6.4 – From Capability to Structure: Organizing and Integrating UAS in Mountain Units
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If the previous sections establish that drones are reshaping the battlefield, this contribution answers a more difficult question:
What does it actually mean to integrate them inside a mountain unit?
The experience presented by the 7th Alpini Regiment (ITA) provides a concrete answer. It shows that integration is not achieved by simply introducing new equipment, but by restructuring training, organization, and command processes around the capability.
The first point that emerges clearly is that a drone operator cannot be treated as a technical specialist detached from the unit. On the contrary, the operator must remain, first and foremost, a mountain soldier. The training pathway reflects this approach: physical preparation, mobility in complex terrain, and operational awareness are treated as prerequisites, not optional additions.
This is a critical point. If drone capability is separated from maneuver capability, it risks becoming ineffective. Integration requires that the operator understands the terrain, the mission, and the tactical context in which the system is employed.
At the same time, the training system itself must evolve. The pathway described moves progressively from basic regulatory knowledge to advanced operational employment, including mission planning, sensor exploitation, and decision-making under stress. This progression highlights a fundamental requirement: operating a drone is not only about flying, but about transforming data into decisions. In mountain warfare, the exploitation of UxV sensors and capabilities differs significantly from other environments, and the training of mountain units must take this into account as a critical component of their preparation.
This leads to a second key aspect: integration is not limited to operators. It extends to the entire unit, and particularly to the staff. The inclusion of battle group personnel in dedicated training—covering areas such as METOC, imagery analysis, and air operations procedures—demonstrates that unmanned systems must be embedded within the decision-making architecture, not treated as external inputs.
In other words, the value of UAS is not in the platform itself, but in its ability to feed the command process with timely and usable information.
A third element concerns sustainment and autonomy. The introduction of in-house capabilities, including maintenance, software configuration, and even component production, reflects an important shift. Units are moving toward a model in which they are not only users of technology, but increasingly capable of adapting, repairing, and even producing systems internally.
This is directly linked to the realities described in Section 3.1. In a context where systems are expendable and adaptation cycles are short, dependence on centralized supply chains becomes a vulnerability. Operational effectiveness increasingly depends on local adaptability and resilience.
However, the most relevant aspect of this contribution lies in how capabilities are distributed across the force.
The proposed approach is based on decentralization. Rather than concentrating UAS assets in a single unit, capabilities are embedded at different levels—squad, platoon, company, and battle group—each with distinct roles and functions.
At squad level, drones support immediate situational awareness and, increasingly, direct engagement. At platoon level, they extend capabilities to target acquisition, fire adjustment, and specialized tasks. At company level, they introduce greater lethality and represent the first level where swarm employment becomes feasible. At higher levels, fixed-wing systems provide persistence and depth.
This layered approach is not simply a matter of scaling capability. It reflects an understanding that effectiveness depends on the alignment between capability and echelon.
At the same time, the organization of teams remains deliberately flexible. The composition can range from a single operator to a small team including pilot, sensor operator, and technician, depending on the system and the mission. This flexibility is not a weakness, but a necessity in an environment, like mountains, characterized by rapid adaptation and diverse operational requirements.
However, decentralization alone is not sufficient. As the number of systems increases, so does the complexity of coordination.
This becomes evident when examining theTactical Command Post. Initial experimentation showed that traditional structures are quickly overwhelmed by the volume of information generated by multiple UAVs and sensors. Even a reduced command post, designed for agility, struggles to maintain situational awareness when data flows increase. The experience highlights a critical friction point: information overload.
The Fire Support Element, already responsible for coordinating fires and deconfliction, becomes saturated when required to manage additional UAV-related tasks, including integration of ISR feeds, coordination with air assets, and deconfliction within the airspace. Even with additional support elements, the system reaches its limits when the number of active assets exceeds a relatively small threshold.
To address this, the introduction of a dedicated 3D coordination structure—including roles such as UAV coordinator, airspace management elements, and C-UAS/EW specialists—represents an important step. However, even this structure shows limitations when faced with high-density environments, particularly in terms of processing capacity and coordination speed.
This leads to a broader conclusion: increasing capability without adapting the command structure results in system saturation rather than increased effectiveness.
At the same time, several critical gaps emerge. There is a shortage of personnel trained in electronic warfare and counter-UAS, particularly at staff level. Existing courses are either too long or not tailored to operational needs, making it difficult to build relevant expertise. Similarly, the lack of legal advisors integrated into exercises highlights a gap in addressing rules of engagement and legal constraints in drone-enabled operations.
Finally, training itself becomes a constraint. The availability of suitable areas and the complexity of operating in environments where civilian and military activities coexist create additional limitations that must be addressed.
6.4.1 Conclusion
The integration of unmanned systems is not a matter of adding capability to existing structures. It requires a redefinition of how units are organized, trained, and commanded.
Three key principles emerge:
Capabilities must be decentralized, embedded at all levels;
Integration must be centralized or coordinated, particularly at battalion level;
Training must involve the entire system, not only operators.
In short, limiting factor is no longer access to technology, but the ability to manage complexity, particularly in terms of information flow and coordination.
The experience of the 7th Alpini Regiment shows that meaningful integration is possible, but only when training, staff procedures, technical support, and command structures evolve together. At the same time, it also shows the limits of trying to absorb this transformation within existing organizational models.
This is the point where practical experimentation meets a broader doctrinal question. If unmanned systems are already influencing command posts, staff workloads, team composition, and sustainment, then adaptation can no longer remain partial or improvised. The next section moves from observed implementation to deliberate transformation, asking what kind of cultural, organizational, and procurement shift is required if FPV and drone-enabled operations are to become truly institutionalized at company and battalion level.
