations, pack animals ensure the survival of the troops. The higher and more impassable the terrain, the more pack animals are in demand. In mountainous terrain, the Haflinger is superior even to off-road vehicles. In this way, they can ensure the survival of soldiers by providing them with food, and ensure the mobility and operational readiness of the troops by transporting equipment and weapons even into impassable areas. A decisive advantage is that the animals can do this regardless of the weather – unlike helicopters, for example. The main use of the pack animal system (the pack animal and its handler) is carrying heavy loads in difficult terrain. Up to 120 kg of supplies can be loaded on the special carrying saddle of a Haflinger. Depending on their size, donkeys can be loaded with a maximum of 80 kg. All the animals are trained to pull loads, and additionally the Haflinger horses are trained to be rideable. However, riding primarily plays a major role in training and maintaining the health of the horses.

A mission with great responsibility

Because it is the only pack animal unit in the AAF, the PAC in HOCHFILZEN bears great responsibility. Its mission is to support different branches of the AAF in all types of operations, especially in operations under difficult terrain conditions in mid and high mountain ranges at home and abroad. In preparation for any operation, training soldiers and animals in HOCHFILZEN is the top priority. Tactical riding and transport training for the Special Operations Forces takes also place there. The PAC also plays a leading role in the training sector internationally. There is close bilateral cooperation with the German Bundeswehr EAZ 230 (operations and training centre for pack animals), who regularly come to the AUT PAC for exercises. In 2022 we had troops from the Netherlands, among others, with us in HOCHFILZEN as part of the European ‘Mountain Training Initiative’.

24 hours, 365 days a year

The soldiers at the PAC not only have important tasks in terms of structure, they also have a special responsibility in their day-to-day work; looking after 60 animals that have neither weekends nor public holidays. We are a large ‘agricultural company’, so there is always work from morning to evening, 365 days a year. Feeding, mucking out, caring for and training the horses; all of this is on the agenda not only for the squad members, but also for the recruits. We do almost everything here ourselves, including building the fences –  that’s at least 5,000 running metres. The fence slats are not simply ordered at a hardware store, but are cut in the forests of the military training area, pulled out with the horses, cut to size and set up. The PAC is on duty around the clock; two recruits are always on duty, even at night. The work is demanding but varied – and despite the strict military hierarchy, it follows its own rules in some areas.

Individual regulations

Our processes and structures are based on the needs of the animals. In addition to the command with the leadership and administration, there are two platoons within the PAC: the pack animal training platoon, which is responsible for rearing and training, and the operational platoon. The knowledge has been built up over many years, but much of it is not set in stone. Due to our unique position within the AAF, we are missing a lot of regulations, and questions keep coming up for which there is no clear rule. Our team is working on the gap.

Pack animals and pack animal handlers: a tight-knit team

In addition to the general conditions, the demands on the soldiers at the PAC are also exceptional. The animals don’t care about ranks. What matters to them? Affection, patience, consistency and tenderness are important qualities that a pack animal handler must have. A pack animal system – the pack animal and its handler – must work together as a team. Both must be able to rely on each other 100%. Anyone who has never had anything to do with horses or donkeys must first develop a feeling for the animals. It is no wonder that Pauli, Astor and co. are given five minutes of cuddling after their daily work. The vast majority of recruits come to the PAC without any previous experience in dealing with horses. The conscripts come to us after two months of basic training. Then we begin training with animals, where we must first quickly develop the basics; we only have them available for a total of four months. During this time, they are trained as pack animal handlers and work with the horses and donkeys day after day. The various exercises often involve alpine terrain. In order for this to work safely for both the soldiers and the animals, both partners in the pack animal system must know exactly what they are doing. Our animals are well trained, and our pack animal handlers must learn everything essential in a very short time in order to be able to fulfil the tasks successfully with the animals in difficult terrain.

Young people urgently required!

Skilled young talent is increasingly in short supply among both conscripts and professional soldiers. There are hardly any recruits who already have experience with horses. Only a few of them enlist after their basic military service. Even if they do, many of our enlisted soldiers only stay for a limited time because they do not want to permanently relocate the centre of their lives. In addition, with us they have an almost 365-day workload and have a great deal of responsibility for the handlers and animals. That is only attractive for a few people in the long term, confirming the current challenges in the personnel area. Finding suitable offspring is also becoming increasingly difficult for the pack animals themselves. Since Haflingers have become popular as sport and leisure horses, breeding has developed in a new direction. The modern Haflinger is slimmer and sportier than the original breed. Finding horses that have the skills to carry heavy loads isn’t getting any easier. Every year around five young animals aged six months are bought, which then begin their careers in the AAF.

Loving rearing, consistent training

The first stop in their new home for the Haflinger stallions (colts) is the Schüttach breeding stable. There they spend their time with their peers in the playpen and in the spacious pastures in HOCHFILZEN until they are three years old. There are approximately 15 colts at any one time, who are slowly introduced to their future tasks through regular, intensive contact with people. The young animals spend the summer at the PAC’s own alpine hut, Marchentalm. In their fourth year they become ‘Remonte’; this is the name given to horses which are in training for later (military) use. They then move into their boxes in the main stable, which was built between 2007 and 2010. The training area and the training hall are attached. The training of our young horses is at the heart of our work. We train them not only to carry loads, but also as riding and draught animals. This task lies primarily with our professional soldiers, who have the necessary experience and skills. In around two years, the animals learn everything they will later need in action.

A lifetime of service

The training of the Haflinger is completed at around the age of six. The horses switch to the operational platoon, where they are in use almost every day, loaded with up to 120 kg and training together with their pack animal handlers. In between, they move wood to build fences or help keep paths clear on horseback, especially in winter. There is relaxation at the weekends, where the herd has access to a total of 35 hectares of pasture. We demand a great deal from our horses and in return offer them optimal living conditions. This is how we keep them healthy and operational. The animals usually remain in the operational platoon until they are around 20 years old, when they are sold into private hands. The older the horses get, the more difficult it is to find buyers for them. Our Haflingers are in great demand, both as leisure horses and in companies providing riding therapies. After all, they are in top shape and well trained.

Practice for emergencies

The animals are in top shape primarily because they are in use day after day. Different exercises for emergencies and operations are always on the agenda. We regularly go into difficult terrain with heavy loads. Correct loading is crucial. With loads of up to 120 kg and large volumes, everything must fit correctly so that pressure points and pain are avoided, and the sometimes sensitive load is also securely attached to the animal. The training then mainly involves movement in impassable terrain. It goes over narrow stony paths, through forests and, of course, often through deep snow in winter. Concentration is required, as is sure-footedness and trust between the humans and animals. In addition to exercises, we also practise setting up pack animal camps. If we are only on the road for a few hours, simple tie-down places are sufficient. The horses can take a breather there, protected by a ‘Woilach’, the blanket that we always have with us as a saddle pad. During longer exercises, canopies are constructed from tarpaulins to provide the horses with protection from the weather at night. Hay and water are delivered by vehicle during the exercises. When deployed, the animals get by on what they find in the forest and fields – only concentrated feed, i.e. grain cereals, is carried with them. But the army forests wouldn’t be happy if we let the animals eat from the forests every day. 

Not stupid: donkeys and their qualities

Frugality in terms of feeding is a decisive advantage in use. This is not the only reason why the Haflingers got reinforcements in 2016; a total of eight donkeys have since strengthened the animal team at the PAC. Their small size – compared to the Haflinger – is particularly noticeable when it comes to their food requirements. They are widespread worldwide and are native to mountainous regions, making them even more versatile for use at home and abroad. They are essential for training the Special Operations Forces for international operations. The fact that, unlike horses, they are not flight animals, makes them ideal for carrying sensitive goods in combat operations. In spite of their smaller body size, they are able to carry similar loads as their blonde-maned counterparts. They come to HOCHFILZEN between the ages of one and four, and their training then lasts a maximum of some months. Donkeys have many positive characteristics that make them suitable for military use. But we had to learn a lot during their training: donkeys are smart and it often takes patience to convince them to take on new tasks. Sometimes we stand at a bridge for four hours until we manage to cross it. In the long term, the PAC would like to further change the unit. The goal: a group of horses, a group of donkeys and a group of mules (a cross between a horse and a donkey). Not only donkeys, mules and horses; the professional soldiers at the PAC are trained to work with camels for missions and operations abroad.

