9 – Proposal for a New Mountain Troops Force Structure Up to Battalion Level
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9.1 – Introduction
The force structure outlined below represents a conceptual proposal developed through a combination of analytical studies, operational observations, experimentation activities, and iterative refinement. It is the result of workshops, expert discussions, and continuous exchanges among subject matter experts, practitioners, and representatives from multiple NATO nations. These interactions have enabled the consolidation of diverse perspectives, lessons identified, and emerging best practices related to the employment of unmanned systems in mountain warfare. As such, this proposal should not be considered prescriptive, but rather as a contribution to the ongoing doctrinal evolution, intended to stimulate further discussion, experimentation, and validation across the Alliance. Its purpose is to support a shared understanding and provide a practical framework that can be adapted, tested, and refined by NATO nations according to their specific operational contexts, force structures, and capabilities.
The findings of the workshop clearly indicate that current force structures are not fully aligned with the operational realities of a drone-enabled battlefield. While existing organizations provide a solid foundation, they were not originally designed to operate in an environment characterized by persistent observation, distributed capabilities, contested electromagnetic spectrum, and the widespread employment of unmanned systems. Adapting to this environment does not necessarily require a complete redesign of existing organizations. However, it does require a systematic evolution aimed at integrating unmanned capabilities as organic and essential components at every level of command.
The organizational integration of unmanned systems will largely depend on the type of system employed, its operational purpose, and the existing force structure of individual nations. Consequently, no universal organizational model can be applied across all mountain warfare forces. Different operational requirements, national doctrines, available resources, and organizational cultures will inevitably generate different implementation approaches. Nevertheless, recent operational experience and experimentation activities suggest a number of common principles that can guide future force development.
At the lowest tactical echelons, the integration of unmanned systems must become fully normalized. Small UAS with a take-off weight below approximately 2.5 kilograms can generally be integrated directly into squad, platoon, and company-level organizations, where they provide commanders with organic reconnaissance, situational awareness, and limited targeting capabilities. These systems must remain simple, robust, portable, and directly integrated into maneuver, allowing small units to operate with increased autonomy while maintaining awareness beyond terrain constraints.
As system size, complexity, endurance, and mission requirements increase, dedicated organizational solutions become necessary. Medium-range reconnaissance systems, FPV platforms, loitering munitions, logistics drones, electronic warfare payloads, and Counter-UAS capabilities require specialized personnel, technical support, maintenance procedures, and command-and-control arrangements that exceed the capabilities of individual operators. The integration of unmanned systems should therefore not be viewed simply as the introduction of new equipment, but as the development of an interconnected capability involving operators, analysts, maintainers, commanders, and support personnel.
Operational experience has consistently demonstrated that successful employment of UAS capabilities depends on more than a single operator. Effective drone operations require mission planning, system operation, intelligence exploitation, technical maintenance, communication management, airspace coordination, and integration with supported units. The organizational integration of unmanned systems therefore requires dedicated and properly trained personnel at every level. Depending on the mission and echelon, crews may consist of multiple personnel performing complementary functions such as command and control, platform operation, sensor exploitation, target identification, battle damage assessment, technical support, and spectrum management.
At company level, the role of unmanned systems expands significantly. Companies must be capable not only of employing drones for reconnaissance, but also of supporting targeting processes, coordinating fires, managing information flows, contributing to local airspace management, and implementing basic Counter-UAS measures. This requires dedicated personnel with clearly defined responsibilities and the ability to integrate sensor data into the decision-making process while maintaining coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters.
The battalion level becomes the decisive integration node. As the density and diversity of systems increase, the challenge shifts from employment to coordination. Battalion structures should therefore include dedicated elements responsible for integrating ISR and targeting data, managing low-altitude airspace and deconfliction measures, coordinating UAS and Counter-UAS activities, supporting command and control through data processing and prioritization, and managing the increasing complexity of operations in the electromagnetic domain. These functions should not be viewed as additional layers of bureaucracy, but as necessary adaptations to prevent system saturation and maintain operational coherence.
