This report is based on a continuous process of observation, experimentation, assessment, and knowledge development conducted by the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MWCOE) between 2024 and 2026. Rather than relying on a single study or isolated activity, the findings presented herein originate from the cumulative results of workshops, experimentation campaigns, pilot projects, demonstrations, training activities, operational observations, multinational exchanges, and expert discussions involving military personnel, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and partner nations.
The methodological approach adopted throughout this work reflects the understanding that unmanned and autonomous systems cannot be adequately assessed through technical performance alone. Their true operational value for Mountain Warfare emerges only when examined within the broader context of military operations, organizational structures, command and control arrangements, force protection requirements, sustainment processes, and environmental constraints.
For this reason, the analysis intentionally focuses on operational relevance rather than technological specifications. The central question is not whether a particular platform performs effectively under ideal conditions, but how unmanned systems influence decision-making, survivability, maneuver, sustainment, reconnaissance, and combat effectiveness within realistic mountain warfare environments.
4.2 – Sources of Analysis
The observations and conclusions contained in this report are derived from multiple complementary sources.
The first source consists of practical activities conducted by the MWCOE, including workshops, field experimentation, demonstrations, training events, and pilot projects involving ISR drones, FPV systems, cargo drones, autonomous support systems, and Counter-UAS capabilities.
The second source derives from operational observations and lessons identified from contemporary conflicts, particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine. These observations provide a unique opportunity to examine unmanned systems under conditions of large-scale combat operations, persistent electronic warfare, contested airspace, and continuous adaptation cycles. Particular attention has been given to publicly available lessons identified, operational reports, NATO analyses, and observations emerging from NATO-Ukraine cooperation initiatives.
The third source consists of exchanges with military practitioners, operational commanders, instructors, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and partner nations. These contributions provide additional perspectives regarding technological developments, organizational challenges, capability gaps, and emerging trends.
The combination of these sources allows the report to balance practical experimentation, operational evidence, and expert assessment, reducing the limitations associated with any individual source of information.
4.3 – Operational Rather Than Technical Perspective
The purpose of this report is not to provide a technical catalogue of unmanned systems. Technologies evolve rapidly and individual platforms may become obsolete within relatively short periods. The observations presented here therefore focus on operational functions, organizational and Force Structure implications, employment concepts, and recurring lessons that remain relevant regardless of future technological developments.
Throughout the report, particular attention is given to the employment and the reflection on Force Structure, training and procurement of:
ISR drones
FPV systems
Cargo UAS
Relay Drones
Counter-UAS capabilities
Low airspace management
Electromagnetic resilience
Organizational integration of unmanned capabilities
These areas were selected because they repeatedly emerged as critical themes across MWCOE activities and operational observations from contemporary conflicts.
4.4 – Mountain Warfare Perspective and New Operational Possibilities
While many observations contained in this report are relevant to military operations in general, the analytical framework remains deliberately focused on mountain warfare.
Mountain environments introduce operational conditions that significantly influence the employment of unmanned systems. Restricted mobility corridors, fragmented lines of sight, degraded communications, complex terrain masking, severe weather conditions, altitude effects, and limited sustainment options create challenges that differ substantially from those encountered in other operational environments.
At the same time, these characteristics create not only challenges, but also entirely new operational possibilities.
Traditionally, mountain warfare has been characterized by limited observation, difficult mobility, restricted logistics, and a high dependence on terrain. The introduction of unmanned and autonomous systems is progressively changing these conditions. Rather than simply compensating for environmental constraints, these capabilities increasingly enable activities that were previously difficult, risky, resource-intensive, or in some cases operationally impossible.
ISR systems can extend observation far beyond line-of-sight limitations imposed by terrain, providing commanders with levels of situational awareness that were previously unattainable. FPV systems allow small tactical units to generate decentralized effects at ranges and locations where traditional fires may be unavailable, delayed, or constrained by terrain. Cargo drones create new opportunities for sustainment by supporting isolated positions, reducing exposure along vulnerable supply routes, and increasing operational endurance in remote areas. Autonomous ground systems can further reduce logistical burdens, enhance operational flexibility, and support distributed operations across complex terrain.
These developments do not simply improve existing capabilities. They fundamentally expand the range of options available to commanders.
At the same time, Counter-UAS capabilities become increasingly important. As unmanned systems generate new opportunities, they also create new vulnerabilities. The ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat adversary unmanned systems therefore becomes a critical prerequisite for maintaining freedom of maneuver and operational effectiveness.
For these reasons, mountain warfare should not be viewed simply as another environment in which unmanned systems can be employed. Rather, it represents an operational context in which both the opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with unmanned systems become more visible, more consequential, and more operationally decisive. The mountain environment therefore serves not only as a challenge for unmanned systems, but also as a catalyst for the development of new concepts, new capabilities, and new ways of conducting military operations.
4.5 – Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned
A fundamental assumption underlying this report is that operational observations only become valuable when translated into institutional adaptation.
Recent conflicts have repeatedly demonstrated that the decisive advantage is often not derived from possessing superior technology, but from the ability to learn and adapt more rapidly than an opponent.
Consequently, the purpose of this report extends beyond the identification of lessons. It seeks to contribute to the process through which observations are transformed into doctrine, training, organizational adaptation, capability development, experimentation priorities, and future force design considerations.
In this regard, the report should be understood as part of a broader NATO effort to strengthen institutional learning and to support the continuous evolution of Mountain Warfare capabilities in an operational environment increasingly shaped by unmanned systems, contested electromagnetic conditions, persistent observation, and accelerated adaptation cycles.