Best working and training conditions

The infrastructure for these development steps is there. The PAC is not a cost factor. Our running costs are low compared to the maintenance costs of modern technical devices, and there is no need for investment in the infrastructure in the next 10 to 15 years. From the condition of the facility, it is easy to see that these are the best conditions for keeping and training the animals, as well as for training the recruits. In addition to the modern main stable, which meets all animal welfare criteria, there is an indoor and outdoor training hall, a training area and 35 hectares of pasture available. The SCHÜTTACH stable offers a species-appropriate surrounding for the young animals, and the MARCHENT alpine hut offers the best conditions for the summer months. But it is not just the animals who live here at the highest standard: with modern two- and four-bedded rooms, the Waldlager, built in 2017 as accommodation for the recruits, is also an example of the most modern military infrastructure. We have every reason to be satisfied – both people and animals find optimal conditions in the HOCHFILZEN military training area.

16. 16 - CSS by helicopter

 

MAJ Mathias Sporer, AUT (A)

Civil proficiency: Electrical engineer                                                                                          1999 entered military service, since 2004 Officer rank (contractor pilot)                        2002 Basic Flight School AB206 JET RANGER,                                                                            2004 Capt. Pilot ALOUETTE III                                                                                                      Total flight hours: 3800 h                                                                                                  Deployments: 2006 EUFOR/MNTF (N) BOSNIA, 2008 KFOR TF MERKUR,                         2009-2021 EUFOR ALTHEA BOSNIA

Email: mathias.sporer@bmlv.gv.at

Introduction

Nothing more needs to be said about the benefits of supporting combat by helicopter. Helicopters have been part of modern warfare for decades. But operating a helicopter in mountainous terrain can sometimes be much more challenging than elsewhere. Of course the weather is a big factor, but also the hot/high environment influences operations. This is why special training and equipment are required to keep both helicopters and crew operational.

This article has been written from an aviator’s point of view, after gathering experience flying for more than two decades in mountainous terrain.

Combat support service (CSS) by helicopter in mountainous terrain

CSS by helicopter in mountainous terrain works very much the same way as in flat, low altitude areas. However, due to the fact that the environment is completely different, and much harsher in most cases, operations need much more effort, special training, and equipment than usual.

The different roles helicopters can offer are still passenger transport, external/internal cargo transport, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, and SAR if needed. But it needs a kind of feeling to see why in mountainous terrain the helicopter crews support in a particular way, or sometimes need to say, ‘There’s no way’.

Main challenges for helicopters in mountainous terrain

The main factor in most cases is the weather, or let´s say the severe weather. Poor visibility and low cloud bases force helicopters into the valleys, to use ‘bad weather routes’. In most cases, there is a mountain pass at the head of the valley. Due to the low cloud base and/or poor visibility, that pass can be closed to helicopters. The crews operating in such conditions need to stay in visual contact with the ground surface. Hitting obstacles or a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) are common pilot errors in such conditions. Sometimes it needs a great deal of experience to find the exact point at which to turn back the way you came.

Low temperatures and freezing conditions helicopters need to face too. Helicopters are usually stuffed with highly sophisticated electronics. Operations in low temperature or changing temperature conditions, creating moisture inside the sensitive electronics, can be very limiting. To be honest, not many helicopters are allowed to be operated in freezing conditions by their manufacturer. Usually it means icing under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), where you got space to manoeuvre away from the ice, but in a narrow valley, there is seldom space to manoeuvre. IFR is the next thing not really working in a valley below summits right now.

Heavy precipitation multiplies the effort required to keep the helicopter in a ready state, and often results in poor visibility.

Strong winds can cause up and downwind effects at the crests of the mountains. In some cases, the downwind or wind shear is too strong for helicopters to operate or land in certain areas. These areas need to be avoided under such conditions.

The landing site also hides challenges. Often there is limited space, which makes the landing site unserviceable for larger helicopters. Slope limitations from 5-10° (depending on the type of helicopter) are also sometimes difficult to work with.

Snow landings, similar to dust landings, challenge the flight crews to keep ground reference. Obstacles can be obscured by the loose snow blown off by the rotor downwash. It is best to keep the wind on the nose, so most of the snow is blown off to the back of the hovering helicopter. The most effective way to land is upwind in any case, but sometimes it is hard to say where the wind is coming from. Landing site markings such as smoke or flags can help the flight crews; putting landing site marking in the correct direction and marking obstacles (day/night) can also help.

Refuelling in remote areas is an important point. Refuelling points in the vicinity are always preferable but not always available. Long distances to refuelling areas reduces the helicopters’ playtime at the scene.

Operating helicopters in mountainous terrain often means a hot/high environment. There is seldom a solution; in most cases it is a compromise of limiting factors.

Dealing with a hot/high environment means lower engine and main/tail rotor performance. It means lesser payload, lesser playtime and/or more time-consuming lifts, or a mix of all three. As mentioned above, a compromise of these factors must be found.

Sometimes simply a bigger/stronger helicopter can help in fulfilling a particular mission.

Specialized training/equipment for helicopter crews

Of course, to manage operations like this, special crew training is mandatory and must be maintained.

In the Austrian Armed Forces’ helicopter aviation, besides all the other training required to become mission-ready as crew, there are some extra courses added for mountainous terrain and high altitudes:

  • Two week high mountain landing course winter
  • Two week high mountain landing course summer
  • One week survival training in mountainous terrain winter
  • One week survival training in mountainous terrain summer
  • Firm geographical knowledge of the AoR

The geographical knowledge must of course be refreshed for any new deployment. It should consist of the bad weather routes or valleys, mountain passes including their heights, and known obstacles such as power lines, cableways, masts, etc.

To keep the crews trained, quarterly and half-yearly training flights are mandatory:

Quarterly training

  • 10 high mountain landings
  • 10 hoist operations
  • 10 sling cargos

Half-yearly training flights

  • 10 NVG high mountain landings
  • 3 NVG hoist operations

The winchmen are non-SQN members and are provided from different units all over Austria. They need training as a mountaineer and the basic course for winchman. Their certification must be updated every four years by a one-week hoist training course. Regular duty in various helicopter SQNs is desirable.

Besides the standard survival gear for aircrews, special equipment consists of warm clothing for temperatures well below 0°C the whole year. Special survival backpacks with additional equipment are provided for every helicopter. This backpack consists of more warm clothes, sleeping bags and food/water to make survival for the crew possible for at least 24 h.

Specific equipment/modifications for helicopters

Various equipment and modifications are available.

The following are mandatory:

  • Snow skids /ice spikes
  • Cable cutters
  • Rescue hoist and light
  • Cargo hook
  • Snow/rain/ice covers
  • De-icing fluids
  • Anti-ice equipment such as heated rotor blades, etc.
  • Moving map GPS including an obstacle library
  • Homing device if SAR is needed

This list does not claim to be comprehensive. Not all is available from the industry, but sometimes can be developed with the support of experienced crews.

Casualty evacuation/medical support

MEDEVAC/CASEVAC operations are quite similar to those in other areas, but some aspects need special attention. A rescue hoist is mandatory, since casualties must be rescued in any terrain. Reduced performance of the helicopter must be expected. Heated areas for the crew, and medication should be available; some medication needs a fridge. Short routes to refuelling areas are desirable. A lot more effort will be required to keep the helicopter in a ready state. Heated hangars or tent hangars, if available, can support the crews; sometimes roofed areas or portable cabin heating can be a solution. A ground-based medical service can be supported with passenger and cargo transports by helicopter.

Conclusion

The environmental impact on helicopter operations in mountainous terrain is much higher than under normal conditions. But nothing is impossible. Special training of personnel, special equipment and modifications of the helicopter make it possible to support ground troops in combat. In addition, the experience of the acting personnel does make a difference.

17. 17 - Multi-purpose helicopters designed for Special Air Operations

COL Tomislav Pušnik, HRV (Air)

Native of Celje, Slovenia. Graduation in June 1997 from the Faculty of Transport and Traffic Science, 1st generation Croatian military pilots.

Aircraft commander at the squadron, wing level, with more than 2,500 hours in the Bell 206 Jet Ranger, Mi-8T, Mi-8 MTV1 and Mi-171Sh helicopters, including about 180 flight hours in operations KFOR, ISAF and RESOLUTE SUPPORT.

Email: tomislav.pusnik@msaptc.org / tomislav.pusnik@morh.hr

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a dramatic escalation of the eight-year-old conflict, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and signified a historic turning point for European security. Since that day, we can say that the period of living in a peaceful and stable environment is behind us, and that we need to prepare for an extended period of life in which most countries in Europe will be exposed to different types of threats, from conventional conflicts to various asymmetric threats. As can be seen, European countries should prepare for various types of military conflict in which the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be enormous, especially if it is a question of asymmetric threats and unconventional warfare.

When we mention SOF and their role in today’s military conflicts, we must be aware that Special Operations are nothing new. Special Operations have been around forever, and the SOF that conduct such operations have existed since the beginning of the first more significant military conflicts, differing only in size and type of organization.