6.4 – From Capability to Structure: Organizing and Integrating UAS in Mountain Units
If the previous sections establish that drones are reshaping the battlefield, this contribution answers a more difficult question:
What does it actually mean to integrate them inside a mountain unit?
The experience presented by the 7th Alpini Regiment (ITA) provides a concrete answer. It shows that integration is not achieved by simply introducing new equipment, but by restructuring training, organization, and command processes around the capability.
The first point that emerges clearly is that a drone operator cannot be treated as a technical specialist detached from the unit. On the contrary, the operator must remain, first and foremost, a mountain soldier. The training pathway reflects this approach: physical preparation, mobility in complex terrain, and operational awareness are treated as prerequisites, not optional additions.
This is a critical point. If drone capability is separated from maneuver capability, it risks becoming ineffective. Integration requires that the operator understands the terrain, the mission, and the tactical context in which the system is employed.
At the same time, the training system itself must evolve. The pathway described moves progressively from basic regulatory knowledge to advanced operational employment, including mission planning, sensor exploitation, and decision-making under stress. This progression highlights a fundamental requirement: operating a drone is not only about flying, but about transforming data into decisions. In mountain warfare, the exploitation of UxV sensors and capabilities differs significantly from other environments, and the training of mountain units must take this into account as a critical component of their preparation.
This leads to a second key aspect: integration is not limited to operators. It extends to the entire unit, and particularly to the staff. The inclusion of battle group personnel in dedicated training—covering areas such as METOC, imagery analysis, and air operations procedures—demonstrates that unmanned systems must be embedded within the decision-making architecture, not treated as external inputs.
In other words, the value of UAS is not in the platform itself, but in its ability to feed the command process with timely and usable information.
A third element concerns sustainment and autonomy. The introduction of in-house capabilities, including maintenance, software configuration, and even component production, reflects an important shift. Units are moving toward a model in which they are not only users of technology, but increasingly capable of adapting, repairing, and even producing systems internally.
This is directly linked to the realities described in Section 3.1. In a context where systems are expendable and adaptation cycles are short, dependence on centralized supply chains becomes a vulnerability. Operational effectiveness increasingly depends on local adaptability and resilience.
However, the most relevant aspect of this contribution lies in how capabilities are distributed across the force.
The proposed approach is based on decentralization. Rather than concentrating UAS assets in a single unit, capabilities are embedded at different levels—squad, platoon, company, and battle group—each with distinct roles and functions.
At squad level, drones support immediate situational awareness and, increasingly, direct engagement. At platoon level, they extend capabilities to target acquisition, fire adjustment, and specialized tasks. At company level, they introduce greater lethality and represent the first level where swarm employment becomes feasible. At higher levels, fixed-wing systems provide persistence and depth.
This layered approach is not simply a matter of scaling capability. It reflects an understanding that effectiveness depends on the alignment between capability and echelon.
At the same time, the organization of teams remains deliberately flexible. The composition can range from a single operator to a small team including pilot, sensor operator, and technician, depending on the system and the mission. This flexibility is not a weakness, but a necessity in an environment, like mountains, characterized by rapid adaptation and diverse operational requirements.
However, decentralization alone is not sufficient. As the number of systems increases, so does the complexity of coordination.
This becomes evident when examining the Tactical Command Post. Initial experimentation showed that traditional structures are quickly overwhelmed by the volume of information generated by multiple UAVs and sensors. Even a reduced command post, designed for agility, struggles to maintain situational awareness when data flows increase. The experience highlights a critical friction point: information overload.
The Fire Support Element, already responsible for coordinating fires and deconfliction, becomes saturated when required to manage additional UAV-related tasks, including integration of ISR feeds, coordination with air assets, and deconfliction within the airspace. Even with additional support elements, the system reaches its limits when the number of active assets exceeds a relatively small threshold.
To address this, the introduction of a dedicated 3D coordination structure—including roles such as UAV coordinator, airspace management elements, and C-UAS/EW specialists—represents an important step. However, even this structure shows limitations when faced with high-density environments, particularly in terms of processing capacity and coordination speed.
This leads to a broader conclusion: increasing capability without adapting the command structure results in system saturation rather than increased effectiveness.
At the same time, several critical gaps emerge. There is a shortage of personnel trained in electronic warfare and counter-UAS, particularly at staff level. Existing courses are either too long or not tailored to operational needs, making it difficult to build relevant expertise. Similarly, the lack of legal advisors integrated into exercises highlights a gap in addressing rules of engagement and legal constraints in drone-enabled operations.
Finally, training itself becomes a constraint. The availability of suitable areas and the complexity of operating in environments where civilian and military activities coexist create additional limitations that must be addressed.
6.4.1 Conclusion
The integration of unmanned systems is not a matter of adding capability to existing structures. It requires a redefinition of how units are organized, trained, and commanded.
Three key principles emerge:
In short, limiting factor is no longer access to technology, but the ability to manage complexity, particularly in terms of information flow and coordination.
The experience of the 7th Alpini Regiment shows that meaningful integration is possible, but only when training, staff procedures, technical support, and command structures evolve together. At the same time, it also shows the limits of trying to absorb this transformation within existing organizational models.
This is the point where practical experimentation meets a broader doctrinal question. If unmanned systems are already influencing command posts, staff workloads, team composition, and sustainment, then adaptation can no longer remain partial or improvised. The next section moves from observed implementation to deliberate transformation, asking what kind of cultural, organizational, and procurement shift is required if FPV and drone-enabled operations are to become truly institutionalized at company and battalion level.