6.5 – From Concept to Transformation: FPV Employment and Structural Change
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At this point of the workshop, the discussion naturally shifts from analysis to responsibility.
Up to now, the focus has been on understanding how the battlefield is changing, identifying the gaps, and reviewing existing experiences. But there is a moment in every discussion where continuing to describe the problem becomes insufficient. That moment was reached here.
The central idea emerging from this intervention is straightforward, but uncomfortable: we already know enough to act.
Drones are no longer niche capabilities. They are employed across the full spectrum of tactical activities—reconnaissance, targeting, logistics, psychological effects, and direct attack. They are not a specialization. And yet, mountain units remain only partially adapted to this reality. Not because the technology is missing, but because the system surrounding it—procurement, structure, training, and mindset—has not evolved at the same pace.
Addressing this gap requires more than incremental adjustments. It requires a cultural shift.
This shift begins with procurement. The current acquisition system is designed for large, complex platforms developed over long cycles. It is inherently incompatible with technologies that evolve rapidly, are often commercially available, and require continuous modification. Attempting to fit drones into this model inevitably slows adaptation and creates dependency.
What emerges instead is a different approach, one that places responsibility closer to the unit. If drones operate at company and battalion level, then adaptation must happen there as well. This implies giving commanders not only the tools, but also the freedom to experiment, to test solutions, and to accept failure as part of the process. It also implies building local capacity—repair, modification, and adaptation—so that units are not passive users of technology, but active participants in its evolution. Small Unit Leaders must be free to buy, test and fail.
This naturally leads to a second, more profound shift: the recognition that innovation does not originate at the top.
In highly dynamic environments, the fastest adaptation occurs where the problem is experienced directly. The operator, the small unit, the platoon—these are the levels where new solutions emerge, are tested, and either discarded or refined. Accepting this reality requires a change in perspective. It means accepting that not every attempt will succeed, and that failure is not inefficiency, but a necessary condition for progress.
The idea of “letting the squad fail” is not a provocation for its own sake. It reflects a fundamental truth: adaptation cannot be centralized when the environment evolves faster than the system. Big Companies are not the only one actor anymore.
However, empowering lower levels is only part of the solution. If drones are to be fully integrated, the structure of the force must reflect their role.
The current model remains characterized by limited availability of systems and a tendency toward centralized control and procurement. This creates a mismatch between capability and need. In practice, it results in insufficient density at the lowest levels, where speed and responsiveness are most critical.
A different approach is required. Drone capabilities must be distributed across the force, embedded at every level, and aligned with the functions they are expected to perform. At company level, this means having organic capacity to observe beyond terrain obstacles, support maneuver, and contribute directly to targeting. In mountain warfare, this is not a luxury. It is a necessity. Without it, terrain becomes a limitation rather than a factor that can be exploited.
The current training system is not designed to produce personnel capable of employing unmanned systems at scale within complex environments such as mountains. It remains largely focused on traditional skills, with limited integration of new requirements. This creates a disconnect between what is needed and what is available. Bridging this gap requires more than adding new courses. It requires rethinking training as a whole, ensuring that operators, commanders, and staff are all prepared to function within a drone-enabled environment. Without this, any structural or technological change remains incomplete.
The discussion therefore cannot stop at employment. Once drones are integrated into maneuver, fires, logistics, and targeting, survivability becomes inseparable from the ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat hostile systems. The next section takes that step directly, shifting the focus from drone-enabled capability to Counter-UAS as a precondition for survival in mountain warfare.
6.5 – From Concept to Transformation: FPV Employment and Structural Change
At this point of the workshop, the discussion naturally shifts from analysis to responsibility.
Up to now, the focus has been on understanding how the battlefield is changing, identifying the gaps, and reviewing existing experiences. But there is a moment in every discussion where continuing to describe the problem becomes insufficient. That moment was reached here.
The central idea emerging from this intervention is straightforward, but uncomfortable: we already know enough to act.
Drones are no longer niche capabilities. They are employed across the full spectrum of tactical activities—reconnaissance, targeting, logistics, psychological effects, and direct attack. They are not a specialization. And yet, mountain units remain only partially adapted to this reality. Not because the technology is missing, but because the system surrounding it—procurement, structure, training, and mindset—has not evolved at the same pace.
Addressing this gap requires more than incremental adjustments. It requires a cultural shift.
This shift begins with procurement. The current acquisition system is designed for large, complex platforms developed over long cycles. It is inherently incompatible with technologies that evolve rapidly, are often commercially available, and require continuous modification. Attempting to fit drones into this model inevitably slows adaptation and creates dependency.
What emerges instead is a different approach, one that places responsibility closer to the unit. If drones operate at company and battalion level, then adaptation must happen there as well. This implies giving commanders not only the tools, but also the freedom to experiment, to test solutions, and to accept failure as part of the process. It also implies building local capacity—repair, modification, and adaptation—so that units are not passive users of technology, but active participants in its evolution. Small Unit Leaders must be free to buy, test and fail.
This naturally leads to a second, more profound shift: the recognition that innovation does not originate at the top.
In highly dynamic environments, the fastest adaptation occurs where the problem is experienced directly. The operator, the small unit, the platoon—these are the levels where new solutions emerge, are tested, and either discarded or refined. Accepting this reality requires a change in perspective. It means accepting that not every attempt will succeed, and that failure is not inefficiency, but a necessary condition for progress.
The idea of “letting the squad fail” is not a provocation for its own sake. It reflects a fundamental truth: adaptation cannot be centralized when the environment evolves faster than the system. Big Companies are not the only one actor anymore.
However, empowering lower levels is only part of the solution. If drones are to be fully integrated, the structure of the force must reflect their role.
The current model remains characterized by limited availability of systems and a tendency toward centralized control and procurement. This creates a mismatch between capability and need. In practice, it results in insufficient density at the lowest levels, where speed and responsiveness are most critical.
A different approach is required. Drone capabilities must be distributed across the force, embedded at every level, and aligned with the functions they are expected to perform. At company level, this means having organic capacity to observe beyond terrain obstacles, support maneuver, and contribute directly to targeting. In mountain warfare, this is not a luxury. It is a necessity. Without it, terrain becomes a limitation rather than a factor that can be exploited.
The current training system is not designed to produce personnel capable of employing unmanned systems at scale within complex environments such as mountains. It remains largely focused on traditional skills, with limited integration of new requirements. This creates a disconnect between what is needed and what is available. Bridging this gap requires more than adding new courses. It requires rethinking training as a whole, ensuring that operators, commanders, and staff are all prepared to function within a drone-enabled environment. Without this, any structural or technological change remains incomplete.
The discussion therefore cannot stop at employment. Once drones are integrated into maneuver, fires, logistics, and targeting, survivability becomes inseparable from the ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat hostile systems. The next section takes that step directly, shifting the focus from drone-enabled capability to Counter-UAS as a precondition for survival in mountain warfare.