An excellent example of the importance of SOF and their influence on the outcome of military conflicts can be seen in the article “A Handful of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?” published by Colin S. Gray for the US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, where a great Mongol warlord was quoted. Colonel Yasotay, an officer in the army of Genghis Khan, the great Mongolian Emperor, is reported to have told General Khan: 

“When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world”.

Colonel Yasotay was referring to how, during missions of national strategic importance or during military campaigns, a small but specially trained elite force could change the dynamics and outcome of a complex and challenging situation far beyond any physical measure of their capability.

Special Operations, and therefore Special Air Operations, are those military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational tactics, techniques, and modes of employment that are not standard to conventional (regular) forces, and that are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations are often high risk, time sensitive, clandestine, or low visibility. SOF Air Operations are activities within SOF operations conducted by Special Operations Air Forces, often requiring support from conventional air units.

NATO Special Operations Forces are vital to multi-domain operations (MDO) where the coordinated use of capabilities from all service branches in more than one physical domain (land, sea, air, space, or cyberspace) or dimension (physical, human, or informational) is required. The defeat of enemies of great power requires the defeat of the enemy’s entire warfighting systems. This means defeating capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment (IE); including personnel, command and control (C2) architecture, intelligence, logistics base, and the enemy’s means of using data. Finally, the enemy must be defeated cognitively by destroying the will to fight.

This means that SOF must be organized, trained, and equipped to be deployed and to conduct operations in diverse geographic environments at short notice, and one of these is the mountainous environment. Generally speaking, the environmental considerations for Special Air Operations crews (Special Operations Aviation Task Units – SOATUs) are no different than for conventional operations crews. The exception is that SOATUs may find themselves deployed more independently, away from the large administrative areas afforded to a conventional deployment. This means that SOATU aircrew should continually improve their personal survival skills with periodic survival, escape/evasion, resistance, and extraction (SERE) refresher training and maintain their physical condition. Just like their land and maritime counterparts, special operations air personnel conduct special operations across the spectrum of conflict, using whatever equipment they have available in unconventional and innovative ways.

One of the main roles of rotary-wing (RW) SOATUs is the transport of SOF personnel and equipment in support of the SOF’s principal tasks: Military Assistance (MA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Direct Action (DA). These transport missions frequently involve extended ranges and difficult flying conditions (e.g. low visibility, austere environments, and high threat levels). The movement, pre-positioning, and resupply of these personnel and their equipment and supplies, which is often conducted in a discreet or covert manner and which is critical to the overall success, are carried out by SOATUs conducting special Air Transport (AT). Some nations have expanded their internal Special Operations Air Force capabilities beyond special AT, which may include ALI (Aviation Location Identification), close air support (CAS), close-combat attack (CCA), electronic warfare (EW), air-to-air refuelling (AAR), personnel recovery (PR), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)/casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for SOF, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

Multi-purpose Helicopters Designed for Special Air Ops

General

Special Operations Air Forces are the primary providers of air support to land and maritime SOF. Conventional air support, especially CCA, CAS, air interdiction (AI), ISR, airlift, PR, MEDEVAC, and AAR, can be provided to and used by SOF. However, it would be inappropriate to use conventional assets in environments where there is a level of physical and/or political risk not normally associated with their capabilities, or where special insertion or extraction techniques are required.

In order for the SOATU to be able to carry out its primary and additional missions defined by the doctrine of Special Forces, they should have helicopters in their composition that enable them to carry out operations in a politically sensitive environment which includes the acceptance of high risk, the constant presence of adversaries and a complex geographical environment.

Some NATO nations’ Special Operations Air Task Units fly helicopters which are highly modified, technologically sophisticated, and offer significant advantages in threat avoidance, survivability, extended ranges, and environmental capacity. While specialized helicopters have an essential role in extending the capabilities of special air warfare forces, high-end capabilities are costly to procure and sustain in terms of equipment, logistical support, and aircrew training. It is considered that a small number of NATO countries can have a different fleet of specialized and highly sophisticated helicopters intended for carrying out specific missions.

On the other hand, combat experiences from the past have demonstrated that in a counter-insurgency environment, technologically sophisticated helicopters are not necessary for many SOF Air Operations, and that for some NATO nations, the process of acquiring and introducing into operational use technologically sophisticated helicopters is very long and challenging. Given that, they are striving to upgrade their current fleet of helicopters.

However, SOF Air Operations in a near-peer environment will need more sophisticated helicopters and capabilities, given the advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems peer states have in their arsenal. Depending on the operational requirements, threats, environment, etc., RW aircraft can effectively support mission areas such as close air support (CAS) or special air transport (AT). They may be a lower-cost alternative to FW aircraft in specific roles and missions. In nearly every case, the requirement is for highly trained air personnel instilled with the special operations mindset who can employ the available vessels in ways unexpected by their adversaries.

Minimum NATO Special Operations Air Forces Standards

SOATUs quickly discover that more than traditional equipment will be needed; specific equipment often needs to be smaller, more discreet, distributed in sufficient numbers, and easy to maintain to ensure near-instant readiness. Deploying anywhere at very short notice requires that assets can be easily prepared/equipped (i.e. with a modular solution) for a variety of environments and scenarios.

Special Operations Air Forces use unique operational techniques, modes of employment, and/or equipment that may not be standard to conventional air forces. For this reason, Special Operations Air Forces must achieve specific minimum standards and operational capabilities to be certified as a NATO SOF unit.

The AFS Volume X, Special Operations Forces and NSHQ Guidelines for NATO SOF Helicopter Operations describe the minimum capabilities that SOF aircrew should acquire to attain essential Special Air Operations capability. In general terms, the minimum capabilities necessary to be considered SOF-qualified are:

  • Capable of planning and conducting special operations (including at least one of the three principal tasks of MA, SR, and DA) in the land and/or maritime environments through the provision of special operations air support, across the full spectrum of military operations, unilaterally and independently as directed by a SOCC, SOAC, or SOATG, or in support of a conventional command.
  • Capable of infiltrating and exfiltrating to or from hostile, politically sensitive, and potentially high-risk operational areas by day and night using special TTP that maximize the probability of mission success.
  • Capable of operating by day and night, in low illumination, in all terrains and environments, in adverse weather conditions (including cold and extremely hot temperatures, low visibility, low cloud ceilings, and high winds), and under austere conditions to insert, extract, resupply, or support land and maritime SOTGs or SOTUs.
  • Capable of conducting low-altitude (less than or equal to 500 feet above ground level) tactical-flight operations commensurate with mission requirements and the expected threat environment.
  • Capable of operating subordinate to a SOATG, SOAC, or SOCC, including conducting integrated mission planning and C2 of organic assets through the provision of liaison elements.

 

To carry out Special Air Operations by the minimum capabilities prescribed in AFS Volume X, as well as in the security environments and high threats, the Special Air Forces units should have in their composition helicopters adapted for today’s conditions of carrying out Special Air Operations. Given the helicopter platforms in their composition, the Special Air Forces should modify and equip them with technologically sophisticated equipment that offers significant advantages in threat avoidance, survivability, extended ranges, and environmental capacity. These systems or equipment can be installed individually or modularly. Some of the more common special air operations modifications that NATO nations have pursued include:

  • Night vision goggle (NVG) compatible interior and exterior lighting.
  • Air refuelling (FW to RW).
  • Fast rope insertion and extraction kit.
  • Ballistic protection.
  • Extended range modifications.
  • Global navigation satellite systems.
  • Terrain-following and terrain-avoidance radars.
  • NATO standard secure line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications and data transfer suites.
  • ISR equipment.
  • Armaments (offensive and defensive).
  • Defensive systems, electronic countermeasures, chaff, and flares.
  • Temporary, usually water-based, aircraft paint to allow scenario-appropriate camouflage.
  • Situational awareness (SA) equipment to facilitate reduced visibility operations.

Conclusion

In all aspects of Special Air Operations, humans are more important than hardware. This means that special operations aircrews will often use conventional aircraft and equipment to achieve unconventional results. Some nations have employed very specialized, purpose-built aircraft, while other nations have been able to achieve very good results with some after-market modifications to aircraft already in use by their conventional fleets. The main goal is to modify the helicopters and equip them to enable the implementation of special air operations in politically sensitive areas where there is a real danger of various threats due to the constant presence of the adversary. In addition, given that the logistical maintenance of helicopter platforms is costly, the goal is to have a unique platform that will reduce the cost of maintenance and the need to store spare parts for several different helicopter platforms. Also, today, when the demand for human resources is very high and their training is expensive and time-consuming, the goal is to speed up and simplify it, which is achieved by introducing into operational use multi-purpose helicopters that can perform several different specialized tasks.

