6.2 – From Experimentation to Integration: Lessons from Previous MWCOE UAS Activities
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The current workshop did not represent a starting point, but rather a transition within an ongoing process. Over the past years, the MWCOE has progressively explored the role of unmanned systems in mountain warfare through a series of workshops, experimentation activities, and initial training initiatives.
These efforts have provided a valuable foundation, not in terms of specific technologies, but in terms of understanding how unmanned capabilities interact with the operational environment. From the outset, the focus has not been on platforms, but on their employment, integration, and relevance within mountain operations.
The trajectory of this work shows a clear evolution. Initial activities were primarily exploratory, aimed at assessing the potential of UAS in supporting specific functions such as environmental monitoring, reconnaissance, logistic and search and rescue. These early use cases demonstrated flexibility and utility, but remained largely confined to functional applications, disconnected from a broader operational framework.
Over time, this approach proved insufficient. The increasing relevance of unmanned systems in contemporary conflicts made it clear that their value does not lie in isolated tasks, but in their ability to shape the conduct of operations as a whole. As a result, subsequent activities shifted focus from experimentation to integration, addressing how UAS could support command and control, enhance situational awareness, and contribute directly to operational decision-making in mountainous environment.
This transition was particularly evident in the first MWCOE UAS workshop, which marked a move from testing capabilities to sharing operational experiences and identifying structural gaps. What emerged from that phase was not a lack of technology, but a lack of coherence in how capabilities were employed, coordinated, and trained.
Several key lessons have remained consistent across all activities.
First, unmanned systems must be considered from the outset of the planning process. Their employment cannot be improvised or appended to existing plans. Instead, they must be integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process, contributing to course of action development, wargaming, and execution. Without this integration, their use remains reactive, limiting their effectiveness and preventing them from shaping operations in a meaningful way.
Second, the growing presence of unmanned systems inevitably generates a corresponding requirement for Counter-UAS capabilities. This is not a problem that can be addressed solely through technology. It requires a combination of training, procedures, awareness, and behaviour, reinforcing the idea that survivability in a drone-enabled environment depends as much on how units operate as on what systems they possess.
Third, the importance of training has become increasingly evident. The effective use of unmanned systems cannot be achieved through occasional exposure or specialized courses alone. It requires continuous integration into routine training and exercises, across all levels. Only through repeated use in realistic conditions can units develop the familiarity and confidence necessary to operate in a drone-saturated environment.
Another critical issue concerns the organization of capabilities within units. Early experimentation often relied on informal or ad hoc solutions, with limited clarity regarding roles and responsibilities. Over time, it became evident that effective employment requires structured elements, including dedicated operators, ISR functions, and technical support. This does not necessarily imply large or complex organizations, but it does require clarity, standardization, and integration within the chain of command.
6.2.1 Conclusion
The experience accumulated through MWCOE activities demonstrates a clear progression: from initial experimentation to a growing recognition of the need for structured integration.
However, this progression is incomplete. The understanding of the capability has matured. Its integration into doctrine, training, and force structure has not.
Yet one point emerges clearly: as soon as drones are integrated into routine operations, they stop being a platform issue and become a coordination issue.
This is particularly evident in the air domain at low altitude, where multiple actors begin to share the same battlespace in real time. For this reason, the present workshop does not only continue previous UAS work; it pushes it into a more demanding area, where integration, deconfliction, and command relationships must be addressed directly. The next section therefore focuses on one of the most immediate consequences of this evolution: the challenge of controlling and coordinating the low airspace in mountain operations.
6.2 – From Experimentation to Integration: Lessons from Previous MWCOE UAS Activities
The current workshop did not represent a starting point, but rather a transition within an ongoing process. Over the past years, the MWCOE has progressively explored the role of unmanned systems in mountain warfare through a series of workshops, experimentation activities, and initial training initiatives.
These efforts have provided a valuable foundation, not in terms of specific technologies, but in terms of understanding how unmanned capabilities interact with the operational environment. From the outset, the focus has not been on platforms, but on their employment, integration, and relevance within mountain operations.
The trajectory of this work shows a clear evolution. Initial activities were primarily exploratory, aimed at assessing the potential of UAS in supporting specific functions such as environmental monitoring, reconnaissance, logistic and search and rescue. These early use cases demonstrated flexibility and utility, but remained largely confined to functional applications, disconnected from a broader operational framework.
Over time, this approach proved insufficient. The increasing relevance of unmanned systems in contemporary conflicts made it clear that their value does not lie in isolated tasks, but in their ability to shape the conduct of operations as a whole. As a result, subsequent activities shifted focus from experimentation to integration, addressing how UAS could support command and control, enhance situational awareness, and contribute directly to operational decision-making in mountainous environment.
This transition was particularly evident in the first MWCOE UAS workshop, which marked a move from testing capabilities to sharing operational experiences and identifying structural gaps. What emerged from that phase was not a lack of technology, but a lack of coherence in how capabilities were employed, coordinated, and trained.
Several key lessons have remained consistent across all activities.
First, unmanned systems must be considered from the outset of the planning process. Their employment cannot be improvised or appended to existing plans. Instead, they must be integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process, contributing to course of action development, wargaming, and execution. Without this integration, their use remains reactive, limiting their effectiveness and preventing them from shaping operations in a meaningful way.
Second, the growing presence of unmanned systems inevitably generates a corresponding requirement for Counter-UAS capabilities. This is not a problem that can be addressed solely through technology. It requires a combination of training, procedures, awareness, and behaviour, reinforcing the idea that survivability in a drone-enabled environment depends as much on how units operate as on what systems they possess.
Third, the importance of training has become increasingly evident. The effective use of unmanned systems cannot be achieved through occasional exposure or specialized courses alone. It requires continuous integration into routine training and exercises, across all levels. Only through repeated use in realistic conditions can units develop the familiarity and confidence necessary to operate in a drone-saturated environment.
Another critical issue concerns the organization of capabilities within units. Early experimentation often relied on informal or ad hoc solutions, with limited clarity regarding roles and responsibilities. Over time, it became evident that effective employment requires structured elements, including dedicated operators, ISR functions, and technical support. This does not necessarily imply large or complex organizations, but it does require clarity, standardization, and integration within the chain of command.
6.2.1 Conclusion
The experience accumulated through MWCOE activities demonstrates a clear progression: from initial experimentation to a growing recognition of the need for structured integration.
However, this progression is incomplete. The understanding of the capability has matured.
Its integration into doctrine, training, and force structure has not.
Yet one point emerges clearly: as soon as drones are integrated into routine operations, they stop being a platform issue and become a coordination issue.
This is particularly evident in the air domain at low altitude, where multiple actors begin to share the same battlespace in real time. For this reason, the present workshop does not only continue previous UAS work; it pushes it into a more demanding area, where integration, deconfliction, and command relationships must be addressed directly. The next section therefore focuses on one of the most immediate consequences of this evolution: the challenge of controlling and coordinating the low airspace in mountain operations.