At brigade level, the focus moves toward synchronization, interoperability, and operational depth. Brigade commands must be capable of integrating multiple battalion-level systems into a broader operational framework, ensuring continuity of information, efficient resource allocation, and alignment with higher-level effects, including joint and multi-domain operations.
A key characteristic of the proposed structure is the balance between decentralization and coordination. Capabilities must be distributed throughout the force to ensure responsiveness, adaptability, and resilience, while coordination mechanisms must remain sufficiently robust to prevent fragmentation, duplication of effort, and fratricide. This balance reflects the realities of mountain warfare, where terrain, weather, and human performance continue to shape operations and where tactical execution is frequently decentralized to battalion level and below.
The emergence of persistent ISR, unmanned systems, and electromagnetic contestation is profoundly altering how these formations must operate. The challenge is therefore not to replace existing structures, but to adapt them to function effectively within a technologically saturated and continuously observed battlespace. Ultimately, the objective is not to create a force that uses drones, but a force that is structurally designed to operate, survive, and prevail in a drone-enabled environment.
9.2 – Design Principles
The proposed evolution of mountain force structure is guided by four key principles:
Decentralized lethality and awareness at the lowest levels
Integration rather than aggregation of unmanned capabilities
Resilience in degraded environments (C2, GNSS, communications)
Terrain-adapted modularity, preserving flexibility across operational levels
These principles remain consistent with doctrinal requirements for mission command and decentralized execution in mountainous terrain, while extending them into the digital and electromagnetic domains.
9.3 – Sub-Unit Level (Squad / Platoon)
At the squad levels, units must be capable of operating with a high degree of autonomy within isolated terrain compartments. This requirement, already central to mountain warfare, becomes even more critical in a battlespace characterized by persistent observation and limited situational awareness.
Every squad should be equipped with one additional UAS operator (or as additional task to a squad soldier) capable to use
organic micro-UAS for immediate reconnaissance (small – short range – light)
limited loitering or precision strike capability, ISR
secure, low-signature communication systems
UAV with modular design and different payload/sensors based on mission, not limited to open air but even for caves, wood and ridges.
These systems must remain simple, portable, and adapted to the terrain. In particular, platforms should support modular payload configurations, allowing employment not only in open environments but also in complex terrain such as forests, ridgelines, and confined spaces including caves. Secure, low-signature communication systems are essential to ensure survivability and reduce electromagnetic exposure. As at squad level, modularity remains essential. Platforms should be adaptable to mission requirements and terrain conditions, ensuring flexibility across different operational scenarios. Secure and resilient communication systems remain a critical enabler, particularly in environments where connectivity is degraded or contested.
The objective at this level is not to create a specialized capability, but toextend the squad’s natural ability to observe and act beyond line of sight, without increasing its physical footprint. Unmanned systems therefore become an integral part of maneuver, directly supporting movement, security, and engagement.
At the squad level, unmanned systems are not specialized assets but integrated tools within maneuver, directly supporting movement, security, and engagement.
At platoon level, the scale and complexity of operations require a more structured approach. Each platoon should include a dedicated UAS team, capable of employing larger short-range systems with increased endurance and sensor capability. These systems should support not only reconnaissance, but also target acquisition, fire adjustment, and, where required, specialized tasks such as CBRN detection. UAV with modular design and different payload/sensors based on mission, not limited to open air but even for caves, wood and ridges
The platoon UAS team should typically consist of three to four personnel, depending on the mission and task organization. In its basic configuration, a three-person team would include:
a team leader responsible for mission command and target allocation
an operator responsible for system control and engagement
a UAS specialist responsible for logistics, reconfiguration, and system support
For more complex missions, a four-person configuration allows for greater functional specialization:
a team leader responsible for coordination and situational awareness
an operator responsible for drone control, data exploitation, and target tracking
an observer supporting target selection, engagement confirmation, and battle damage assessment
a technical specialist responsible for system preparation, maintenance, and signal management
This structure allows the platoon to move beyond simple drone employment and toward integrated ISR and targeting support, while maintaining the flexibility required in mountainous terrain.
