7.1 – Counter-UAS and the Swarm Threat: From Vulnerability to Survivability
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The increasing proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and the lessons emerging from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, have fundamentally altered the relationship between force employment and force protection. Discussions on drone warfare often focus on how unmanned systems enhance reconnaissance, targeting, and strike capabilities. However, this represents only one side of the operational problem. The other, equally important, concerns survivability. If drones increasingly define the modern battlefield, Counter-UAS capabilities increasingly determine who can survive and operate effectively within it.
The widespread availability of low-cost FPV drones, loitering munitions, autonomous systems, and commercially adaptable UAS platforms has transformed aerial surveillance and precision engagement from specialized capabilities into persistent features of the operational environment. Tactical units are now subject to continuous observation, tracking, and potential engagement. In such an environment, the ability to generate combat effects is no longer sufficient. Operational success increasingly depends on the ability to survive and maintain freedom of action within a drone-saturated battlespace.
Recent conflicts have further demonstrated the growing operational relevance of coordinated drone attacks and swarm-like employment of unmanned systems. The challenge is no longer represented by isolated platforms but by multiple systems operating simultaneously, often designed to saturate defensive measures, overwhelm observation and engagement capacities, and significantly reduce available reaction times. Such attacks can generate disproportionate operational and psychological effects, particularly against units operating under constrained conditions.
These challenges are amplified in mountain warfare environments and traditional air defence concepts and centralized protection architectures alone are insufficient. A dedicated platoon, a single technological solution, or a so-called “silver bullet” approach cannot adequately address the complexity of the threat. Centralized systems frequently suffer from reduced coverage, delayed response times, and limited effectiveness across dispersed and compartmentalized terrain.
For this reason, Counter-UAS in mountain warfare must be understood as a distributed, layered, and decentralized capability integrated across the entire force. The battlespace itself imposes this requirement. Survivability begins at the lowest tactical level and does not initially depend on technology. Concealment, dispersion, signature management, camouflage discipline, deception, mobility, and sound fieldcraft remain the most effective and resilient countermeasures against persistent aerial observation. The conflict in Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that survivability increasingly depends on adaptation and movement rather than on static defensive positions. Units that fail to apply these principles expose themselves unnecessarily regardless of the technological systems available to them.
Building upon these passive measures, tactical units require the ability to achieve local situational awareness. In mountainous terrain, drones may appear with little warning due to terrain masking and environmental conditions. Company and platoon-level elements must therefore be capable of detecting, identifying, reporting, and reacting to drone activity independently and under degraded operational conditions. The objective is not to establish full control of the airspace but to avoid tactical surprise and maintain sufficient awareness to preserve operational freedom of action.
At higher tactical levels, the challenge evolves from detection to integration and coordination. Battalion-level formations must combine information from multiple sources, prioritize threats, allocate limited resources, and synchronize responses across dispersed units. Dedicated elements are required to integrate ISR assets, detection systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and available effectors into a coherent defensive framework. At brigade level and above, Counter-UAS becomes an architectural problem requiring the integration of detection networks, electronic warfare, kinetic systems, fires, communications, and airspace management within a common operational framework capable of adapting to both terrain constraints and evolving threats. Workshop activities and experimentation conducted by the MW COE further highlighted the importance of scalable and distributed defensive solutions. Traditional engagement models designed to counter individual aerial threats become increasingly ineffective when confronted by multiple simultaneous drones. This creates a structural mismatch between defensive systems optimized for sequential engagements and adversaries employing massed, low-cost aerial platforms intended to saturate available defences. Addressing this challenge requires low-cost, scalable, and distributed countermeasures capable of responding to multiple threats simultaneously. Particular relevance has been identified for portable Counter-UAS systems, decentralized electronic warfare and jamming capabilities, observation networks, rapid warning procedures, resilient communication systems, low-level airspace coordination measures, and modular defensive architectures deployable at company and platoon level.
Electronic warfare assumes a particularly important role within this framework because it offers the possibility of disrupting multiple unmanned systems simultaneously without relying exclusively on kinetic engagements. Nevertheless, no single capability can provide a complete solution. Effective Counter-UAS requires the integration of passive protection measures, camouflage discipline, deception, low-signature movement procedures, decentralized observation, electronic attack capabilities, kinetic defence systems, and robust command-and-control arrangements.