The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter is the best example of a multi-purpose helicopter platform. More than 30 militaries around the world depend on UH-60 and S-70 Black Hawk fleets for high reliability in tough environments. These multi-purpose platforms have a proven military pedigree of transporting troops and cargo into battle, conducting armed reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, medevac and humanitarian relief missions. The U.S. Army’s stated intent to continue operating Black Hawk helicopters into the 2070s means the platform will benefit from continued investment for another 50 years from both Sikorsky and the U.S. military. As part of that effort, Sikorsky has developed and certified a new weapons system retrofit kit for the Black Hawk. Armed Black Hawks do exist, but the majority of these have been modified by the U.S. Special Operations community for their specific needs and are therefore not available internationally.

The genesis of Sikorsky’s new weapons system kit dates back to 2009, when Sikorsky and Elbit Systems conducted proof-of-concept demonstrations for an armed Black Hawk in Israel. Both companies invested their own money and, over two years, test-fired a number of weapons, including a turreted gun, guided advanced tactical rockets (GATR), and the Spike air-to-ground missile.

“The demonstration programme in Israel had very positive results,” said Joe Palumbo, Sikorsky’s programme director overseeing the weapons system programme for the Black Hawk. “Couple that with the strong international customer base of almost 1,400 Black Hawks, and the fact that many nations can’t support both a utility helicopter and an attack helicopter – these factors taken together supported the business case to develop a kit to weaponize the Black Hawk. The new weapons system kit also leverages our whole logistics and support package by having one inventory of parts and one training path for pilots, so that’s also very attractive to fleet operators.”

The new weapons kit is designed for third-generation S-70M and S-70i Black Hawks, all of which are built to a military standard and equipped with a digital cockpit, digital interface database, enhanced engines and blades, an integrated vehicle health management system (IVHMS), and various other safety and product improvements.

The digital architecture of these aircraft facilitates full integration of the weapons system kit with the cockpit avionics, and will enable the crew to fire fixed-forward guns, rockets and missiles during armed reconnaissance missions; it can also act as a multi-role medium attack helicopter supporting ground troops. Weapons are carried by two external wings – the external stores and weapons system (ESWS). Together, the wings have four weapons stations that can support any combination of certified munitions or up to four 200-gallon external fuel tanks, which allows the aircraft to self-deploy on long missions or be ferried up to 1,400 km.

It takes around three months to modify a Black Hawk with the integrated weapons system kit, which is then warrantied by Sikorsky. Once modified, support crews can configure the aircraft to its medium attack role in less than three hours, thus giving military commanders flexibility as battlefield situations dictate.

The weapons management targeting system for the new kit is made by Elbit Systems, and is now integrated with the Black Hawk’s integrated head-up display (I-HUD). By integrating with the I-HUD, the pilot no longer has to look down to his weapons pages to select weapons or to do any ballistic calculations.

The primary benefit of a weapons system integrated with the aircraft’s flight controls is the ability to put the first round onto a static or moving target with minimal training. Extreme accuracy is ideal for minimizing collateral damage to assets in close proximity to targets, thereby reducing the risk for troops in the field while providing close air support.

The weapons include fixed-forward GAU-19 and M134 guns, seven different types of unguided 2.75-inch (70mm) Hydra rockets in 19-shot or 7-shot pod configuration, and the Hellfire air-to-ground missile. The new weapons kit is also able to launch the 2.75-inch guided advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) and/or TALON rockets. These precision weapons require a laser designator, which is part of the EO/IR pod fitted to the aircraft.

Considerable effort was spent developing new software for the aircraft’s flight management system and for weapons symbology in the multi-function displays. The aircraft’s electrical system was also amended to support the power required for the weapons.

The pilots’ cyclic grips have weapons selection and trigger mechanisms added, while the collective is now configured with additional weapons features. Also added are integrated electronic circuit breakers and two centre-console mission grips (for pilot and co-pilot) to operate weapons and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors. The aircraft are also fitted for engine inlet barrier filters and internal auxiliary fuel tanks.

Rounding out the major systems enhancements is the pilot’s helmet tracking system, which is completely mapped to the cockpit so that weapons symbology is harmonized when the pilot turns his or her head. The weapons system mission kit also includes ammunition pallets that fit inside the cabin to feed the GAU-19 and M134 guns.

The test aircraft were fitted with the FLIR Systems BRITE Star II EO/IR pod, though the Black Hawk can accommodate other vendors’ pods to suit customer requirements. Although these sensors can be removed when not in armed configuration, Sikorsky believes that most operators will elect to keep them on the aircraft for enhanced situational awareness during day or night, and the ability to conduct search and rescue operations as needed.

18. 18 - Dual-use of drones in mountainous environments

Sebastian Maygruendter

Sebastian Mayrgündter works at NOI Techpark in Bolzano/Bozen as a specialist for drones in extreme environments. As an economist, he took up the position to improve the interaction of government interventions for the development of this new industry. Since 2015, he has contributed to the development of industrial applications of drones in mountain areas for filming and monitoring of natural hazards, and in agriculture by supporting and accompanying many innovation projects. He pays particular attention to the use of drones in mountain rescue. He has actively supported and scientifically accompanied the development of drone teams in mountain rescue in Belluno, South Tyrol, Tyrol and Bavaria.

Email: s.mayrguendter@noi.bz.it

Summary:

Over the past few years, research teams, startups and companies at NOI Techpark have shown how to give ideas wings – and those who have taken business ideas or research and development projects into the air with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) – also known as drones – have really made us fly. We have accompanied numerous projects on these topics: moderating, and searching for funding and partnerships, always impressed each time by the ingenuity and passion of all involved.

This report illustrates the experience of mountain rescue in adopting drones for rescue, demonstrating the importance of creating a network of stakeholders with complementary skills. Specifically, we would like to see test fields – including former military infrastructures – for continuous testing to verify the applicability of drones in extreme environments. Finally, we emphasize the need to increase investment in this sector in order to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and improve defence capabilities. Cooperation between military users, research and industry plays a crucial role in this.

About us

NOI Techpark – Innovation that people need

NOI stands for NATURE OF INNOVATION. Our approach is inspired by nature. So far, nature is the start-up that has produced the most unicorns – and we have taken note. Our philosophy is centred on the Nature of Innovation – keeping what works, discarding what does not, and creating solutions that improve people’s lives. For us, innovation means answering questions and designing solutions with the potential for success. In one respect, we are even ahead of nature. While nature has to rely on trial and error, we rely on market analyses, timing and process methods, and we build on the know-how of companies, start-ups and science. This makes innovation feasible and sustainable, even for small companies.

Situated on the border with Austria and Switzerland, South Tyrol is Italy’s northernmost region. It is a link between north and south, a holiday destination, and an up-and-coming business and research location with a history rich in changes. NOI is South Tyrol’s growing innovation district, which links economy and science to boost R&D investment, business innovation and research impact. As a next generation European science and technology park, we focus on sustainability, open innovation, a European innovation strategy and the needs of the territory.

Hard Facts

 

1,100 People

       3   Research Institutes

     15  Languages

     62  Companies

     12  Hectare Campus

     25  Start-ups

       3   University Facilities

     49  Research Laboratories

 

At NOI we offer the space, time and expertise to accompany promising ideas on their way to innovative products:

  • LABS: 46 scientific and 3 prototype laboratories: we connect you with the right laboratory.
  • TECH TRANSFER: Knowledge transfer and technological know-how: we advise, support and network within our technology fields.
  • START-UP INCUBATOR: Coaching, workshops, access to mentors and investors, accelerator programmes and more: we help start-ups grow.
  • INNOVATION MANAGEMENT: Innovation between user, technology and the economy: we support companies during the innovation process.
  • AREA & SPACES: We offer spaces for events, offices, and laboratories.
  • EU-OPPORTUNITIES: As an official partner of the EEN network, we are the gateway to Europe for innovative companies.
  • OPEN DATA HUB: Access to South Tyrol’s largest data pool on tourism, mobility and more.
  • PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: Customized initiatives and events for families, children, students and interested adults.

Tech Transfer Automotive | Automation

Competence Centre for Drones in Extreme Environments

 

The Competence Centre for Drones in Extreme Environments at NOI Techpark is a dedicated facility focused on the development and application of drone technology in challenging and extreme environments. Located in South Tyrol, the centre aims to support the region’s transition to a green and digital economy by leveraging drones for various purposes. It is part of the ecosystem Automotive | Automation.

The ecosystem Automotive | Automation in the broader sense contains more than 800 producing companies and service providers. These employ over 16,000 people, and are among the region’s most important exporters, contributing to more than half of the regional investments in research and development.

