7.3 – EW Resilience and Deconfliction: Fighting in a Contested Spectrum. Another technical perspective from our technological partner
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If the previous section establishes that GNSS denial is becoming the norm, this session expands the perspective further. The problem is not GPS. The problem is the spectrum.
What emerges clearly is that modern operations—especially those involving unmanned systems—are fully dependent on the electromagnetic environment. Communications, navigation, control links, data exchange: everything relies on it.
And in mountain warfare, that environment is not only contested. It is inherently unstable.
Electronic warfare is therefore not an additional layer of complexity. It is the environment in which the fight takes place.
7.3.1 A Battlespace Shaped by Terrain and Spectrum
The first key insight is that mountain terrain does not simply complicate operations. It actively shapes the electromagnetic environment.
Line-of-sight is constantly interrupted. Valleys and ridgelines create shadow zones where signals are degraded or completely lost. At the same time, reflections and multipath effects distort signals, affecting both communications and navigation. This has two immediate consequences.
First, connectivity becomes fragmented. Units cannot rely on stable links, and communication must be continuously re-established and adapted.
Second, the effectiveness of electronic warfare is amplified. Even relatively low-power jammers can achieve significant effects when terrain funnels and concentrates signals. In valleys, for example, spoofing and jamming become easier due to reflections and constrained geometry.
The result is a battlespace where disruption is not occasional—it is persistent.
7.3.2 Resilience by Design, Not by Addition
Faced with this reality, the traditional approach—adding protection layers to existing systems—is insufficient. Resilience must be built into the system from the outset.
This applies first to communications. Instead of relying on single links or centralized nodes, systems must adopt distributed and adaptive networking models. Mesh networks, terrain-aware routing, and directional communications allow connectivity to be maintained even when parts of the system are degraded. The concept of “self-healing connectivity” captures this idea well. High-altitude platforms provide line-of-sight and sensing, intermediate relays bridge terrain obstacles, and lower-level systems operate tactically within the environment. Together, they form a network that can adapt dynamically to disruption.
This is not redundancy in the traditional sense. It is adaptability under pressure.
7.3.3 Autonomy as a Requirement, Not an Option
As connectivity becomes less reliable, the role of autonomy increases.
Systems must be able to continue operating even when communication is degraded or lost. This includes the ability to navigate without GNSS, adapt missions in real time, and maintain coordination within a swarm or distributed system.
Autonomy is therefore not about efficiency. It is about mission continuity. The integration of onboard processing, AI-supported decision-making, and real-time detection of electronic interference allows systems to react immediately, rather than waiting for external input.
This becomes particularly relevant in swarm operations.
7.3.4 Swarm Logic and Resilient Systems
Swarm operations introduce a different model of resilience. Instead of relying on the survivability of individual platforms, they rely on the resilience of the system as a whole. If one node is lost or disrupted, others compensate. Data is rerouted, roles are redistributed, and the mission continues. This creates a structure that is inherently difficult to neutralize.
From an EW perspective, this presents a significant challenge. Jamming or disrupting a single link is no longer sufficient. The system adapts, reconfigures, and continues operating. Even partial disruption does not necessarily translate into mission failure.
In mountainous terrain, this is further enhanced by the ability of swarms to occupy different altitudes and positions, effectively filling gaps in coverage and maintaining connectivity across fragmented terrain.
7.3.5 The Hidden Risk: Fratricide and Interference
However, increased use of the spectrum introduces a new and often underestimated risk.
Not all interference is enemy interference. As multiple systems operate simultaneously—drones, artillery, loitering munitions, electronic warfare assets—the battlespace becomes congested. This is particularly evident in what is described as the TRSC environment, where multiple effectors and systems operate concurrently within the same space.
In such conditions, the risk of:
friendly interference
signal overlap
and even fratricide
increases significantly. This is especially critical in mountain warfare, where terrain already fragments the force and limits situational awareness.
7.3.6 Deconfliction as a Core Function
This leads to the final, and perhaps most important, aspect of this session: deconfliction.