9.4 – Company Level
At company level, the integration of unmanned systems transitions from a purely tactical function to a command, coordination, and synchronization function. While the company retains its classical structure—Company Headquarters, three maneuver platoons, and one support platoon—this configuration alone is no longer sufficient to operate effectively in a drone-enabled and electromagnetically contested battlespace.
Mountain warfare doctrine already highlights that company-level commanders operate in fragmented terrain, often with limited situational awareness and restricted lines of communication. The widespread employment of unmanned systems amplifies both the opportunities and the risks associated with this environment. As a result, companies must evolve to manage not only maneuver, but also information flow, airspace usage, and electromagnetic exposure.
A dedicated UAS platoon should be established as an organic element of the company. This platoon would provide the company commander with the ability to generate, sustain, and coordinate unmanned effects across multiple terrain compartments. The UAS platoon should include:
one drone team, structured similarly to platoon-level UAS teams, capable of conducting ISR, precision strike, route reconnaissance, and target acquisition, as well as providing overwatch for patrols operating beyond line of sight, particularly behind ridgelines or within confined terrain
one team dedicated to data fusion, information integration, and dissemination, responsible for collecting, processing, and distributing information from multiple sources, including squad and platoon-level UAVs. This function is critical to prevent information overload, ensure that collected data is transformed into actionable information, and enable the company to move from isolated drone employment toward a coherent and shared situational picture, which is essential in mountainous environments where units operate in dispersed and partially disconnected conditions
one team responsible for capturing, sharing, and implementing lessons identified, both upward and downward. This includes the integration of updates related to software, hardware modifications, and electronic warfare countermeasures
one team capable of providing a basic capability for local airspace coordination and deconfliction. Given the density of unmanned systems operating at low altitude, particularly in mountainous terrain where vertical and horizontal separation are limited, the risk of interference and fratricide increases significantly. Simple, scalable procedures and clearly defined responsibilities are therefore essential
one team capable of a dedicated Counter-UAS (C-UAS) cell should be integrated within the companyy. This cell should consist, at a minimum, of two trained personnel equipped with portable counter-UAS systems, including handheld detectors, jammers, and, where available, kinetic anti-drone solutions. The purpose of this element is not to create a centralized defensive capability, but to provide the company with immediate protection against low-altitude threats, particularly in situations where support from higher echelons is delayed or unavailable due to terrain constraints.
The existing support platoon must integrate a team capable of providing alimited but effective logistic support capability using light UAV systems. These systems, capable of transporting payloads of up to approximately 10 kg, can support the resupply of forward elements operating in difficult terrain, reducing physical exposure and increasing operational endurance
Taken together, these adaptations reflect the increasing complexity of operating multiple systems within restricted terrain compartments. In mountain warfare, where movement is constrained and observation is limited, the ability to manage airspace, information, and electromagnetic signatures becomes as important as the ability to maneuver.
In this context, the company should be able to:
fuse information from multiple sources into a coherent operational picture
coordinate ISR, fires, and maneuver in a synchronized manner
operate effectively under intermittent, degraded, or denied communications conditions
Ultimately, the company evolves from a unit focused primarily on maneuver to one capable of integrating effects across domains, while retaining the flexibility and adaptability required in mountainous terrain.
9.5 – Battalion Level (Decisive Integration Node)
At battalion level, the integration of unmanned systems evolves from coordination at company level to full-spectrum orchestration of capabilities across multiple terrain compartments.
In mountain warfare, the battalion already represents the highest echelon capable of effectively controlling maneuver, due to terrain fragmentation and limited mobility. In a drone-enabled battlespace, this role expands significantly. The battalion becomes the central node for integration, prioritization, and synchronization of all unmanned and counter-unmanned activities.