At the same time, Counter-UAS cannot be separated from UAS employment itself. In many operational contexts, friendly unmanned systems provide the most effective means of countering enemy drones through early warning, detection, tracking, and enhanced situational awareness. This reinforces the understanding that UAS and Counter-UAS are not distinct domains but interconnected components of a single operational ecosystem.
Ultimately, even the most sophisticated architecture remains ineffective without adequately trained personnel. Counter-UAS must therefore be regarded as a force-wide competency rather than a specialized function reserved for a limited number of experts. Every soldier requires a basic understanding of the threat, associated vulnerabilities, and immediate protective measures. Specialized personnel must be capable of operating sensors, managing information flows, and coordinating defensive responses, while units as a whole must integrate Counter-UAS considerations into routine planning, training, and execution. This requirement becomes even more demanding in mountain warfare, where altitude, weather, terrain, and seasonal variations continuously affect both unmanned systems and countermeasures. Capabilities effective in one environment may prove significantly less effective in another, making adaptation, repetition, and realistic training across diverse operational conditions essential prerequisites for maintaining survivability and operational effectiveness in future mountain warfare operations.
7.1.1 Conclusion
Counter-UAS fundamentally changes the logic of survivability. It is no longer sufficient to avoid contact or reduce exposure. Units must operate under the assumption that they are constantly observed and potentially targeted. The question is no longer how to avoid the threat, but how to survive within it.
This requires a shift from centralized solutions to distributed, layered, and terrain-adapted systems, supported by training, discipline, and coordination.
The discussion on Counter-UAS makes clear that survivability depends not only on structure and training, but also on the ability to operate when the electromagnetic environment is degraded or deliberately contested. In practice, many of the assumptions on which unmanned systems depend—location, timing, connectivity, and control—can no longer be treated as stable.
This brings the analysis to one of the most immediate and operationally relevant consequences of electronic warfare: the loss or corruption of GNSS-based navigation. The next section therefore focuses on GPS- and GNSS-denied environments, examining what happens when positional certainty disappears and how resilience can be built into the system from the outset.
7.1 – Counter-UAS and the Swarm Threat: From Vulnerability to Survivability
The increasing proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and the lessons emerging from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, have fundamentally altered the relationship between force employment and force protection. Discussions on drone warfare often focus on how unmanned systems enhance reconnaissance, targeting, and strike capabilities. However, this represents only one side of the operational problem. The other, equally important, concerns survivability. If drones increasingly define the modern battlefield, Counter-UAS capabilities increasingly determine who can survive and operate effectively within it.
The widespread availability of low-cost FPV drones, loitering munitions, autonomous systems, and commercially adaptable UAS platforms has transformed aerial surveillance and precision engagement from specialized capabilities into persistent features of the operational environment. Tactical units are now subject to continuous observation, tracking, and potential engagement. In such an environment, the ability to generate combat effects is no longer sufficient. Operational success increasingly depends on the ability to survive and maintain freedom of action within a drone-saturated battlespace.
Recent conflicts have further demonstrated the growing operational relevance of coordinated drone attacks and swarm-like employment of unmanned systems. The challenge is no longer represented by isolated platforms but by multiple systems operating simultaneously, often designed to saturate defensive measures, overwhelm observation and engagement capacities, and significantly reduce available reaction times. Such attacks can generate disproportionate operational and psychological effects, particularly against units operating under constrained conditions.
These challenges are amplified in mountain warfare environments and traditional air defence concepts and centralized protection architectures alone are insufficient. A dedicated platoon, a single technological solution, or a so-called “silver bullet” approach cannot adequately address the complexity of the threat. Centralized systems frequently suffer from reduced coverage, delayed response times, and limited effectiveness across dispersed and compartmentalized terrain.
For this reason, Counter-UAS in mountain warfare must be understood as a distributed, layered, and decentralized capability integrated across the entire force. The battlespace itself imposes this requirement. Survivability begins at the lowest tactical level and does not initially depend on technology. Concealment, dispersion, signature management, camouflage discipline, deception, mobility, and sound fieldcraft remain the most effective and resilient countermeasures against persistent aerial observation. The conflict in Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that survivability increasingly depends on adaptation and movement rather than on static defensive positions. Units that fail to apply these principles expose themselves unnecessarily regardless of the technological systems available to them.