Deconfliction is often treated as a procedural requirement. In reality, it becomes a core operational function.
The proposed framework highlights a layered approach. At the lowest level, spectrum management ensures that systems do not interfere with each other. Above this, airspace deconfliction organizes the vertical and horizontal use of space. This is followed by integration with fires and other effectors, ensuring that actions are coordinated rather than conflicting. Finally, identification and safety mechanisms reduce the risk of fratricide.
What is important here is not the structure itself, but the implication. Deconfliction is no longer a staff activity. It is a continuous process that must be understood and applied at multiple levels.
From platoon to company level, commanders must understand who controls what, how the battlespace is organized, and how different systems interact. Without this understanding, increased capability leads to increased risk.
7.3.7 Adapting to the Environment
The session also highlights a number of practical adaptations that reflect this reality. Terrain masking, for example, can be used not only for protection, but also as a way to reduce exposure to electronic warfare. Similarly, last-mile autonomy allows systems to complete missions even when links are disrupted.
At the same time, rapid iteration becomes essential. Procedures, configurations, and tactics must be continuously adjusted based on observed effects. Static solutions quickly become obsolete in a dynamic electromagnetic environment.
7.3.8 Conclusion
Electronic warfare fundamentally reshapes the operational environment.
It affects how systems communicate, how navigate, coordinate and ultimately, whether they can complete their mission.
In mountain warfare, these effects are amplified by terrain, creating a battlespace that is both physically and electromagnetically complex. Survival and effectiveness depend on the same factors: adaptability, redundancy, and autonomy.
At this point, the technical and tactical picture is complete. The workshop has shown that unmanned systems, counter-UAS, navigation resilience, and spectrum management cannot be treated as separate issues. They form a single operational problem that cuts across tactics, command structures, training, and survivability.
The remaining challenge is therefore not analytical, but institutional: how to translate this growing body of operational insight into doctrine, training standards, and force development. The next section addresses precisely that question, examining how battlefield innovation can be captured, validated, and transformed into doctrinal guidance rather than remaining fragmented at local level.
7.3 – EW Resilience and Deconfliction: Fighting in a Contested Spectrum. Another technical perspective from our technological partner
If the previous section establishes that GNSS denial is becoming the norm, this session expands the perspective further. The problem is not GPS. The problem is the spectrum.
What emerges clearly is that modern operations—especially those involving unmanned systems—are fully dependent on the electromagnetic environment. Communications, navigation, control links, data exchange: everything relies on it.
And in mountain warfare, that environment is not only contested. It is inherently unstable.
Electronic warfare is therefore not an additional layer of complexity. It is the environment in which the fight takes place.
7.3.1 A Battlespace Shaped by Terrain and Spectrum
The first key insight is that mountain terrain does not simply complicate operations. It actively shapes the electromagnetic environment.
Line-of-sight is constantly interrupted. Valleys and ridgelines create shadow zones where signals are degraded or completely lost. At the same time, reflections and multipath effects distort signals, affecting both communications and navigation. This has two immediate consequences.
First, connectivity becomes fragmented. Units cannot rely on stable links, and communication must be continuously re-established and adapted.
Second, the effectiveness of electronic warfare is amplified. Even relatively low-power jammers can achieve significant effects when terrain funnels and concentrates signals. In valleys, for example, spoofing and jamming become easier due to reflections and constrained geometry.
The result is a battlespace where disruption is not occasional—it is persistent.
7.3.2 Resilience by Design, Not by Addition
Faced with this reality, the traditional approach—adding protection layers to existing systems—is insufficient. Resilience must be built into the system from the outset.
This applies first to communications. Instead of relying on single links or centralized nodes, systems must adopt distributed and adaptive networking models. Mesh networks, terrain-aware routing, and directional communications allow connectivity to be maintained even when parts of the system are degraded. The concept of “self-healing connectivity” captures this idea well. High-altitude platforms provide line-of-sight and sensing, intermediate relays bridge terrain obstacles, and lower-level systems operate tactically within the environment. Together, they form a network that can adapt dynamically to disruption.