While retaining its classical structure—Battalion HQ, maneuver companies, and combat support elements—the battalion must evolve to manage not only maneuver and fires, but also data flows, airspace control, and electromagnetic effects across depth.
In a drone-enabled battlespace, the battalion becomes thecritical integration node, requiring structural adaptation. It should include:
a UAS Company or equivalent multi-functional unit, integrating:
ISR platoon
FPV/strike platoon
loitering munitions
Counter-UAS platoon that include an intelligence and adaptation cell, capable of study enemy drones, adapt countermeasure quickly and feed update to down and upper level (brigade)
a C2 and data integration element (tactical command post), composed by:
a dedicated team for real time video exploitation, terrain mapping and target identification
a team for target prioritization and dissemination
a team for terrain mapping and risk management (summer and winter) (similar to Mountain Cell)
low-altitude airspace coordination, ensuring safe and effective employment of multiple systems
an enhanced EW and spectrum management component, recognizing that control of the electromagnetic environment is now as decisive as terrain
Inside the Combat Service Support
a dedicated heavy logistic drone section must be implemented to carry up to 80 kg to resupply companies in difficult terrain
a dedicated medical CASEVAC unmanned team should be created
Inside the Combat Support a dedicated technical and workshop section in charge of repair, modification, upgrade and battery management of all system inside the battalion
Taken together, this structure enables the battalion to effectively coordinate distributed systems across multiple terrain compartments, while avoiding saturation and interference, and maintaining operational tempo despite fragmentation.
9.6 – Conclusion
The proposed force structure does not aim to create a technologically dependent force, but a force that is structurally adapted to operate in a battlespace where observation is constant, signatures are contested, and tempo is driven by information flow as much as by movement.
9 – Proposal for a New Mountain Troops Force Structure Up to Battalion Level
9.1 – Introduction
The force structure outlined below represents a conceptual proposal developed through a combination of analytical studies, operational observations, experimentation activities, and iterative refinement. It is the result of workshops, expert discussions, and continuous exchanges among subject matter experts, practitioners, and representatives from multiple NATO nations. These interactions have enabled the consolidation of diverse perspectives, lessons identified, and emerging best practices related to the employment of unmanned systems in mountain warfare. As such, this proposal should not be considered prescriptive, but rather as a contribution to the ongoing doctrinal evolution, intended to stimulate further discussion, experimentation, and validation across the Alliance. Its purpose is to support a shared understanding and provide a practical framework that can be adapted, tested, and refined by NATO nations according to their specific operational contexts, force structures, and capabilities.
The findings of the workshop clearly indicate that current force structures are not fully aligned with the operational realities of a drone-enabled battlefield. While existing organizations provide a solid foundation, they were not originally designed to operate in an environment characterized by persistent observation, distributed capabilities, contested electromagnetic spectrum, and the widespread employment of unmanned systems. Adapting to this environment does not necessarily require a complete redesign of existing organizations. However, it does require a systematic evolution aimed at integrating unmanned capabilities as organic and essential components at every level of command.
The organizational integration of unmanned systems will largely depend on the type of system employed, its operational purpose, and the existing force structure of individual nations. Consequently, no universal organizational model can be applied across all mountain warfare forces. Different operational requirements, national doctrines, available resources, and organizational cultures will inevitably generate different implementation approaches. Nevertheless, recent operational experience and experimentation activities suggest a number of common principles that can guide future force development.
At the lowest tactical echelons, the integration of unmanned systems must become fully normalized. Small UAS with a take-off weight below approximately 2.5 kilograms can generally be integrated directly into squad, platoon, and company-level organizations, where they provide commanders with organic reconnaissance, situational awareness, and limited targeting capabilities. These systems must remain simple, robust, portable, and directly integrated into maneuver, allowing small units to operate with increased autonomy while maintaining awareness beyond terrain constraints.
