This publication is produced by the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (NATO MW COE) and is intended for external use. The information contained in this publication does not represent any official NATO policy or position and is intended to provide an independent analysis and perspective of the NATO MW COE.
The observations presented in this document should not be interpreted as prescriptive solutions applicable to all nations and operational contexts.
National force structures, doctrine, procurement systems, legal frameworks, and operational requirements differ significantly among Allied and Partner nations. Consequently, the findings and recommendations contained herein are intended to support discussion, experimentation, capability development, and further analysis rather than impose specific organizational models.
Similarly, the rapid pace of technological development requires caution. The relevance of individual platforms may change rapidly. However, the broader operational trends identified throughout this report—including the growing importance of persistent surveillance, decentralized effects, Counter-UAS capabilities, electromagnetic resilience, and rapid adaptation—are expected to remain highly relevant for the foreseeable future.
The objective of this report is therefore not to predict the future of unmanned systems, but to contribute to the understanding of how military organizations operating in mountainous environments can adapt to an operational environment in which unmanned systems are already becoming a structural component of the battlefield.
At the end of this document, a Special Insight is provided on a topic that deserves particular attention in Mountain Warfare: “Drones and the Psyche: Conditioning and Consequences for Military Operations.”
1 – Disclaimer
This publication is produced by the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (NATO MW COE) and is intended for external use. The information contained in this publication does not represent any official NATO policy or position and is intended to provide an independent analysis and perspective of the NATO MW COE.
The observations presented in this document should not be interpreted as prescriptive solutions applicable to all nations and operational contexts.
National force structures, doctrine, procurement systems, legal frameworks, and operational requirements differ significantly among Allied and Partner nations. Consequently, the findings and recommendations contained herein are intended to support discussion, experimentation, capability development, and further analysis rather than impose specific organizational models.
Similarly, the rapid pace of technological development requires caution. The relevance of individual platforms may change rapidly. However, the broader operational trends identified throughout this report—including the growing importance of persistent surveillance, decentralized effects, Counter-UAS capabilities, electromagnetic resilience, and rapid adaptation—are expected to remain highly relevant for the foreseeable future.
The objective of this report is therefore not to predict the future of unmanned systems, but to contribute to the understanding of how military organizations operating in mountainous environments can adapt to an operational environment in which unmanned systems are already becoming a structural component of the battlefield.
At the end of this document, a Special Insight is provided on a topic that deserves particular attention in Mountain Warfare: “Drones and the Psyche: Conditioning and Consequences for Military Operations.”