Additive manufacturing, electrification, mechatronics, optical measurement technology and sensors – these are the key technologies receiving special attention. They are developed and brought to application in a network of innovative start-ups, specialized service providers, internationally established enterprises, and investors. For their support, we provide the following services:

  • We advise and support them in R&D projects.
  • We network them with companies and research partners.
  • We organise events where we pass on sound technological know-how.

Drones have the potential to address various challenges in South Tyrol, such as providing aerial imaging for industries, reducing risks in steep vineyards, monitoring critical infrastructure, and delivering goods to remote areas. However, the use of drones in complex terrain such as mountains poses unique challenges. The advancement of artificial intelligence is expected to open new possibilities for drone applications in the future, but safety concerns, infrastructure requirements, data analytics, and the need for a specialized ecosystem remain significant considerations.

To foster innovation and address extreme environmental issues, the Competence Centre collaborates with pilot teams from mountain rescue organizations in Belluno, South Tyrol, Tyrol, and Bavaria. Scientists and other collaborators also participate in these initiatives to co-develop and test innovative practices and technologies. This approach, implemented within the START LIVING LAB, aims to bring together diverse expertise and resources to tackle the specific challenges posed by extreme environments.

Overall, the Competence Centre for Drones in Extreme Environments at NOI Techpark plays a crucial role in promoting the application of drone technology in challenging settings, fostering collaboration between stakeholders, and driving innovation in South Tyrol’s green and digital economy.

The network of NOI Techpark

Pioneering Mountain Applications for UAS in Extreme Environments

In recent years, drones have emerged as a transformative technology with vast potential across various industries. UAS are a sustainable, low-cost and less man-intensive alternative to helicopters for logistics and tactical support of operations in extreme environments. On the military side drones have been used for the last 30 years. European military drone capabilities remain less mature than in other parts of the world, but the potential contribution of military use to EU strategic autonomy is recognized. One of the areas where drones are expected to play a crucial role in the future is in extreme environments, particularly in mountainous regions. The development of an ecosystem of drones tailored for these challenging terrains is gaining momentum, driven by user-centred organization and addressing the dual-use challenge of civil applications and safety.

  1. Drones: A Future Key Technology in Mountain Areas

Drones offer unique capabilities which make them invaluable tools for various applications in mountainous regions. These unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can overcome geographical barriers, access remote and hazardous areas, and provide valuable data for a wide range of purposes. They can be equipped with advanced sensors, cameras, and other payloads to capture high-resolution imagery, collect environmental data, and assist in search and rescue operations. The potential applications in mountain areas are diverse, including environmental monitoring, infrastructure inspection, wildlife management, and emergency response.

  1. User-Centred Development:

To ensure the effectiveness and usability of drones in extreme environments, the development of this ecosystem at NOI Techpark is organized in a user-centred manner. This approach involves close collaboration with stakeholders such as mountaineers, mountain rescue teams, environmental researchers, and local communities. By engaging with end-users throughout the development process, the ecosystem can better understand their specific needs, challenges, and requirements. This user feedback helps shape the design, functionalities, and capabilities of the drones, ensuring that they are tailored to address the unique demands of operating in mountainous terrain.

  1. Dual-Use Challenges:

One of the significant challenges in developing an ecosystem of drones for extreme environments is the dual-use aspect. While the primary focus may be on civil applications such as environmental monitoring or infrastructure inspection, safety is paramount. Drones should be designed to mitigate risks and ensure compliance with regulations, particularly in areas prone to avalanches, extreme weather conditions or other hazardous situations. This requires the development of technological solutions that prioritize both the effectiveness of the technology for civil use, and its ability to enhance safety in extreme environments.

 

The emergence of an ecosystem of drones for extreme environments, particularly in mountain areas, holds immense potential. By embracing a user-centred development approach and addressing the challenges of dual-use applications, these drones can revolutionize operations in remote and hazardous terrain. The integration of advanced sensors, data analysis techniques and safety features will enable the drones to provide valuable insights, enhance situational awareness, and contribute to the well-being of both the environment and the people operating in these extreme locations. As the technology continues to evolve, the ecosystem of drones for extreme environments will undoubtedly unlock new possibilities and improve our ability to understand and address the unique challenges posed by mountainous regions.

The following are the selected partners with whom an ecosystem for the dual use of drones in extreme conditions is being established at the NOI Techpark:

IDV

Military vehicles

IDV, a company of Iveco Group, is dedicated to delivering innovative automotive and protection solutions to meet the needs of military customers worldwide. The company, whose headquarters is in Bolzano (Italy), manufactures specialist logistic, protected, and armoured vehicles to meet a broad spectrum of defence applications.

FlyingBasket

Cargo drones

This start-up was the first commercial cargo drone available in Europe. FlyingBasket is a drone manufacturer specializing in heavy-payload cargo drones. Over the last seven years of activity, from prototyping to production, the matured expertise has converged into the FB3 cargo drone. With 8 rotors and a 100kg payload capability, it is used to lift and transport goods, materials, and equipment in different applications and environments. Since May 2023, Leonardo S.p.A. has become an important shareholder, enabling FlyingBasket’s further growth.

MAVTech

Transport of Airborne Sensors such as defibrillators, RGB, IR and Lifeseeker

MAVTech has a primary interest in the development of innovative aeronautical products and services, for aerial surveys and tactical operation support, transferring new aerospace technologies from research to the industrial domain. The Q4X Drone is designed to provide high performance in harsh environments. Powerful engines and light rain resistance ensure high-altitude flights. The Q4X can be equipped with high resolution RGB and thermal cameras for search and rescue purposes, tactical surveys and aerial monitoring.

START mountain rescue

Inter-regional cooperation

As part of the START project – funded by the European Union – mountain rescue organizations began a collaboration on technology development in 2018. The focus is the development of airborne support and the establishment of drone teams in the rescue chain. Today, there are about 42 teams in the region that use drones for the safety of people on the mountain. On the one hand, this collaboration focuses on automation in flight planning and risk assessment, as well as the innovative application of sensor systems; on the other, the transport of material over the ‘last mile’ in rough terrain is being tested.

EURAC research TerraXCube

Testing of people and machines in extreme environments

The Extreme Climate Simulator can simulate the most extreme climate conditions on earth. In one large (12x6x5m) and four smaller climate chambers it is possible to investigate how people and ecological processes react to environmental stress, and how extreme climate conditions affect the performance of materials and technical products. Drones can fly in an artificially reproduced scenario of multiple climatic stress factors: wind, heat, rain, snow, high altitude, etc.

UAVDACH

Working group Public Safety and Defence

UAVDACH e.V. is the most experienced association for civil and commercial aviation of unmanned aircraft systems in Europe. Since 2000, UAVDACH has represented the interests of its more than 240 members from research, manufacturing and application in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.

Drones for mountain rescue

In November 2023, the kickoff event of the Public Security & Defence Working Group took place, focusing on dual-use systems and purely military systems.

Lessons learned from UAS in mountain rescue 2016-2022

Since 2016, NOI Techpark has been involved in many projects where drones are used in alpine risk management. Initially – as in the EVADAR (Emergenze gestite con Velivoli a pilotaggio remoto in Aree di Difficile Accesso e a Rischio) project funded by ARGEALP (2015-2017) – it was about exploring the performance of drones in comparison with ground-based and satellite technologies. However, we then realized that the weak point in the implementation of the technology is the human aspect. We therefore we switched to a more user-centric approach (DronEX, EFRE1132, 2017-2020) and focused on possible applications of the technology (InnoAlp Tec, EFRE 1060, 2016-2019); in this 2nd phase we focused on development applications such as filming, agriculture, monitoring, transport and rescue, and on the development of an international ecosystem for drone technologies. Finally, the project START (Interreg V IT-AT, 2018-2021) offered the opportunity to enable mountain rescuers to cooperate with research and companies in the innovation process. We then realized that working with users in a structured innovation process would be beneficial to our goal: the development of an industry for drones in extreme environments.

  • Step 1: Co-develop

This is a creative step where diverse perspectives are brought together to share information, data, experience, and new ideas about how to improve specific practices or technologies. With the active involvement of specific users, the innovations and accompanying scientific research activities are co-developed and prepared for testing. NOI offers support at this stage with the service R&D consulting, including EU funding opportunities.[1]

  • Step 2: Evaluate

The innovations are evaluated where they will be used: by specific users in the real environment or in the TerraXCube. Along with real-life tests, scientific research helps assess how well the practices or technologies are performing, including their environmental and socio-economic impact. NOI offers support at this stage with specific labs and expertise.