As system size, complexity, endurance, and mission requirements increase, dedicated organizational solutions become necessary. Medium-range reconnaissance systems, FPV platforms, loitering munitions, logistics drones, electronic warfare payloads, and Counter-UAS capabilities require specialized personnel, technical support, maintenance procedures, and command-and-control arrangements that exceed the capabilities of individual operators. The integration of unmanned systems should therefore not be viewed simply as the introduction of new equipment, but as the development of an interconnected capability involving operators, analysts, maintainers, commanders, and support personnel.
Operational experience has consistently demonstrated that successful employment of UAS capabilities depends on more than a single operator. Effective drone operations require mission planning, system operation, intelligence exploitation, technical maintenance, communication management, airspace coordination, and integration with supported units. The organizational integration of unmanned systems therefore requires dedicated and properly trained personnel at every level. Depending on the mission and echelon, crews may consist of multiple personnel performing complementary functions such as command and control, platform operation, sensor exploitation, target identification, battle damage assessment, technical support, and spectrum management.
At company level, the role of unmanned systems expands significantly. Companies must be capable not only of employing drones for reconnaissance, but also of supporting targeting processes, coordinating fires, managing information flows, contributing to local airspace management, and implementing basic Counter-UAS measures. This requires dedicated personnel with clearly defined responsibilities and the ability to integrate sensor data into the decision-making process while maintaining coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters.
The battalion level becomes the decisive integration node. As the density and diversity of systems increase, the challenge shifts from employment to coordination. Battalion structures should therefore include dedicated elements responsible for integrating ISR and targeting data, managing low-altitude airspace and deconfliction measures, coordinating UAS and Counter-UAS activities, supporting command and control through data processing and prioritization, and managing the increasing complexity of operations in the electromagnetic domain. These functions should not be viewed as additional layers of bureaucracy, but as necessary adaptations to prevent system saturation and maintain operational coherence.
At brigade level, the focus moves toward synchronization, interoperability, and operational depth. Brigade commands must be capable of integrating multiple battalion-level systems into a broader operational framework, ensuring continuity of information, efficient resource allocation, and alignment with higher-level effects, including joint and multi-domain operations.
A key characteristic of the proposed structure is the balance between decentralization and coordination. Capabilities must be distributed throughout the force to ensure responsiveness, adaptability, and resilience, while coordination mechanisms must remain sufficiently robust to prevent fragmentation, duplication of effort, and fratricide. This balance reflects the realities of mountain warfare, where terrain, weather, and human performance continue to shape operations and where tactical execution is frequently decentralized to battalion level and below.
The emergence of persistent ISR, unmanned systems, and electromagnetic contestation is profoundly altering how these formations must operate. The challenge is therefore not to replace existing structures, but to adapt them to function effectively within a technologically saturated and continuously observed battlespace. Ultimately, the objective is not to create a force that uses drones, but a force that is structurally designed to operate, survive, and prevail in a drone-enabled environment.
9.2 – Design Principles
The proposed evolution of mountain force structure is guided by four key principles:
These principles remain consistent with doctrinal requirements for mission command and decentralized execution in mountainous terrain, while extending them into the digital and electromagnetic domains.
9.3 – Sub-Unit Level (Squad / Platoon)
At the squad levels, units must be capable of operating with a high degree of autonomy within isolated terrain compartments. This requirement, already central to mountain warfare, becomes even more critical in a battlespace characterized by persistent observation and limited situational awareness.
Every squad should be equipped with one additional UAS operator (or as additional task to a squad soldier) capable to use
These systems must remain simple, portable, and adapted to the terrain. In particular, platforms should support modular payload configurations, allowing employment not only in open environments but also in complex terrain such as forests, ridgelines, and confined spaces including caves. Secure, low-signature communication systems are essential to ensure survivability and reduce electromagnetic exposure. As at squad level, modularity remains essential. Platforms should be adaptable to mission requirements and terrain conditions, ensuring flexibility across different operational scenarios. Secure and resilient communication systems remain a critical enabler, particularly in environments where connectivity is degraded or contested.
