The analysis of the evolving threat, combined with the outcomes of workshops, experimentation, and operational observations, highlights that Counter-UAS in mountain warfare cannot be addressed through a single capability or a centralized solution.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated that adversaries increasingly employ reconnaissance-strike complexes integrating ISR drones, FPV systems, loitering munitions, electronic warfare assets, and digital command-and-control networks. These systems significantly compress sensor-to-shooter timelines, enabling rapid detection, identification, targeting, and engagement cycles. In mountain warfare, where terrain often constrains maneuver into predictable routes and terrain corridors, such capabilities can substantially increase the vulnerability of military forces and challenge traditional approaches to concealment, movement, and force protection.

It must instead be understood and designed, with a particular attention in Mountain Warfare, as a layered, distributed, and terrain-adapted system, where responsibilities are shared across all echelons—from the individual soldier to higher headquarters.

This approach reflects a fundamental consideration: in mountainous environments, terrain, weather, and limited lines of sight degrade both unmanned systems and counter-measures. As a result, effectiveness can only be achieved through redundancy, dispersion, and integration across multiple levels.

12.1 – A proposed five-Layer Model for C-UAS in Mountain Warfare

A coherent and scalable approach can be structured around five complementary layers, each contributing to detection, protection, and engagement in a different way.

The first layer is the Passive Defence Layer, which is embedded across the entire force. This layer does not rely on technology, but on fieldcraft, discipline and training. It includes camouflage, dispersion, concealment, signature management (thermal, visual, and electromagnetic), the use of decoys, and terrain masking. In mountain warfare, this is the first and most effective form of protection, as it directly reduces exposure and limits the number of threats that must be actively countered.

The second layer is the Local Awareness Layer, positioned primarily at company and battalion level. This layer is based on small, distributed elements capable of providing immediate detection, reporting, and local situational awareness. It includes trained observers, passive sensors, and basic C-UAS kits. In mountainous terrain, where engagement timelines are short due to terrain masking, this layer is essential to provide early warning and enable rapid reaction. The training for these assets should be done in Mountain Units/schools.

The third layer is the Battalion Maneuver-Support Layer, which represents the first level of coordinated and structured C-UAS capability. At this level, a dedicated C-UAS platoon or equivalent element integrates detection, limited effectors, and reporting functions. Its role is to protect critical nodes—such as command posts, logistics hubs, artillery positions, landing zones, and key terrain—and to support maneuver units across multiple terrain compartments. It also ensures the integration of information into the battalion-level operational picture.

The fourth layer is the Brigade C-UAS Coordination Layer, typically organized as a company or battery. At this level, the focus shifts from local engagement to coordination, prioritization, and synchronization. This layer is responsible for managing the overall C-UAS picture, allocating resources, integrating detection and engagement systems, and coordinating with fires, electronic warfare, and airspace control. It ensures that limited assets are employed where they are most effective, taking into account terrain and operational priorities.

The fifth layer is the Higher-Echelon Reachback Layer, which provides capabilities that cannot be generated at brigade level. This includes access to wide-area surveillance, advanced intelligence, signals exploitation, long-range communication systems, and higher-level authorization for certain countermeasures. In a mountain context, where local capabilities are often constrained, this layer ensures depth, scalability, and integration within the broader operational framework.

12.2 – Key Considerations

This layered approach reinforces several key principles:

• C-UAS is not a standalone function, but a system-of-systems problem
• effectiveness depends on distribution, redundancy, and integration, rather than centralization
• terrain dictates both threat behaviour and defensive architecture
• passive measures and field discipline remain the first line of defence

12.3 – Conclusion

In mountain warfare, C-UAS must be organized as a distributed, layered, brigade-led but battalion-embedded capability, fully integrated into the force structure and training system.

It is not sufficient to rely on a limited number of advanced systems. Instead, success depends on the ability to combine simple and scalable solutions, trained personnel at all levels and resilient and adaptable architectures.

Ultimately, the units that will prevail are not those with the most advanced technology, but those able to integrate, adapt, and operate effectively within a complex and contested environment shaped by terrain, weather, and continuous aerial threat.