  • Step 3: Test

The innovations are tested in many ways, such as their practical application and effectiveness, based on both scientific research and the hands-on experience of specific users. This data and evaluation ensures that specific users and scientists have useful and scientifically proven solutions that can be readily adopted by others. NOI offers support at this stage with the service Networking & Cooperation, creating synergies for the solutions of the future.[2]

[1] See https://noi.bz.it/en/for-companies/get-r-d-advice

[2] See https://noi.bz.it/en/services/networking-cooperation

Evidence from the pilot teams of the mountain rescue services

Drones in emergency response[1]

As part of the START project, we were able to accompany mountain rescue services in the introduction of drones. We conducted 11 usability tests with 49 scenarios with 288 participants from Austrian and Italian mountain rescue organizations. In this way we were able to investigate the usability and effectiveness of drones in rescue operations, especially in mountainous regions. The tests showed that drones have the potential to reduce operational risks, increase the safety and performance of responders, and improve mission planning and control. The results highlight the benefits of using drones in emergency operations, such as search and rescue missions and emergency equipment delivery, by reducing response times and minimizing risk. However, improvements in drone-to-helicopter communications are needed to further increase the operational capability of drones for emergency missions. Mountain rescue pilots need to be empowered (training, adaptation of the legal framework) to bring help to people in need by transporting rescue equipment and providing tactical support for search and rescue.

[1] Wankmüller, Kunovjanex, Mayrgündter, “Drones in emergency response – evidence from cross-border, multi-disciplinary usability tests”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 65 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102567

Use cases

SAR operations with telemedical support[1]

Together with the South Tyrolean Mountain and Cave Rescue and EURAC research, we used scientific methods to investigate the use of drones in search and rescue (SAR) missions in difficult terrain. The challenge for mountain rescue is to shorten the search time and the treatment-free interval for patients. The study conducted a randomized controlled trial comparing two methods of searching for and treating a patient: a drone-assisted intervention group and a conventional ground rescue control group.

The results showed that the average time to locate the patient was 14.6 minutes in the drone-assisted intervention group and 20.6 minutes in the control group. The use of drones in SAR missions significantly reduced the search time and treatment-free interval for patients in difficult terrain. The results suggest that drones may enable faster searching and delivery of medical equipment, which could improve outcomes for patients with traumatic injuries.

Alpine Star[2]

During the multidomain exercise ‘Alpine Star’ in Merano-Merano 2000 (IT) in 2022, the Italian Army deployed unmanned systems capable of operating in constantly changing environments and increasing the protection of personnel on a mission from potential threats. FlyingBasket contributed a logistic transport drone designed to support mountain troops in their daily high-altitude logistics challenges in extreme environments and weather conditions. Its main feature is the ability to transport a payload of up to 100 kg over long distances.

[1] Strapazzon, Mayrgündter, van Veelen et al., “Drones reduce the treatment-free interval in search and rescue operations with telemedical support – A randomized controlled trial”, American Journal of Emergency Medicine 66 (2023) 40-44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajem.2023.01.020

[2] Promotion video of Leonardo. Starting from 1:59 you see a video about FlyingBasket’s cargo drone: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyMOmkxKW8g

Rescue Drone 2030

With the development of the concept ‘Rescue Drone 2030’ we have identified a wide range of potential applications that could significantly enhance UAS operations, including remote location of people, transportation of rescue materials, ‘eye in the sky’ exploration, telediagnosis of patients, and transportation of people. For the use cases that we develop, we pay attention to sustainability as a first step; in particular, we require that the solution can add value in an economic context and that the environmental impact is favourable. Furthermore, safety must be manageable. If this is successful, we support an R&D project of an innovative application for the rescue system. Each application highlights the benefits and the positive impact it can have on rescue missions.

  1. Remote Location of People: Sensor-Based Detection
  • Increased security during rescue in rough and steep terrain.
  • Capable of conducting rescue operations in unfavourable environmental conditions.
  • Enables faster response time with first aid within 5 minutes.
  1. ‘Eye in the Sky’: Exploration of the Area of Operation
  • Enables mapping of the rescue area for better situational awareness.
  • Supports exploration and assessment of dangerous situations, even in adverse weather conditions.
  • Provides real-time monitoring to aid mission coordination and decision-making.
  1. Transportation of Rescue Materials:
  • Companies can initiate initial steps in rescue efforts.
  • Facilitates first aid treatment through the delivery of essential medicines.
  • Allows autonomous delivery of defibrillators in cases where rescue teams experience delays.
  1. Telediagnosis of Patients:
  • Establishes contact between rescuers and individuals in need of assistance, providing reassurance.
  • Enables initial diagnosis for faster treatment, increasing chances of successful outcomes.
  • Can be combined with the transportation of rescue materials for seamless support.
  1. Transportation of People:
  2. Transport of Rescuers:
  • Saves time by quickly transporting rescuers to the scene, enhancing response capabilities.
  • Improves accessibility in challenging terrain, reaching remote locations more efficiently.
  1. Transportation of Patients:
  • Reduces transportation time, ensuring timely medical attention.
  • Facilitates rescue operations even in difficult conditions, improving chances of survival.

The Rescue Drone 2030 offers a multitude of advantages across various applications in rescue operations. From remote location detection and transportation of rescue materials, to serving as an ‘eye in the sky’ for exploration and telediagnosis of patients, as well as efficient transportation of both rescuers and patients, these applications increase the effectiveness and efficiency of rescue missions. By leveraging the capabilities of the Rescue Drone 2030, rescue teams can save lives, mitigate risks, and provide vital support in challenging and critical situations.

Opportunities for mountain rescue

START rescue drones

While rescue drones offer significant benefits in mountain rescue scenarios, there are several challenges that need to be addressed. As part of the study ‘RESCUE DRONES 2030’, we have summarized the challenges and potential benefits of using rescue drones in mountainous regions. The use of drones in alpine terrain can significantly increase the safety of rescuers and shorten the time to reach the patient. According to leading experts in Europe, particular emphasis is placed on tactical support in rescue operations through transport of material and the ability of drones to locate people, especially in adverse weather conditions and difficult terrain.

Legal regulations, including airspace guidelines and collision avoidance systems, pose a major challenge to the widespread use of drones. For example, connectivity in remote areas and transporting people is currently only possible in experimental settings due to legal requirements. Currently, drones are not yet perceived as an integral part of rescue operations, creating tension between traditional rescue methods and the potential of drone technology. Legal frameworks, communication and acceptance among stakeholders, and cost-effectiveness remain key areas that require attention.

For the further development of the rescue drone, the study recommends cooperation with industry, which is only possible through the development of large-scale use cases. In the industrial sector, drones are already finding applications in areas such as agriculture, media production, and logistics. However, their economic viability is still limited in many cases. The cost-benefit factor of drone use is not yet comparable to that of human resources. The interviewed experts suggest that scalability and modular design could help find economically viable applications for drones by 2030.

What are the advantages of military and civil cooperation?

Creating an innovation ecosystem

Collaboration between the military and civil sectors in the development of drone technology offers numerous advantages. In Europe, citizens have shown a positive attitude towards the use of drones for community-oriented purposes, such as medical or emergency transport and connecting remote areas.[1] While military drones have been in use for several decades, the maturity of European military drone capabilities lags behind other regions. However, the potential contribution of military use to EU strategic autonomy is recognized by the European Commission.[2]

Fundamental to this is significant support for and investments in start-ups and new technology-oriented businesses. These factors are driving the creation of an innovation ecosystem. By addressing concerns related to safety, security, noise, and environmental impact, these measures aim to ensure that unmanned systems benefit society at large by providing affordable, integrated, and complementary mobility solutions. Consequently, within the next three to five years, Europe expects to see the emergence of greener and faster mobility solutions for extreme environments.

[1] EASA (2021), Study on the societal acceptance of Urban Air Mobility in Europe

[2] EU Drone Strategy 2.0, COM(2022) 652 final

Dual Use Systems and Multi Domain Operations

User-Centric Approach and EU Drone Strategy 2.0

The Multi-Domain Operations approach within NATO emphasizes the importance of external stakeholders in innovation, technological advancement, and military capability transformation. This approach enables the Alliance to strategically influence events, synchronize efforts with external stakeholders, and present formidable challenges to adversaries.[1]

In 2022, the European Commission published the ‘Drone Strategy 2.0 for a Smart and Sustainable Unmanned Aircraft Ecosystem in Europe’.5 This strategy outlines the necessary actions to deploy a drone ecosystem in the European Union, aligning with the goals of the European Green Deal[2] and the digital transformation of the European Economy and of the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy[3]. At NOI Techpark we focus on drones in extreme environments.