This is not redundancy in the traditional sense. It is adaptability under pressure.
7.3.3 Autonomy as a Requirement, Not an Option
As connectivity becomes less reliable, the role of autonomy increases.
Systems must be able to continue operating even when communication is degraded or lost. This includes the ability to navigate without GNSS, adapt missions in real time, and maintain coordination within a swarm or distributed system.
Autonomy is therefore not about efficiency. It is about mission continuity. The integration of onboard processing, AI-supported decision-making, and real-time detection of electronic interference allows systems to react immediately, rather than waiting for external input.
This becomes particularly relevant in swarm operations.
7.3.4 Swarm Logic and Resilient Systems
Swarm operations introduce a different model of resilience. Instead of relying on the survivability of individual platforms, they rely on the resilience of the system as a whole. If one node is lost or disrupted, others compensate. Data is rerouted, roles are redistributed, and the mission continues. This creates a structure that is inherently difficult to neutralize.
From an EW perspective, this presents a significant challenge. Jamming or disrupting a single link is no longer sufficient. The system adapts, reconfigures, and continues operating. Even partial disruption does not necessarily translate into mission failure.
In mountainous terrain, this is further enhanced by the ability of swarms to occupy different altitudes and positions, effectively filling gaps in coverage and maintaining connectivity across fragmented terrain.
7.3.5 The Hidden Risk: Fratricide and Interference
However, increased use of the spectrum introduces a new and often underestimated risk.
Not all interference is enemy interference. As multiple systems operate simultaneously—drones, artillery, loitering munitions, electronic warfare assets—the battlespace becomes congested. This is particularly evident in what is described as the TRSC environment, where multiple effectors and systems operate concurrently within the same space.
In such conditions, the risk of:
increases significantly. This is especially critical in mountain warfare, where terrain already fragments the force and limits situational awareness.
7.3.6 Deconfliction as a Core Function
This leads to the final, and perhaps most important, aspect of this session: deconfliction.
Deconfliction is often treated as a procedural requirement. In reality, it becomes a core operational function.
The proposed framework highlights a layered approach. At the lowest level, spectrum management ensures that systems do not interfere with each other. Above this, airspace deconfliction organizes the vertical and horizontal use of space. This is followed by integration with fires and other effectors, ensuring that actions are coordinated rather than conflicting. Finally, identification and safety mechanisms reduce the risk of fratricide.
What is important here is not the structure itself, but the implication. Deconfliction is no longer a staff activity. It is a continuous process that must be understood and applied at multiple levels.
From platoon to company level, commanders must understand who controls what, how the battlespace is organized, and how different systems interact. Without this understanding, increased capability leads to increased risk.
7.3.7 Adapting to the Environment
The session also highlights a number of practical adaptations that reflect this reality. Terrain masking, for example, can be used not only for protection, but also as a way to reduce exposure to electronic warfare. Similarly, last-mile autonomy allows systems to complete missions even when links are disrupted.
At the same time, rapid iteration becomes essential. Procedures, configurations, and tactics must be continuously adjusted based on observed effects. Static solutions quickly become obsolete in a dynamic electromagnetic environment.
7.3.8 Conclusion
Electronic warfare fundamentally reshapes the operational environment.
It affects how systems communicate, how navigate, coordinate and ultimately, whether they can complete their mission.
In mountain warfare, these effects are amplified by terrain, creating a battlespace that is both physically and electromagnetically complex. Survival and effectiveness depend on the same factors: adaptability, redundancy, and autonomy.
At this point, the technical and tactical picture is complete. The workshop has shown that unmanned systems, counter-UAS, navigation resilience, and spectrum management cannot be treated as separate issues. They form a single operational problem that cuts across tactics, command structures, training, and survivability.
The remaining challenge is therefore not analytical, but institutional: how to translate this growing body of operational insight into doctrine, training standards, and force development. The next section addresses precisely that question, examining how battlefield innovation can be captured, validated, and transformed into doctrinal guidance rather than remaining fragmented at local level.