The objective at this level is not to create a specialized capability, but to extend the squad’s natural ability to observe and act beyond line of sight, without increasing its physical footprint. Unmanned systems therefore become an integral part of maneuver, directly supporting movement, security, and engagement.
At the squad level, unmanned systems are not specialized assets but integrated tools within maneuver, directly supporting movement, security, and engagement.
At platoon level, the scale and complexity of operations require a more structured approach. Each platoon should include a dedicated UAS team, capable of employing larger short-range systems with increased endurance and sensor capability. These systems should support not only reconnaissance, but also target acquisition, fire adjustment, and, where required, specialized tasks such as CBRN detection. UAV with modular design and different payload/sensors based on mission, not limited to open air but even for caves, wood and ridges
The platoon UAS team should typically consist of three to four personnel, depending on the mission and task organization. In its basic configuration, a three-person team would include:
For more complex missions, a four-person configuration allows for greater functional specialization:
This structure allows the platoon to move beyond simple drone employment and toward integrated ISR and targeting support, while maintaining the flexibility required in mountainous terrain.
9.4 – Company Level
At company level, the integration of unmanned systems transitions from a purely tactical function to a command, coordination, and synchronization function. While the company retains its classical structure—Company Headquarters, three maneuver platoons, and one support platoon—this configuration alone is no longer sufficient to operate effectively in a drone-enabled and electromagnetically contested battlespace.
Mountain warfare doctrine already highlights that company-level commanders operate in fragmented terrain, often with limited situational awareness and restricted lines of communication. The widespread employment of unmanned systems amplifies both the opportunities and the risks associated with this environment. As a result, companies must evolve to manage not only maneuver, but also information flow, airspace usage, and electromagnetic exposure.
A dedicated UAS platoon should be established as an organic element of the company. This platoon would provide the company commander with the ability to generate, sustain, and coordinate unmanned effects across multiple terrain compartments. The UAS platoon should include:
The existing support platoon must integrate a team capable of providing a limited but effective logistic support capability using light UAV systems. These systems, capable of transporting payloads of up to approximately 10 kg, can support the resupply of forward elements operating in difficult terrain, reducing physical exposure and increasing operational endurance
Taken together, these adaptations reflect the increasing complexity of operating multiple systems within restricted terrain compartments. In mountain warfare, where movement is constrained and observation is limited, the ability to manage airspace, information, and electromagnetic signatures becomes as important as the ability to maneuver.
In this context, the company should be able to:
Ultimately, the company evolves from a unit focused primarily on maneuver to one capable of integrating effects across domains, while retaining the flexibility and adaptability required in mountainous terrain.
9.5 – Battalion Level (Decisive Integration Node)
At battalion level, the integration of unmanned systems evolves from coordination at company level to full-spectrum orchestration of capabilities across multiple terrain compartments.
In mountain warfare, the battalion already represents the highest echelon capable of effectively controlling maneuver, due to terrain fragmentation and limited mobility. In a drone-enabled battlespace, this role expands significantly. The battalion becomes the central node for integration, prioritization, and synchronization of all unmanned and counter-unmanned activities.
While retaining its classical structure—Battalion HQ, maneuver companies, and combat support elements—the battalion must evolve to manage not only maneuver and fires, but also data flows, airspace control, and electromagnetic effects across depth.
In a drone-enabled battlespace, the battalion becomes the critical integration node, requiring structural adaptation. It should include:
Inside the Combat Service Support
Inside the Combat Support a dedicated technical and workshop section in charge of repair, modification, upgrade and battery management of all system inside the battalion
Taken together, this structure enables the battalion to effectively coordinate distributed systems across multiple terrain compartments, while avoiding saturation and interference, and maintaining operational tempo despite fragmentation.
9.6 – Conclusion
The proposed force structure does not aim to create a technologically dependent force, but a force that is structurally adapted to operate in a battlespace where observation is constant, signatures are contested, and tempo is driven by information flow as much as by movement.