By fostering an innovation ecosystem, addressing dual-use considerations, and aligning with strategic approaches such as Multi-Domain Operations and the European Drone Strategy 2.0, Europe can unlock the potential of drones for both military and civil applications. This collaboration holds promise for enhancing mobility, safety, and sustainability in extreme environments, while supporting broader societal goals. Under a user-centric approach, collaboration between mountain rescuers, mountain warfare teams, academia, and companies can lead to the development of NATO Class I and II drones tailored to their specific needs. The European Defence Fund may provide support under specific conditions to implement Flagship Action 14 of the EU Drone Strategy 2.0. This action aims to establish an EU network of civil-defence drone testing centres, facilitating exchanges between the civilian and defence sectors.

[1] NATO (2023), Multi-Domain Operations in NATO – Explained, https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/

[2] European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final

[3] EU Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy, COM(2020) 789 final

Test fields in South Tyrol and Europe

Possible R&D cooperation

The drone industry in South Tyrol has been experiencing exponential growth in recent years. This growth has highlighted the need for facilities to test new technologies and collaborate with the research community and stakeholders in the region. Test flights and flight demonstrations play a crucial role in the safe exploration and development of new drone prototypes, as they transition from concept to deployment or demonstrate new business scenarios. In 2020, we conducted a survey in which we invited 616 stakeholders from all over Europe to participate.

The study revealed that testing drones both indoors and outdoors is essential for the product development of the industry. This finding is aligned with the Smart Specialization Strategy of South Tyrol (RIS3), which recommends the establishment of testing areas in close proximity to practical applications. The strategy also emphasizes the promotion of intersectoral cooperation, cross-project collaboration, and exchange with other regions, including data exchange.[1]

The European Union recognizes that better availability and geographic distribution of test sites across the EU would be beneficial for the development of unmanned technologies, encompassing both digital infrastructure and vehicle technology. Additionally, given the limited availability of airspace and airfield facilities, maximizing the use of military facilities is crucial to enable the dual-use of defined airspace volumes and to facilitate harmonized testing between civil, military, and commercial operators.[2]

[1] Measure 20, Smart Specialisation Strategy of South Tyrol (2021)

[2] Flagship Action 14, EU Drone Strategy 2.0, COM(2022) 652 final

Living Lab South Tyrol

User centred innovation with mountain rescue

The Living Lab Initiative revolutionizes rescue drone innovation by uniting mountain rescue teams, scientists, and industry leaders to co-develop and test pioneering practices and technologies that tackle technological challenges in extreme environments with drones. This turns the conventional innovation process (specifications – technological innovation – pilot project – standardization – procurement) on its head, as the user participates from the outset. At the start of a research and development project, dedicated interdisciplinary R&D teams identify needs, establish common priorities, and define objectives. Through this collective effort, they design innovative practices or technologies to address these needs. The resulting innovations are then subjected to repeated testing, evaluation, and iterative improvements. With each cycle, the team gains valuable insights into the practices and technologies being developed. By repeating the process, the innovations are continually refined based on feedback from users, collaborators, scientists, and the prioritization of the challenges.

In our inter-regional project with mountain rescue teams from Italy, Austria, and Germany, scientists and teams of FlyingBasket and MAVTech will be developing not only an experimental test site but also a cross-border competence network from 2023 to 2025. The START Living Lab will implement suitable methods and procedures throughout its establishment and operation. Based on stakeholder needs analysis, the following airborne topics have been prioritized:

  • Life Seeker (Manual BVLOS flight for locating mobile phones)
  • Range Extension (Delivery of equipment to an operation site using cargo drones)
  • Drone Swarm (Systematic search with a flight plan)
  • Radio Range Extender
  • Forest Fire Monitoring (Temperature, air quality)
  • Transportation of injured individuals
  • Acoustic sensors for Detect & Avoid
  • Vertiport & Mobile Command Centre

By establishing a cross-border competence network, we aim to enhance the capabilities of mountain rescue teams and contribute to the safety and efficiency of operations in challenging mountainous environments. The experience of mountain rescue teams can be used to further develop unmanned systems for mountain warfare teams.

19. 19 - Why Simulation? The Benefits of Synthetic Hoist Training

 

 

 

 

Mario Schuler, AUT

Sales Manager, AMST Group

Headquarters: Ranshofen, Austria

Expertise: Crew Training Solutions

Email: mario.schuler@amst.at

Summary:

Most rescue missions and military operations must be executed in limited time. Harsh weather and stressful conditions are high risks for aircrew. A well-trained team is essential for success and the safety of both the aircrew and the rescued people. The operation of helicopters’ man-rated hoisting systems requires a high degree of confidence and expertise.

Comprehensive training of these skills can be carried out in a safe environment. The training begins with the basics and ends with the trainee completing a mission simulation, very similar to reality. Helicopters with integrated hoisting systems are used world-wide as essential mission support equipment.

The RHT (Rescue Hoist Trainer) is highly valuable for rescue teams during training. Besides cost savings and a reduction in environmental emissions, the RHT has the following benefits:

  • The training intensity is ten times more efficient than in a real helicopter
  • The training is very safe, as the RHT cannot crash, and various control safety systems prevent an overload of its capacityTraining can be stopped at any time by activating an emergency stop button
  • Training specialists and instructors supervise the training
  • The aircrew learn and see everything close up and personally
  • Rotor downwash sound can be switched off, so it is always possible to concentrate on the essential aspects and crew communication
  • There are no restrictions on the training scenarios process due to bad weather
  • Training can be configured with winch positions to the left and right side or with a rigid and slewable winch
  • Opportunity for 24-hour training
  • Training is not cancelled due to bad weather conditions

Bergwacht Bayern

The Bergwacht Bayern is the Bavarian Mountain Rescue Service, based in Bad Toelz, Germany. They have developed a dynamic rescue hoist simulator with an advanced training concept. AMST and Bergwacht Bayern entered a close cooperation for further development and to market this unique training system worldwide. The long-term experience of AMST-Systemtechnik GmbH in designing and manufacturing extremely reliable training devices and simulation equipment, combined with the vast experience in helicopter rescue operations of the Bergwacht Bayern, has led to an enhanced, unique training solution. This ensures a complete, safe mission training environment for the entire helicopter rescue team, while working under extreme conditions.

Emergency operations

Extreme situations do not allow any compromises or mistakes; the safety of the helicopter crew and teams in special operations need to be ensured. Terrorist attacks, piracy and hostage-taking are only a few situations that need immediate access by perfectly trained teams of special forces. Fast-roping, rappelling/abseiling, night vision operations and Crew Resource Management (CRM) are a selection of scenarios practised in combination with the dynamic hoist trainer.

The range of customer-tailored equipment, such as fast-roping devices and infrared equipment, used in the RHT makes the training situation the most realistic available. Ground based mock-ups, such as buildings with different roof styles or obstacles, enhance the urban training environment. AMST-Systemtechnik GmbH provides well-tested, customer-tailored solutions for different kinds of scenarios on demand.

Training of combat MEDEVAC:

  • Mission preparation
  • Get into the helicopter
  • Take off and landing
  • Get out of the helicopter
  • Secure the landing area
  • Evacuation of injured person
  • First aid training

Additionally, it is possible to use different environmental mock-ups or video walls combined with projection systems. The option to integrate door gunner simulators is also available.

20. 20 - Lessons Learned – a view to the future

LTC Igor BRINAR – SVN

– LTC Brinar began his career as a PLT Leader, Coy CMDR – Infantry, he was part of G7 Force Command, TRADOC SAF and
LL in SAF. At MW COE since 2017
– Missions: UN Cyprus , KFOR, EUFOR

e-mail: igor.brinar@mwcoe.org

LTC Petr Križ – CZE

– LTC Križ began his career in Airborne BN (COY com/BN S3),
different positions in Rapid Deployment BDE S3, Rapid Deployment BDE DCOS OPS, 1GN Corps Münster, DEU Training
coordinator at EU Military Staff (BXL), DEP Branch Head at
MoD Development Division (ABN section)
– Multiple deployments to former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan
– At MW COE since 2022

e-mail: petr.kriz@mwcoe.org

In today’s rapidly changing security environment, the ability to identify and implement improvements quickly is a crucial component. The NATO Lessons Learned (LL) process provides a structured framework to capture and pass on practical experience and knowledge for the benefit of others. Lessons from all activities, including operations and exercises, which are captured and subjected to a procedure of identification, rectification and implementation, will lead to increased effectiveness, efficiency and sharing of best practice.

The vision of the NATO MW COE Lessons Learned Capability is for it to be the hub for the Mountain Warfare Lessons Learned Process within the NATO community. Our mission is to assist NATO member countries, partners, other countries and international organizations, in order to enhance mountain warfare capabilities.