Building upon these passive measures, tactical units require the ability to achieve local situational awareness. In mountainous terrain, drones may appear with little warning due to terrain masking and environmental conditions. Company and platoon-level elements must therefore be capable of detecting, identifying, reporting, and reacting to drone activity independently and under degraded operational conditions. The objective is not to establish full control of the airspace but to avoid tactical surprise and maintain sufficient awareness to preserve operational freedom of action.
At higher tactical levels, the challenge evolves from detection to integration and coordination. Battalion-level formations must combine information from multiple sources, prioritize threats, allocate limited resources, and synchronize responses across dispersed units. Dedicated elements are required to integrate ISR assets, detection systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and available effectors into a coherent defensive framework. At brigade level and above, Counter-UAS becomes an architectural problem requiring the integration of detection networks, electronic warfare, kinetic systems, fires, communications, and airspace management within a common operational framework capable of adapting to both terrain constraints and evolving threats. Workshop activities and experimentation conducted by the MW COE further highlighted the importance of scalable and distributed defensive solutions. Traditional engagement models designed to counter individual aerial threats become increasingly ineffective when confronted by multiple simultaneous drones. This creates a structural mismatch between defensive systems optimized for sequential engagements and adversaries employing massed, low-cost aerial platforms intended to saturate available defences. Addressing this challenge requires low-cost, scalable, and distributed countermeasures capable of responding to multiple threats simultaneously. Particular relevance has been identified for portable Counter-UAS systems, decentralized electronic warfare and jamming capabilities, observation networks, rapid warning procedures, resilient communication systems, low-level airspace coordination measures, and modular defensive architectures deployable at company and platoon level.
Electronic warfare assumes a particularly important role within this framework because it offers the possibility of disrupting multiple unmanned systems simultaneously without relying exclusively on kinetic engagements. Nevertheless, no single capability can provide a complete solution. Effective Counter-UAS requires the integration of passive protection measures, camouflage discipline, deception, low-signature movement procedures, decentralized observation, electronic attack capabilities, kinetic defence systems, and robust command-and-control arrangements.
At the same time, Counter-UAS cannot be separated from UAS employment itself. In many operational contexts, friendly unmanned systems provide the most effective means of countering enemy drones through early warning, detection, tracking, and enhanced situational awareness. This reinforces the understanding that UAS and Counter-UAS are not distinct domains but interconnected components of a single operational ecosystem.
Ultimately, even the most sophisticated architecture remains ineffective without adequately trained personnel. Counter-UAS must therefore be regarded as a force-wide competency rather than a specialized function reserved for a limited number of experts. Every soldier requires a basic understanding of the threat, associated vulnerabilities, and immediate protective measures. Specialized personnel must be capable of operating sensors, managing information flows, and coordinating defensive responses, while units as a whole must integrate Counter-UAS considerations into routine planning, training, and execution. This requirement becomes even more demanding in mountain warfare, where altitude, weather, terrain, and seasonal variations continuously affect both unmanned systems and countermeasures. Capabilities effective in one environment may prove significantly less effective in another, making adaptation, repetition, and realistic training across diverse operational conditions essential prerequisites for maintaining survivability and operational effectiveness in future mountain warfare operations.
7.1.1 Conclusion
Counter-UAS fundamentally changes the logic of survivability. It is no longer sufficient to avoid contact or reduce exposure. Units must operate under the assumption that they are constantly observed and potentially targeted. The question is no longer how to avoid the threat, but how to survive within it.
This requires a shift from centralized solutions to distributed, layered, and terrain-adapted systems, supported by training, discipline, and coordination.
The discussion on Counter-UAS makes clear that survivability depends not only on structure and training, but also on the ability to operate when the electromagnetic environment is degraded or deliberately contested. In practice, many of the assumptions on which unmanned systems depend—location, timing, connectivity, and control—can no longer be treated as stable.
This brings the analysis to one of the most immediate and operationally relevant consequences of electronic warfare: the loss or corruption of GNSS-based navigation. The next section therefore focuses on GPS- and GNSS-denied environments, examining what happens when positional certainty disappears and how resilience can be built into the system from the outset.