The u201cUnmanned Systems in Mountain Warfare: Company Employment and Battalion Integrationu201d workshop, conducted at the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence, examined the rapidly evolving role of unmanned systems in contemporary operations, with a specific focus on their implications for mountain warfare.
The discussions confirmed that unmanned systems are no longer emerging capabilities, but central components of the modern battlefield in Mountain Warfare. Their widespread use has fundamentally altered how forces observe, decide, and act, creating an operational environment characterized by persistent surveillance, rapid targeting cycles, and decentralized execution.
A key finding is the transition from a battlefield defined by intermittent exposure to one of continuous observation. Air superiority can no longer be taken for granted. Units must now assume that detection is constant and that engagement may follow within minutes. This shift significantly reduces reaction time and places greater emphasis on dispersion, mobility, and signature management as primary means of survivability.
The increasing density of unmanned systems on the battlefield has also fundamentally altered traditional concepts of survivability and maneuver. Concealment and static protection alone are often no longer sufficient in an operational environment characterized by continuous aerial observation and rapid target engagement cycles. Unmanned systems have enabled a decentralization of capability, something that for a Mountain soldier exists since the first day of training. This increases (or renew in technological means) the autonomy of tactical units but also generates a requirement for coordination and integration at battalion and brigade level, where multiple systems must be synchronized within a coherent operational framework.
In addition, UAS/UAV and autonomous systems open entirely new operational possibilities in terms of mobility, speed, reconnaissance, command and control, situational awareness, terrain analysis (snowpack, avalance etcu2026) and tactical effectiveness. ISR drones allow persistent observation of terrain features and movement corridors which are difficult or impossible to observe from the ground. FPV systems provide decentralized strike capabilities at lower tactical levels, while cargo drones and autonomous support systems improve sustainment and logistical flexibility in isolated or hard-to-reach areas.
The workshop also highlighted a critical mismatch between operational adaptation and institutional processes. While battlefield innovation occurs rapidly, driven by continuous experimentation and feedback, doctrine, training, and procurement systems evolve more slowly. Bridging this gap is essential to ensure that available capabilities are effectively employed. Another central finding concerns the electromagnetic environment, which must now be considered contested and degraded by default. GNSS denial, communications disruption, and electronic warfare are persistent features of the battlefield. Systems and procedures must therefore be designed to operate under these conditions, rather than relying on their availability.
Counter-UAS emerges as a fundamental requirement for survivability. It cannot be treated as a specialized capability, but must be integrated across all levels of the force, combining behavioural adaptation, awareness, and technical solutions within a layered approach.
The lessons identified further highlight that future operational success in mountainous terrain will increasingly depend on the ability to effectively integrate unmanned and autonomous systems into all aspects of military operations, including the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), Mountain Cell procedures, reconnaissance planning, sustainment operations, and Counter-UAS concepts an TTPs.
The workshops done in the NATO MW COE and all the studies conducted leads to a clear conclusion: the challenge is not to introduce unmanned systems into existing structures and training, but to adapt those structures to a battlefield in which unmanned systems are already central.Based on these findings, several priority areas for adaptation emerge in the discussion during the workshop:
Doctrine must evolve to quick integrate unmanned systems across all warfighting functions and reflect decentralized execution.
Training must systematically expose units to drone-enabled and degraded environments, including GNSS-denied conditions.
Force structures must align capabilities with operational needs, embedding UAS at company level and ensuring coordination at battalion level and above.
Procurement models must become more flexible and responsive, enabling rapid adaptation and bottom-up innovation.
Electromagnetic resilience and low airspace management must be treated as core operational functions.
The workshop represents a step within a broader effort to translate operational experience into doctrine, training, and capability development. The MWCOE will continue to support this process, contributing to the evolution of NATO standards, including ATrainP-6, and fostering a shared understanding across Allied nations.
2 – Executive Summary
The u201cUnmanned Systems in Mountain Warfare: Company Employment and Battalion Integrationu201d workshop, conducted at the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence, examined the rapidly evolving role of unmanned systems in contemporary operations, with a specific focus on their implications for mountain warfare.
The discussions confirmed that unmanned systems are no longer emerging capabilities, but central components of the modern battlefield in Mountain Warfare. Their widespread use has fundamentally altered how forces observe, decide, and act, creating an operational environment characterized by persistent surveillance, rapid targeting cycles, and decentralized execution.
A key finding is the transition from a battlefield defined by intermittent exposure to one of continuous observation. Air superiority can no longer be taken for granted. Units must now assume that detection is constant and that engagement may follow within minutes. This shift significantly reduces reaction time and places greater emphasis on dispersion, mobility, and signature management as primary means of survivability.
The increasing density of unmanned systems on the battlefield has also fundamentally altered traditional concepts of survivability and maneuver. Concealment and static protection alone are often no longer sufficient in an operational environment characterized by continuous aerial observation and rapid target engagement cycles. Unmanned systems have enabled a decentralization of capability, something that for a Mountain soldier exists since the first day of training. This increases (or renew in technological means) the autonomy of tactical units but also generates a requirement for coordination and integration at battalion and brigade level, where multiple systems must be synchronized within a coherent operational framework.
In addition, UAS/UAV and autonomous systems open entirely new operational possibilities in terms of mobility, speed, reconnaissance, command and control, situational awareness, terrain analysis (snowpack, avalance etcu2026) and tactical effectiveness. ISR drones allow persistent observation of terrain features and movement corridors which are difficult or impossible to observe from the ground. FPV systems provide decentralized strike capabilities at lower tactical levels, while cargo drones and autonomous support systems improve sustainment and logistical flexibility in isolated or hard-to-reach areas.
The workshop also highlighted a critical mismatch between operational adaptation and institutional processes. While battlefield innovation occurs rapidly, driven by continuous experimentation and feedback, doctrine, training, and procurement systems evolve more slowly. Bridging this gap is essential to ensure that available capabilities are effectively employed.
Another central finding concerns the electromagnetic environment, which must now be considered contested and degraded by default. GNSS denial, communications disruption, and electronic warfare are persistent features of the battlefield. Systems and procedures must therefore be designed to operate under these conditions, rather than relying on their availability.
Counter-UAS emerges as a fundamental requirement for survivability. It cannot be treated as a specialized capability, but must be integrated across all levels of the force, combining behavioural adaptation, awareness, and technical solutions within a layered approach.
The lessons identified further highlight that future operational success in mountainous terrain will increasingly depend on the ability to effectively integrate unmanned and autonomous systems into all aspects of military operations, including the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), Mountain Cell procedures, reconnaissance planning, sustainment operations, and Counter-UAS concepts an TTPs.
The workshops done in the NATO MW COE and all the studies conducted leads to a clear conclusion: the challenge is not to introduce unmanned systems into existing structures and training, but to adapt those structures to a battlefield in which unmanned systems are already central. Based on these findings, several priority areas for adaptation emerge in the discussion during the workshop:
The workshop represents a step within a broader effort to translate operational experience into doctrine, training, and capability development. The MWCOE will continue to support this process, contributing to the evolution of NATO standards, including ATrainP-6, and fostering a shared understanding across Allied nations.