4 – Methodology and Framework
4.1 – Analytical Approach
This report is based on a continuous process of observation, experimentation, assessment, and knowledge development conducted by the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MWCOE) between 2024 and 2026. Rather than relying on a single study or isolated activity, the findings presented herein originate from the cumulative results of workshops, experimentation campaigns, pilot projects, demonstrations, training activities, operational observations, multinational exchanges, and expert discussions involving military personnel, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and partner nations.
The methodological approach adopted throughout this work reflects the understanding that unmanned and autonomous systems cannot be adequately assessed through technical performance alone. Their true operational value for Mountain Warfare emerges only when examined within the broader context of military operations, organizational structures, command and control arrangements, force protection requirements, sustainment processes, and environmental constraints.
For this reason, the analysis intentionally focuses on operational relevance rather than technological specifications. The central question is not whether a particular platform performs effectively under ideal conditions, but how unmanned systems influence decision-making, survivability, maneuver, sustainment, reconnaissance, and combat effectiveness within realistic mountain warfare environments.
4.2 – Sources of Analysis
The observations and conclusions contained in this report are derived from multiple complementary sources.
The first source consists of practical activities conducted by the MWCOE, including workshops, field experimentation, demonstrations, training events, and pilot projects involving ISR drones, FPV systems, cargo drones, autonomous support systems, and Counter-UAS capabilities.
The second source derives from operational observations and lessons identified from contemporary conflicts, particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine. These observations provide a unique opportunity to examine unmanned systems under conditions of large-scale combat operations, persistent electronic warfare, contested airspace, and continuous adaptation cycles. Particular attention has been given to publicly available lessons identified, operational reports, NATO analyses, and observations emerging from NATO-Ukraine cooperation initiatives.
The third source consists of exchanges with military practitioners, operational commanders, instructors, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and partner nations. These contributions provide additional perspectives regarding technological developments, organizational challenges, capability gaps, and emerging trends.
The combination of these sources allows the report to balance practical experimentation, operational evidence, and expert assessment, reducing the limitations associated with any individual source of information.
4.3 – Operational Rather Than Technical Perspective
The purpose of this report is not to provide a technical catalogue of unmanned systems. Technologies evolve rapidly and individual platforms may become obsolete within relatively short periods. The observations presented here therefore focus on operational functions, organizational and Force Structure implications, employment concepts, and recurring lessons that remain relevant regardless of future technological developments.
Throughout the report, particular attention is given to the employment and the reflection on Force Structure, training and procurement of:
These areas were selected because they repeatedly emerged as critical themes across MWCOE activities and operational observations from contemporary conflicts.
4.4 – Mountain Warfare Perspective and New Operational Possibilities
While many observations contained in this report are relevant to military operations in general, the analytical framework remains deliberately focused on mountain warfare.
Mountain environments introduce operational conditions that significantly influence the employment of unmanned systems. Restricted mobility corridors, fragmented lines of sight, degraded communications, complex terrain masking, severe weather conditions, altitude effects, and limited sustainment options create challenges that differ substantially from those encountered in other operational environments.
At the same time, these characteristics create not only challenges, but also entirely new operational possibilities.
Traditionally, mountain warfare has been characterized by limited observation, difficult mobility, restricted logistics, and a high dependence on terrain. The introduction of unmanned and autonomous systems is progressively changing these conditions. Rather than simply compensating for environmental constraints, these capabilities increasingly enable activities that were previously difficult, risky, resource-intensive, or in some cases operationally impossible.
ISR systems can extend observation far beyond line-of-sight limitations imposed by terrain, providing commanders with levels of situational awareness that were previously unattainable. FPV systems allow small tactical units to generate decentralized effects at ranges and locations where traditional fires may be unavailable, delayed, or constrained by terrain. Cargo drones create new opportunities for sustainment by supporting isolated positions, reducing exposure along vulnerable supply routes, and increasing operational endurance in remote areas. Autonomous ground systems can further reduce logistical burdens, enhance operational flexibility, and support distributed operations across complex terrain.
These developments do not simply improve existing capabilities. They fundamentally expand the range of options available to commanders.
At the same time, Counter-UAS capabilities become increasingly important. As unmanned systems generate new opportunities, they also create new vulnerabilities. The ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat adversary unmanned systems therefore becomes a critical prerequisite for maintaining freedom of maneuver and operational effectiveness.
For these reasons, mountain warfare should not be viewed simply as another environment in which unmanned systems can be employed. Rather, it represents an operational context in which both the opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with unmanned systems become more visible, more consequential, and more operationally decisive. The mountain environment therefore serves not only as a challenge for unmanned systems, but also as a catalyst for the development of new concepts, new capabilities, and new ways of conducting military operations.
4.5 – Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned
A fundamental assumption underlying this report is that operational observations only become valuable when translated into institutional adaptation.
Recent conflicts have repeatedly demonstrated that the decisive advantage is often not derived from possessing superior technology, but from the ability to learn and adapt more rapidly than an opponent.
Consequently, the purpose of this report extends beyond the identification of lessons. It seeks to contribute to the process through which observations are transformed into doctrine, training, organizational adaptation, capability development, experimentation priorities, and future force design considerations.
In this regard, the report should be understood as part of a broader NATO effort to strengthen institutional learning and to support the continuous evolution of Mountain Warfare capabilities in an operational environment increasingly shaped by unmanned systems, contested electromagnetic conditions, persistent observation, and accelerated adaptation cycles.