Lines of effort:

  • Establish and sustain Lessons Learned capability and execute the Lessons Learned Process. Follow the NATO LL Process described in BI-SC Directive 80-6 Lessons Learned.
  • Build a MW Community of Interest (COI) in the area of Lessons Learned.
  • Establish and maintain a LL Portal and Database.
  • Collect MW-related observations, Lessons Identified (LI) and Lessons Learned from operations, exercises, training, the COI etc.
  • Analyse the observations, implement the LI and ensure LL are incorporated into doctrines, standards, manuals, SOP’s, TTP’s, etc.
  • As a MW LL hub and a focal point within NATO, support and contribute to future capability development by accurate LL.
  • On request, assist and support the JALLC in order to enhance the NATO doctrines, concepts and procedures.
  • Disseminate the Lessons Learned (MW COE LL Portal, JALLC Database, Newsletters, etc.).

NATO MW COE Lessons Learned Community of Interest (COI)

The MW COI gathers people together around a topic of common interest. Its members take part in the community to exchange information, o improve their understanding of a subject, and so on.

NATO MW COE Lessons Learned Capability: What can we do for you?

– Support the MW COI by active engagement of the LLB and MW COE subject matter

   experts (SMEs) in MW related activities (exercises, events, research, etc.);

– Organization of events aimed at mutual experience sharing and learning across the MW COI;

– Active search for common fields of interest across the MW COI, and recommendation of proper measures for improvement in identified areas;

– Active search for mutually beneficial partnerships with identified nations/military units/organizations within the MW framework;

– Active search to utilize possible MW COE SMEs’ expertise in order to improve partner nations/units/organizations’ effectiveness and development.

NATO MW COE Lessons Learned Capability: What can you do for the MW Community?

Workshops/Webinars

– SMEs attendance as lecturers

– Interested personnel attend as audience

Lessons Learned Web Portal

– Become   /   Provide   /   Contribute

– Information / Articles / Experiences / Research results / Recommendations

– Your work / Promotion of your results / Community learning from each other

– LL Portal – accessible 24/7 (for approved users only)

NATO MW COE Lessons Learned Capability: MW COE internal engagement

21. 21 - Field Exercise

Summary

CPT Adrian Codalbu ROM (A), MAJ Jakub Zdunski POL (A); both MW COE

For a better understanding of the environment, the special needs of mountain troops and the opportunities that they can create, our Centre, in cooperation with the 132nd Mountain Regiment of the Slovenian Army, conducted a Field Exercise in the Mačkovec Shooting Range on 4th October. The aim was to show the capabilities of mountain troops in conducting deep activities through vertical manoeuvre, and how new technologies can enhance warfighting in mountainous environments.

The first part of the event was a tactical scenario where a platoon conducted a hostage rescue mission in mountainous terrain. To achieve this with maximum efficiency, all modern warfighting tools and assets were involved:

– Reconnaissance was conducted by UAVs so that ground forces could plan infiltration routes according to the specific terrain and enemy positions;

– The field activities were conducted in a multi-domain environment, orchestrating Air and Land to conduct an air assault in combination with suppressive fires, ground manoeuvres and medical air evacuation from the battlefield;

– The civil environment was also involved in many aspects, supporting the deployment of UAVs, ensuring link and feed from forces in the terrain to command and control elements, and providing cargo lift and resupply by different types of drones.

The second part of the Field Exercise consisted of practical presentations and workshops with modern military equipment relevant to the mountain environment. The participants had the chance to see and experience the mobility and practical employment of a twin chassis multi-purpose Bronco Tracked Infantry Carrier, designed specifically for traversing difficult mountain terrain, the Helix Operations’ products for tactical mountaineering, and two different types of UAVs: one small tactical with enhanced ISR capabilities to support situational awareness, and the second with the ability to lift and carry cargo in vertical terrain to resupply deployed forces.

This Field Exercise showed that Mountain Warfare is constantly evolving, and today it has developed into a combination of small, highly specialized forces operating through multiple domains, and modern technologies that can achieve greater effects over larger distances. This practical presentation played its part as an illustration of all the theoretical topics that were addressed during the Vertical Manoeuvre MW Congress.

22. 22 - Industry Day

LTC Ivan ERMENC SVN (A), MW COE

As part of the Congress, a half-day ‘Industry Day’ event was organized, where the industry had the opportunity to display its most advanced military supplies which coincided with the Congress topic and Mountain Warfare in general. At this event, the participants had the opportunity and privilege to meet companies and entrepreneurs within the MW field of expertise, get acquainted with cutting-edge technology through static and dynamic displays which incorporated several product demonstrations (for instance, outdoor demonstrations of all-terrain vehicles – tracked APCs; transport of cargo with UAVs; and handling equipment for use in very steep and ‘no-go’ terrain), and exchange knowledge and experience in the form of face-to-face interviews. 

From the companies’ perspective, the Industry Day provides an occasion where they can meet and build up a network of potential customers (the Community of Interest in Mountain Warfare).

This year, 28 companies from all over the world displayed their products, with some of them still in the prototype phase. A variety of products were displayed, such as UAVs, exoskeletons, folding skis, COMMs and IT equipment, mountain safety equipment, vehicles, protective clothing, water purification systems and other mountain warfare-related equipment.   

23. 23 - Conclusion: ACT FOGO Speech

 

 

 

 

 

 

BGEN MOSCHOS VOUDOURIS

HQ SACT ACOS Joint Force Development

As we all know, mountain operations are considered to be some of the most challenging tasks, and it is now clear that being able to operate in this selective environment could create a number of new opportunities. This will only be possible through specific understanding, training, organization and equipment.

Today mountains are not only borders between different geographical areas and nations, and the traditional idea of mountain warfare connected to local forces dedicated to a specific environment is no longer valid.

Mountains cover 25% of the world’s land surface in different climatic regions, and 12% of the world’s population live in mountain regions.

Mountains represent a watershed and water supply for more than half of humanity for drinking, irrigation, industry, food, and energy production, and represent a rich area of natural resources.

Globalization has triggered a range of secondary processes, such as rapid urbanization and increasing migration, which have affected mountain regions significantly in both positive and negative ways.

For these reasons it is expected that mountains will gain a bigger strategic prominence in the coming years.

Integrating mountain warfare into NATO’s operations is a vital necessity in order to maintain the strategic advantage towards adversaries and competitors, by transforming – as I said before – the threats of an hazardous and often hostile environment characterized by isolation and harsh weather conditions into new opportunities.

I have followed with interest the several achievements of the last year, and was also actively involved in some of them.

Without mentioning them all, I just want to congratulate you on the finalization of the main project, the Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept. Last February HQ SACT and ACO signed the final version of the document and sent it to the MC for notation. This important action attested the importance given by the Alliance to this specific topic in a particular historic moment, in which the global situation shows that NATO’s ability to adapt and innovate is more crucial than ever.

After the demanding experience in Afghanistan, and in harmony with the NDPP principles – aimed to provide a framework in which the required forces and capabilities are ready in the most effective way – this document stresses the attention on new capabilities, and will surely impact the identification of new requirements.

Implementing education, training, research and experimentation in Mountain Warfare is now an imperative within the Alliance.

I also want to mention the importance of overcoming the COE’s Periodic Assessment last spring. This achievement confirms how the COE is an important contributor to the Alliance’s capabilities.

Thinking about the present and the future, we need to strengthen the linkage between the COEs, and we need their expertise to implement the newly approved Multi-Domain Operations Concept. The MDO involves the integrated use of capabilities across multiple domains, stresses the necessity of an active interaction between Instruments of Powers, and requires a deep understanding of effects and implications.

In this contest I am waiting to see your Programme of Work for 2024, recently approved by the Steering Committee, but I have already been informed that the MW COE is working in the right direction.

The study of a possible “Multi Domain Operation in mountainous environments” concept – currently under the attention of HQ SACT – is a clear example, as is the intention to develop new training solutions in line with the contents of the (NWCC) WDA “Multi Domain Warfighter and Leader Development” Line of Delivery.

With reference to the MDO Concept and the necessity for synchronizing the MIoP with external stakeholders, I know that the MW COE is already well connected with the industry (with which it is developing and testing equipment and materials), with civilian associations involved in mountain rescue, and with academia; in this regard I have read the publication produced after last year’s Congress on “Physical and Psychological Performance of Mountain Warfare Soldiers”, and I found it really interesting.

With regard to this Congress, I want to thank all those present (more than 100 attendees) for coming together to discuss and share expertise about this challenging issue. “Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare” is clearly particularly important in an environment characterized by altitude, where superiority in mobility requires the application of specific movement techniques.

From a training perspective, it is vital to equip personnel involved in utilizing various Instruments of Power with the necessary knowledge, skills, and attributes to operate effectively in multi-domain environments.

This three-day meeting in the pleasant area of Brdo has surely offered you the opportunity to share different real life experiences of experts coming from different Nations, increasing your background and providing you with different points of view.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be with you; I hope to have the possibility of joining you on a future occasion.